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 1 introduction and acknowledgements 
Introduction and Acknowledgements 
This report offers the story of the Surdna Foundation’s Initiative on Smart Growth, 
which took place in Utah, New Mexico, Maryland, and New Jersey from 1998 to 2003. It 
provides background on the evolution of the Foundation’s Environment program and 
how that led to the formation of the Initiative, as well as how the Initiative was launched 
and carried out. It explores what the Foundation’s assumptions were about the 
structure of the Initiative itself, its benefits to grantees and the field, the kind of 
outcomes grantee work was seeking to effect, and priority strategies for achieving these 
outcomes. It provides detailed case studies of what happened in each of the four states, 
both within and beyond the scope of the Surdna grants. Finally, it reflects on the 
Foundation’s process and assumptions and the case studies and lays out lessons learned. 
This text is intended primarily for a philanthropic audience: specifically those with 
interest in issues of smart growth and livable communities who may be able to draw 
ideas from what the Surdna Foundation did, why, and what it learned. It should also 
be useful for the organizations described herein who may wish to share the report 
with potential funders to provide an independent perspective on their work as well as 
context and examples. At the same time, anyone who is interested in tools and 
approaches for promoting smart growth should find the case studies and lessons 
learned useful. 
The monograph is co-authored by Julia Parzen, independent consultant, and 
Hooper Brooks, Program Director for Environment of the Surdna Foundation. It is 
based upon primary documents such as grant proposals, grant reports, and Surdna 
Foundation meeting notes; secondary research on the four states; and selected follow 
up interviews with grantees. Surdna Foundation grantees provided invaluable assis-
tance by reviewing and commenting on drafts of the monograph. Special thanks and 
recognition go to Alison Van Gorp for providing much of the content for “The Utah 
Story” through her Master’s Project at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies. We would also like to recognize and thank Dick Mark, whose three-year 
assessment of the Initiative provided useful background for the case studies and many 
of the ideas for the “Lessons Learned” portion of the monograph. 
The content of the monograph is structured according to the following sections: 
Context: provides background on the Surdna Foundation and its transporta-
tion and smart growth work. It also reflects on Surdna’s definition of smart 
growth. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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The Surdna Foundation Story: describes the Surdna Foundation’s goals, 
strategy, assumptions, and questions going into the Smart Growth Initiative 
and contrasts them against what actually happened. 
The Four State Stories: contains stories from each of the four states, includ-
ing the context, the roles and goals of Surdna Foundation grantees, and what 
actually happened. 
Lessons Learned: reviews the common lessons, elements, and themes from 
the case studies, both for philanthropy and smart growth strategy. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Context 
Surdna is a family foundation that was established in 1917. It has grant programs in 
five areas: Environment, Community Revitalization, Effective Citizenry, Arts, and 
Nonprofit Sector Support. Total annual Foundation grants currently average approx-
imately $30 million. Since 1990, the Environment program has had one grant theme 
focused on formulating and implementing new policy for the linked goals of trans-
portation and land use reform, namely, smart growth. In collaboration with other 
funders, the Surdna Foundation has played a leading role on smart growth in the 
foundation community and fostered significant results in the field. 
Around 1990, Surdna started helping to create the institutions and shape the 
strategies leading to the visionary federal transportation law, the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Enhancement Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and its successor, the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21).1 These laws and the advocacy 
for implementation that followed their enactment have made it possible for 
communities to use federal transportation dollars for a broader range of investments 
than highway augmentation, and to plan for how transportation can help to establish 
livable communities. 
In the mid-1990s, as public and political awareness and concern about the envi-
ronmental, social, and economic impacts of sprawl began to grow, the Surdna 
Foundation began to complement its transportation grants with support for policy 
development and advocacy for smart growth.The Surdna Foundation’s transporta-
tion funding focused heavily on change at the top, especially federal spending and 
policy. It complemented this with a few strategically selected local, regional, and state 
advocacy campaigns to mobilize the grassroots and local communities to demand 
implementation of the new federal policy and use it as leverage for local policy and 
funding reform. 
When it came to smart growth, Surdna concluded that the frontlines for 
action should be at the state and local levels. 
1 The Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) 
was the successor bill to the 
Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act, 
which revolutionized the fed-
eral government’s approach to 
expanding and maintaining 
the nation’s network of high-
ways, transit systems, and 
ancillary facilities. Passed in 
1998, TEA-21 included comple-
tion of the Interstate Highway 
System; improved air quality 
in the nation’s cities; greater 
integration of road, rail, tran-
sit, marine, and air transporta-
tion; and many other accom-
plishments. 
The Foundation’s ultimate goal was to blaze a trail for smart growth across the coun-
try. However, in the absence of an overarching national legal framework for land use, 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Smart Growth America’s defini-
tion of smart growth is the 
consensus product of multiple 
organizations representing the 
different perspectives of a 
diverse coalition and diverse 
regions. It defines smart 
growth “according to its out-
comes – outcomes that mirror 
the basic values of most 
Americans. Smart growth is 
growth that helps to achieve . . . 
six goals”: neighborhood liv-
ability; better access; less traf-
fic; thriving cities, suburbs and 
towns; shared benefits; lower 
costs, lower taxes; keeping 
open space open. Each of the 
goals is followed by paragraph 
descriptions carefully crafted to 
cover what the goals would 
entail. 
Surdna saw state mechanisms such as state zoning enabling legislation, statewide 
growth management legislation, and incentive programs for smart growth, as front-
line tools. Reform of land use and environmental laws at the local level also played a 
role in the Foundation’s strategy. 
The Surdna Foundation has no single definition of smart growth. Since the 
Foundation funds different kinds of smart growth groups and projects, ranging from 
Smart Growth America to select local campaigns throughout the domestic United 
States, identifying a single set of universally shared criteria is an elusive goal. 
For example, Smart Growth America’s definition of smart growth is the consensus 
product of multiple organizations representing the different perspectives of a diverse 
coalition and diverse regions. It defines smart growth “according to its outcomes – 
outcomes that mirror the basic values of most Americans. Smart growth is growth 
that helps to achieve . . . six goals:” neighborhood livability; better access; less traffic; 
thriving cities, suburbs and towns; shared benefits; lower costs, lower taxes; keeping 
open space open. Each of the goals is followed by a paragraph that carefully details 
what the goals entail. This is a good springboard for a national coalition – it should 
help to begin to move multiple players in the right direction. To be useful in specific 
cases, however, there should be a more detailed vision of a desired settlement pattern 
with specific measurements of progress – and as public awareness and political will 
evolve towards acceptance of the need for smarter growth, the vision should become 
increasingly focused. 
There are many definitions, each crafted to suit the politics, positioning, and tim-
ing of the defining group or individual. Therefore, it is not the specific definition that 
matters as much as the process by which the definition is developed and refined, and 
how its meaning evolves over time. Surdna strives to understand the baseline condi-
tions at any given place and then looks for increasing clarity over time – about the 
important levers in the systems that affect growth, about vision, about goals and 
about metrics. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
  
 
5 the surdna foundation story 
The Surdna Foundation Story 
design of the surdna initiative for smart growth and
livable communities 
In May of 1999, the Surdna Foundation’s staff and its Board Environment Committee 
began to explore a special grant-making focus on smart growth and development of 
livable communities. At the time, there were not many success stories. The progress 
made with land use zoning in Portland, Oregon was somewhat prominent, but groups 
in other parts of the country found it hard to relate to or replicate what was happen-
ing there. Nor was the Portland the only model for smart growth – there was much 
room to develop creative alternatives. 
The Surdna Foundation team decided that the Foundation should help to foster a 
range of good examples in different geographic and organizational contexts. As a part 
of this, the Foundation sought places where strategic support of organizations and 
development of innovative strategies could yield significant results in a discreet time-
frame. The results, important on their own, could also provide inspiration for the 
dozens of other efforts around the country. 
To assist the selection process, the Surdna Foundation engaged the research division 
of the American Planning Association to develop selection criteria and survey the 
opportunities. The Surdna team also spoke with knowledgeable colleagues. The 
American Planning Association provided the Foundation with community and organ-
ization profiles for seventeen states and regions, and in-depth research and analysis on 
what it considered to be the five most promising places. The Foundation used this 
research, in addition to input from the foundation’s staff, Board, and colleagues, to 
select the focus states for the Initiative. 
Acknowledging the complexity of addressing smart growth and the long 
timeframes usually needed to achieve significant results, the Surdna Foundation chose 
places where there seemed to be momentum for change. The selection criteria 
included: 
a receptive local population; 
receptive government; 
strong leadership in the business, government, or nonprofit sectors; 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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6 livability and smart growth 
strong nonprofit organizational capacity in the region; 
potential local, regional, or national funding partners; 
a generally shared sense that valuable assets were at risk; and 
approaches to smart growth that would seem replicable to other states. [m2]  
The Surdna team recognized that not all criteria would be met in every place – 
rather, they were helpful indicators of potential. The case studies that follow include 
details on meeting these standards. 
The Surdna staff and Board Committee for the Environment Program recom-
mended that the Foundation support smart growth efforts at the state level in four 
states: New Mexico, New Jersey, Utah, and Maryland. 
Once the board gave its approval of the identified areas, the Surdna staff spent sev-
eral additional months learning about key organizations, issues, and players in each 
location. At the May 1999 Surdna board meeting, this team recommended that the 
board allocate $500,000 to get the ball rolling with the understanding that a final 
detailed set of proposals would be reviewed by the Environment Committee before 
the end of the fiscal year, (June 1999). The plan was for Surdna to invest about $1 mil-
lion per year for three to five years in order to achieve a set of specific goals in each 
place. These investments were also intended to leverage dollars from other funders and 
support linkage and mutual learning between the four sites and collaborative dissem-
ination of the results of the Surdna Foundation’s Smart Growth and Community 
Livability Initiative. 
The initial round of grants went to lead organizations in three of the four states: 
New Jersey Future in New Jersey, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation in Maryland, and 
1000 Friends of New Mexico in New Mexico. This preliminary funding was to allow 
these organizations to convene other groups to map out long-term strategies and 
broader packages of potential grants. Surdna participated closely in this process. In 
Utah, Envision Utah offered a fairly complete package by itself, so the initial conven-
ing phase was bypassed. 
The Surdna Foundation’s philosophy was to emphasize “learning by doing.” 
Therefore, rather than undertaking a lengthy internal foundation process of addition-
al data-gathering, convening, and study, the Surdna team worked with practitioners in 
each state to determine the best grant-making strategies for each state. Surdna’s initial 
investment of $500,000 was relatively small once it had been distributed across the 
four projects. The Foundation staff decided that more could be accomplished faster by 
putting these dollars to work in the field immediately, then adjusting strategies and 
grant targets along the way as needed. 
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7 the surdna foundation story 
thinking behind the initiative: assumptions and theory 
Assumptions 
Surdna made several key assumptions in the framing of these grants as a part of the 
Smart Growth and Community Livability Initiative: 
The American Planning Association selection criteria would be a reliable tool 
for identifying the most promising opportunities. 
The Initiative framework would create greater value for the field of smart 
growth than the alternative of investing the same dollars over the same time 
period without geographic targeting, clustering, or convening. 
Surdna, by strategically providing support and opportunities for cross-learn-
ing, would help organizations to accelerate activity and develop innovative 
strategies in a shorter timeframe. 
Grantee organizations and individual players would also be strengthened by 
the shared learning process, consulting support, and workshops. 
Lead organizations in each location were the best suited to convene other 
groups and develop, in collaboration with Surdna, a strategic analysis that 
would lead to a sound long-range grant strategy. 
The outcomes would be important in and of themselves, but would also pro-
vide inspiration for other efforts around the country. 
A basic set of progress indicators would be developed in collaboration with 
grantees to help Surdna track the work, to help the participants assess and 
adjust strategies for  effectiveness, and to help both in describing results. 
Outcomes and Theory of Change 
Surdna also approached the work with a range of general ideas about what good short-
term and long-term smart growth outcomes might be and what combination of 
strategies, tools, and players would be best for achieving these outcomes. 
Short-term outcomes were anticipated in two contexts: 
1. Increased capacity of grantee organizations 
at the individual level with the emergence of leaders in the field; 
at the organizational level with development of skills and 
improved management; and 
at the field level with establishment of coalitions, expansion of net-
works, development of communications strategies. 
2. Changes in the public and/or private sector that would be levers for 
broader change such as: 
improved government or private investment plans; 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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new economic incentives; 
increased community participation; 
engagement of under-represented groups; 
a widely accepted vision, plan, or implementation strategy for 
each area; 
significant, positive changes in policy (e.g. rules and incentives); 
compelling pilot projects. 
Long-term outcomes were more difficult to project. These would include such 
things as: 
wide-spread changes in behavior of elected officials, developers, the general 
public; 
broad and lasting changes in investment of public and private dollars; 
extensive changes in the patterns of land use; 
protection of key natural resources; and 
development of significant indicators of community livability. 
Surdna did not develop a rigid initial “theory of how things would be changed.” 
Nor did it define what strategies, tools, and players should be deployed in each place. 
As the case studies demonstrate, much depended on the unique conditions of each 
location and the judgments of the practitioner communities. As such, Surdna 
approached the Initiative with general principles such as the importance of regional 
perspectives and the need for smart growth to be equitable growth. 
The Surdna team did not think that regional outcomes necessarily required a 
regional approach from the outset, or that there would be a one-size-fits-all way to 
incorporate equity. It thought in terms of a kit of parts that would be applied in dif-
ferent sequences and combinations in different places. This kit would include such 
things as: 
broad, diverse coalitions to push for and sustain change; 
engagement of key stakeholders such as businesses and faith-based organiza-
tions; 
the use of decision support tools; 
the power of data and analysis to impel and instruct change; 
the value of accountability mechanisms to track and adjust progress and keep 
others informed; and  
the use of state-of-the-art communications techniques. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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implementation of the smart growth initiative 
The Initiative was ultimately funded at approximately $1 million per year for five years, 
for a total of $5 million to be spent across the four states between May 1999 and May 
2004. In addition to grants, the Surdna Foundation invested staff time and some addi-
tional dollars in: leveraging grants, creating a process for learning and improvement, and 
developing a set of lessons learned. 
Leveraging Grants 
Although limits on staff time and resources prevented an intensive level of collabora-
tion, Surdna staff did work with its grantees to engage other local and national fun-
ders. In New Jersey, Surdna joined formally and informally with other New Jersey fun-
ders to develop a clearer sense of ongoing strategies, gaps in strategies, and funding 
needs. In Utah, Surdna staff and Dick Mark, on behalf of the Surdna Foundation, 
worked closely with staff from the Hewlett Foundation in support of Envision Utah. 
This collaborative effort included a joint site visit. The Foundation also held numer-
ous one-on-one discussions with other funders regarding Maryland (especially 
Baltimore) and New Mexico. Other funders occasionally attended the Initiative meet-
ings as well. 
The Surdna Foundation believes that by bringing new resources to the table and 
committing to a five-year engagement, its support not only helped to accelerate capac-
ity building, but also helped to leverage other funding support: 
It helped New Jersey Future to stabilize its organization by attracting new 
support from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation and an increase in 
annual funding from the William Penn Foundation. As a result, New Jersey 
Future was able to take on multi-year demographic, economic, and commu-
nications research. It was also able to formulate long-term policies, and it still 
had the flexible funding needed to create and seize opportunities for progress 
during Governor McGreevey’s administration. 
Isles, another New Jersey non-profit organization, credits Surdna with allow-
ing it to launch its urban-suburban regional equity coalition building 
process. At a time when it was difficult for Isles to attract support from tradi-
tional community development funders for this work, its plans were a good 
fit with the interests of the Surdna Foundation. 
It enabled the Baltimore Regional Partnership and Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation to expand and play an important roles in the Vision 2030 process. 
Strong public response to the Vision laid the groundwork for a subsequent 
series of events leading to the creation of the Baltimore Transit Alliance, 
which has attracted $250,000 in local funding support. 
It helped Envision Utah to match an Eccles Foundation challenge grant and 
keep its core program going as it ramped up with a special exit grant from the 
Hewlett Foundation (a one-time-only $3 million grant). Envision Utah’s suc-
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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cess is directly related to the high level of funding it has sustained over many 
years. Envision Utah was able to work with and train a large share of Salt Lake 
City public and private leaders because of its success in raising funds for this 
purpose. 
According to 1000 Friends of New Mexico, without Surdna support, the cre-
ation of the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future would not have been 
possible for several years and the opportunity to encourage debate about 
smart growth issues during the 2003 elections would have been missed. 
At the outset, Surdna’s plan was to exit or diminish funding for grantees after five 
years. The premise for this was that by that time the grantees would have had cultivat-
ed other, potentially large, funding sources and that the Initiative would have fostered 
broader awareness in the funding community of smart growth work. In at least two 
cases, shifts in the priorities of anticipated future funders and the overall downturn in 
foundation grant budgets, tracking the economy, meant that long-term funding plans 
were set back. This has been felt most keenly in New Mexico and Utah, but has gener-
ally required programmatic and organizational belt tightening across the board. These 
are the kinds of changes that make the design of successful exit strategies for programs 
such as the Smart Growth Initiatives a major challenge. However, the Surdna 
Foundation was clear about the timeframe from the outset, so the organizations 
involved were not surprised. 
Creating a Process for Learning and Improvement 
In keeping with its “learn by doing” philosophy, the Foundation convened four meet-
ings of Initiative grantees – one in each of the Initiative locations – between February 
2000 and October 2002. At each meeting, the host state’s grantees arranged for inform-
ative and provocative site visits and guest speakers to educate the group on relevant 
local issues and projects. Each meeting also included presentations and updates on 
grantee work and on smart growth progress in each location, which was followed by 
constructive group commentary. Surdna also hosted workshops to bring forward 
important ideas and resources. These provided a venue for experts to speak on topics 
that could improve grantee work such as decision support tools, list enhancement 
techniques, and systems thinking. In June 2004, the Initiative grantees came together 
again for a fifth meeting to share their progress and lessons learned. 
The five Initiative meetings helped to build relationships among the grantees and 
resulted in shared learning. In addition to leaders of grantee organizations, the 
Initiative meetings included other staff members of these organizations, local elected 
officials, business leaders, and board members from the grantee organizations and the 
Surdna Foundation. Over time the grantees began to consult their colleagues in other 
states on questions and concerns related to their projects. They were also encouraged 
to critique each other’s work, identifying strengths and weaknesses based on their own 
experiences. 
During this time, Surdna also engaged Dick Mark, director of Environmental 
Media Services and co-founder of the Buttonwood Partnership, as an outside expert 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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to work with grantees to enrich the learning process. Mr. Mark helped the Surdna 
Foundation grantees to develop or enhance their measures of progress. The hope was 
that this work would lead to a simple set of generic indicators that would provide com-
parability and a common vocabulary, and be a tool to help Surdna, its grantees, and 
others (e.g., funders and the public) to communicate on smart growth. However, 
benchmarking and indicators were completely new to most grantees. The general feel-
ing among participants was that it would take more time and resources to get their 
heads around quality work on indicators than they had, so there was little enthusiasm 
for taking it on. Grantees felt it was sufficient to develop progress measures for their 
own organizations without working on comparability of measures. While it proved to 
be too difficult to compare work and progress between sites and organizations, 
through this exercise grantees still came to better understand the importance of meas-
urement. As a result, they developed measures of progress for several years of the 
Initiative. 
Dick Mark also provided direct advice to Surdna regarding technical assistance 
needs of grantees, organizational and policy challenges to success, dissemination of 
Initiative findings, and opportunities for staff intervention or participation with 
grantees on other issues. He interviewed leaders in each of the four states and pro-
duced a “snapshot” assessment of the grantees’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategies. 
His assessment was edited for public consumption and circulated to all Initiative 
grantees. While this kind of analysis can raise sensitivities and is not always fully 
accepted, the grantees generally considered it constructive. 
The Surdna Foundation also facilitated the sharing of tools and practices between 
grantees. For example, after learning about the Envision Utah visioning process 
through the Surdna Initiative, the Baltimore Regional Partnership decided that this 
method offered possibilities for the Baltimore 2030 vision plan process. As a result, 
Envision Utah’s executive director met with the Baltimore Regional Partnership and 
Maryland government officials just prior to the Maryland Initiative meeting. The 
Surdna Foundation covered the additional travel expenses. 
While a complete accounting of all non-grant expenses for the Initiative has not 
been prepared, Surdna estimates that it spent between $150,000 and $200,000 on 
additional meeting costs (travel, lodging, meals, meeting space), Surdna staff time, 
consultants, and report preparations. 
Lessons for the Field  
Throughout the process, the Foundation staff kept track of findings and insights that 
could be helpful to other funders and the field. Some of this information has already 
been disseminated through a Funders’ Network on Smart Growth email publication 
and by selected distribution of Dick Mark’s report. This monograph represents the 
final step in the Surdna Foundation’s effort to share its lessons with the field. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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The Utah Story: Bottom Up in a 
Conservative State 
A Case Study of Providing the Table Where All 
Parties are Welcome 
“There are not many places like Portland. There are many more like Salt Lake City.” 
— Keith Bartholomew, attorney, 1000 Friends of Oregon 
context3 
Utah is the sixth most urban state in the nation, with 88 percent of its population liv- 3 Much of the context for this 
section, including most of the ing in urban areas as of the 2000 census. Utah’s population is largely middle class, with 
demographic statistics, is 
a higher-than-average percentage of school-age children and elderly than other states. based on an analysis of
Utah is a strongly Republican state. In 2003, the governor, both US senators, two of Envision Utah conducted by 
three US representatives, 56 of 75 state representatives, and 22 of 29 state senators were Alison Van Gorp as her 
Master’s Project at the Yale Republicans. Seventy-five percent of Utah’s land is publicly owned. School of Forestry & 
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are a strong political Environmental Studies. 
force in Utah. Ninety percent of the Utah state legislature are members, as are all of the 
judges on the state supreme court, and the entire Salt Lake City council. Church mem-
bers are generally Republicans, with 69 percent reporting GOP affiliation compared to 
57 percent of Utahans as a whole. Latter-
Day Saints voters generally have a higher 
voter turnout than those not affiliated with 
the Church. Because Latter-Day Saints 
membership is so prevalent, there is cohe-
siveness to local beliefs, emphasizing family 
values (Van Gorp 2003). 
The Greater Wasatch Area is home to 
four out of five Utah residents. This is a 
narrow 100 mile-long corridor that stretch-
es north and south of Salt Lake City. The 
mountainous topography of the greater 
A view of the shoreline along the Great Salt
Lake, which Envision Utah has sought to protect
through three Quality Growth Demonstration
Projects. 
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4 Thompson, Kristin. Engaging 
Citizens: Public Consultation 
and Participation in Urban 
Transportation Planning and 
Project Approval and 
Implementation. A Report 
Prepared for the ECMT-OECD 
Workshop on Overcoming 
Institutional Barriers to 
Implementing Sustainable 
Urban Travel Policies. Palacio 
de Congresos, Madrid, Spain. 
13-14 December 2000. 
Available at http://www1. 
oecd.org/cem/UrbTrav/Works 
hops/InstBarriers/Thompson. 
pdf. (Accessed 19 November 
2003). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Much of this story was 
adapted from the History of 
Envision Utah found on the 
Envision Utah website. 
Wasatch area provides a natural growth boundary. It is composed of 10 counties, 91 
cities, and 157 special service districts, each of which has its own authority over land 
use decisions. 
Utah was one of the fastest growing states in the nation during the 1990s, and 80 
percent of Utah’s future growth is projected to take place in the Greater Wasatch Area. 
Nearly three-fourths of this growth will be internally generated, comprised of the chil-
dren and grandchildren of current residents.4 The Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Budget estimates that the area will add one million new residents between 1995 and 
2020, pushing the population of 2.7 million.5 
Utah politics strongly favor local control. Any infringement into a local commu-
nity’s ability to make its own decisions about land use would not be tolerated. Thus, 
while Utah has a history of comprehensive planning laws dating back to the 1920s, 
voters rejected a referendum on land-use planning in the early 1970s. Mike Leavitt, 
who was governor at the outset of the Surdna Initiative, was not interested in state 
land use legislation but supported the concept of quality growth, as have his succes-
sors Olene Walker and Jon Huntsman, Jr. 
roles of the surdna foundation’s grantees 
Envision Utah was the Surdna Foundation’s only grantee in Utah. To understand the 
Envision Utah case study, it is helpful to know some of the history of Envision Utah 
and its parent organization, the Coalition for Utah’s Future.6 
The Coalition for Utah’s Future was established in the mid-1980s. Within a few 
years it had established its credibility in Utah as a community problem-solving 
organization. It had engaged key constituencies, including religious leaders, business 
leaders, ranchers, local officials, and nonprofit leaders, to work together on a variety of 
crucial problems, from childcare to transportation. 
In 1995, the Coalition’s Board formed the Quality Growth Steering Committee, a 
special committee to research how rapid population growth in the state might impact 
quality of life. This Committee included business leaders, the Governor’s Office of 
Planning and Budget, Utah’s largest residential developer, state legislators, urban plan-
ning advocates, and local government officials. 
Robert Grow, a prominent Salt Lake businessman, emerged as the leader of the 
Committee. Under Grow’s leadership, the Committee studied the problems 
associated with Utah’s rapid growth, and how to address them. In 1995, the 
Committee commissioned a public opinion poll aimed at pinpointing the issues 
of greatest concern to Utah residents. The poll showed that Utahans were so 
anxious about future growth that growth ranked above crime, safety, and other 
issues in the survey. 
The Committee began to look for models being employed in other states to address 
growth issues that might be tailored to fit Utah’s unique circumstance. One program 
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considered was Portland Oregon’s Metro 2040 process, which created regional goals 
and objectives to guide future growth. Another example was the Denver Regional 
Council of Governments’ Metro Vision 2020 Framework, which was adopted in 
Colorado in 1995. 
The Coalition approached Governor Mike Leavitt to ask him to form a committee 
to coordinate discussion of future growth challenges. The governor refused, as he felt 
this was a topic better managed by local jurisdictions. However, he did establish a sub-
cabinet group within the state government to study the issue of future growth. The 
group was comprised of representatives from the state Department of Transportation, 
the Department of Environmental Quality, the Department of Community and 
Economic Development, the Department of Natural Resources, and others. This 
group’s major recommendation was that the state should hold a high profile “summit” 
to discuss growth-related issues. 
The Growth Summit took place in November 1995. The event was well publicized 
by the media and well attended by members of the state legislature. It focused on open 
space preservation and transportation, which were of particular interest to the public 
due to the impending reconstruction of Interstate 15, the main corridor through the 
state. The Summit was broadcast live on all four affiliates of the major networks. While 
television ratings of the event were low, it did raise awareness of the issues. 
The Coalition for Utah’s Future used the momentum from the Summit and the 
findings of its research to reach out to state agencies and legislators about the need for 
and the potential cost savings of a better approach to growth. The State Planning 
Coordinator, in particular, was impressed with the potential of geographic informa-
tion system data gathering and modeling to aid better understanding of the impacts 
and costs of growth trends. During the next legislative session, the legislature appro-
priated $250,000 for “quality growth efficiency tools” to help regions and the state 
understand the implication of growth trends.7 
The Growth Steering Committee then set out to build a public-private partnership 
of local and state officials and community, business, and civic leaders. The Committee 
opted to focus its efforts on the Greater Wasatch Area since 80 percent of Utah’s future 
growth was projected to take place in that 100-mile long corridor. In preparation, the 
Committee interviewed approximately 150 community leaders including religious 
leaders, educators, business leaders, environmentalists, developers, mayors, city coun-
cil members, legislators, utility companies, and minority and civic leaders. These inter-
views were critical both in helping the Committee decide how to proceed and in build-
ing support for a process to address growth issues. 
As part of its stakeholder interviews, the Coalition for Utah’s Future identified 
names of potential members for the partnership. Rather than inviting the usual cast of 
characters to participate, the Coalition identified stakeholders who had power to effect 
change from each of the cities and towns within the Greater Wasatch Area. Each 
prospective member was asked to bring expertise to the group and to sign a pledge to 
overlook individual interests. The Coalition invited over 100 people to join the new 
partnership and only one person declined. 
Envision Utah was formally launched in January 1997 at a press conference and 
7 In subsequent years, it appro-
priated an additional 
$100,000 per year, with total 
appropriations reaching 
$550,000 by 1999. 
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Although Envision Utah was 
the Surdna Foundation’s only 
Utah-based smart growth 
grantee, it is worth noting 
that there are a number of 
other nonprofit organizations 
working on smart growth in 
that state, including local 
chapters of national environ-
mental organizations such as 
the Sierra Club and various 
transit and housing advocacy 
organizations. 
partnership meeting. Its mission was to help the residents of the Greater Wasatch Area 
to find a way to deal effectively with the growth-related challenges facing the region while 
preserving Utah’s high quality of life for future generations. The coalition’s supporters 
took every opportunity to build relationships with local media, and several key mem-
bers of the media served as partners or special advisors to the group, so by the time 
Envision Utah was launched, most news organizations were aware of it.8 
Local government support was particularly critical to the success of Envision 
Utah. Therefore, in addition to including local government officials as formal 
partners, the group made a point of engaging a range of local officials, including 
all area mayors, throughout the process  – inviting them to meetings, seeking 
their input, and requesting their support for public meetings. 
Envision Utah’s initial funding included investments from foundations, in-kind 
support from the state, and funding from local governments in the study area based 
on their size and population. 
case study 
A primary goal of Envision Utah was to 
engage all of the leaders and residents of 
the region in a process to consider what 
would define “quality growth” for the 
region. The group began with a survey 
to identify the values of people in the 
region and the strategy that they pre-
ferred for addressing growth issues. The 
poll showed that residents valued the 
peace of mind they felt living among 
people with common senses of honesty, 
morality, and ethics. Family ranked as a top concern, and because of this respondents 
indicated that they cared deeply about the quality of life for the next generation, which 
they wanted to stay in the region. When asked who could best deal with growth issues 
in Utah, 
42 percent of those surveyed responded that residents were charged with this 
task; 
20 percent thought the state government should handle it; 
18 percent indicated that local governments should assume this responsibility; 
and 
14 percent considered Utah businesses best equipped to assume control. 
In 1999, Stephen Holbrook, Envision Utah Executive
Director, speaks with Michael Leavitt, Utah
Governor (1992 – 2003), and Jon Huntsman, Jr., the
current Utah governor. Both governors served as
Honorary Co-Chairs of Envision Utah. 
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From this, Envision Utah concluded that it needed a process that would engage res-
idents and draw upon the skills of both public and private leaders. 
Envision Utah’s next step was to use modeling and mapping to project the area’s 
land use over the next 25 years under current conditions, and under several alternative 
scenarios. The baseline data were released to the public first –  Envision Utah wanted 
people to be aware of where their region was headed if conditions did not change. The 
governor announced publicly that the state could not afford the projected costs of the 
infrastructure required for this scenario. At this and every stage of Envision Utah’s 
process, media partners, who were invited to all meetings and kept informed of every 
step, provided coverage that kept residents informed. 
Envision Utah hired Calthorpe Associates, a consulting firm with experience in 
regional planning. Calthorpe Associates developed a series of workshops to engage 
local leaders in choosing alternative development scenarios. The first workshop 
focused on the question of “Where Shall We Grow?” The second workshop took place 
a month later and focused on the question of “How Shall we Grow?” Envision Utah 
invited its 100 partners and special advisors, as well as every mayor and city planner in 
the Greater Wasatch Area to these events. More than 200 people participated. 
At both workshops, small breakout groups were given maps and paper chips to 
identify areas that should be designated as open space and areas acceptable for 
development. At the second workshop, the same small groups chose among stan-
dard forms of development and alternatives that included walkable, mixed-use 
developments of different densities. The resulting maps showed a preference for 
higher density walkable developments, especially along transit corridors (Van 
Gorp 2003). 
Utah residents participate in regional mapping work-
shops. More than 2090 community workshops have
been held to look at housing, transportation, trails,
open land, and employment choices. 
Envision Utah also held 15 Regional Design Workshops in communities throughout 
the Area to engage the broader public as well as seven Community Options 
Workshops. Together, these events attracted over 1000 residents. At the Community 
Options Workshops, residents were able to choose between development types 
through a visualization survey format. 
Participants preferred the more walk-
able environments, and design seemed 
to matter more to participants than 
density. 
Envision Utah combined the 
results of the various workshops into 
four scenarios for future growth, 
which represented varying levels of 
dispersion of housing and investment 
in public transit. The Quality Growth 
Efficiency Tools funded by the legisla-
ture were employed: the group used a 
modeling process similar to that of the 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
 18 livability and smart growth 
baseline study to project out the pattern of growth under each of the scenarios. This 
modeling also analyzed the costs and benefits of each scenario in terms of vehicle miles 
traveled, water consumption, and infrastructure costs. The disparity in the impacts of 
each was dramatic when they were projected out 20 years. 
Once the four scenarios were developed, Envision Utah launched a widespread 
media campaign in January 1999 to educate residents about their efforts and to get 
them involved in the decision-making process. The group planned this media campaign 
for over a year. Its leaders felt that their success depended on engaging the public. The 
group held a press conference announcing the four scenarios and offered a press tour 
for the managers, editors, and reporters of the largest newspapers and television sta-
tions. It placed local television and radio advertisements worth over $200,000, of which 
$140,000 was donated, asking people to look for an upcoming newspaper insert. 
The newspaper insert contained overviews of the four scenarios and a qualitative 
description of their impacts. It also contained a mail-back survey that asked 
respondents to rank the scenarios and to indicate what they felt was the most 
significant challenge currently facing the region. Governor Leavitt and several local 
celebrities appeared in commercials alongside local children urging residents to get 
involved. A Public Broadcast Station documentary on the region’s growth issues, 
which Envision Utah leaders had urged, also was aired at this time. A special Envision 
Utah insert went to teachers throughout the region, with a letter from the governor 
urging their participation. 
Shortly after the newspaper survey was distributed, a series of 50 public meetings 
were held throughout the Greater Wasatch Area in order to provide a forum for 
discussion of growth issues within each community. In addition to the nearly 2,000 
residents that attended the 50 public meetings, almost 17,500 people returned the 
survey by mail or on-line. These respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of the 
scenarios that had less dispersed development patterns and more public transit. 
With greater public awareness, Envision Utah also experienced stronger opposi-
tion both from environmentalists who thought the group was advocating growth 
and libertarians who believed that Envision Utah wanted to constrain property 
rights. Envision Utah staff and leaders met with every opponent and responded to 
every letter to the editor. Because news organizations were already familiar with 
the growth scenarios, they did not jump to report every criticism. 
Envision Utah also experienced greater support from the governor. In 1999, he put 
forward the Quality Growth Act of 1999, which proposed a Quality Growth 
Commission, incentives for quality growth areas, and guidelines for preserving open 
space. Envision Utah worked to ensure that local officials were involved in forming the 
legislation, bringing together possible opposing interests and helping to address 
potential concerns about the legislation. The group helped to arrange for and sponsor 
a weekly caucus, which produced many improvements to the drafts. Envision Utah’s 
publicity campaign coincided with the opening weeks of the legislative session. The 
legislation passed. 
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Before Envision Utah staff could move forward to promote the type of growth pat-
terns the community supported, they wanted a better understanding of how the com-
munity thought changes in growth patterns should be achieved. They held another 
round of 50 public meetings to collect ideas for how to modify current plans and poli-
cies. The findings from the workshops and other data were used to generate a list of 
Quality Growth strategies. Envision Utah also began working with the recently estab-
lished Quality Growth Commission to develop a new series of Community Design 
Workshops. Envision Utah invited all 91 cities and 10 counties of the Greater Wasatch 
Areas to participate in planning efforts. Eight cities applied to participate in six differ-
ent projects. Calthorpe Associates worked with each of the cities to develop a plan for 
growth. Developers, property owners and city officials had the opportunity to work 
together, see the trade-offs they needed to consider, and reach consensus on how to 
solve local problems. 
Based upon all of these inputs, Envision Utah developed the “ready for prime time” 
Quality Growth Strategy. This Strategy was a refined version of the scenario preferred 
by survey respondents. When the Quality Growth Strategy was compared with the 
original baseline model, it showed that modest changes in personal living decisions 
could result in major changes in land and resource consumption over the long term. 
For example, by reducing average lot sizes by 0.06 acres, 116 square miles of agricul-
tural land and 171 square miles of undeveloped land could be spared from develop-
ment. Envision Utah’s Quality Growth Strategy relied on 32 criteria, including: 
pedestrian friendly/walkable communities; 
housing choices; 
infill development;9 and 
regional public transportation choices. 
The Quality Growth Strategy was released to the public with a second media cam-
paign near the beginning of 2000. The format of this campaign was similar to the one 
announcing the four future growth scenarios. Heavy emphasis was placed on the ben-
efits of the plan to communities. Another newspaper insert including a mail-back sur-
vey was distributed, with the aim of getting feedback on the Strategy. Envision Utah 
received 6,045 responses to the survey, which indicated strong support for the Strategy, 
especially in the areas of critical lands preservation, public transit, and walkable com-
munities. 
Beyond educating residents about the Quality Growth Strategy and its goals, the 
media campaign helped to motivate residents to support implementation of the 
Strategy at the local and state levels. Envision Utah held educational presentations on 
the Quality Growth Strategy for the general public, local elected officials, business 
leaders, developers, and other key players throughout 2000. The group also polled a 
representative sample of residents throughout the region on the Quality Growth prin-
ciples, which helped local officials to understand public the preferences on housing 
and design.10 
9 Infill development: a strategy 
that takes advantage of land 
availability closer to urban 
centers. 
10 Envision Utah continues to 
conduct regional public 
awareness campaigns every 
January, when it is able to 
get donated media time. In 
2001, the campaign focused 
on tools and resources. In 
2002, the focus was 
encouraging residents to 
share their vision with local 
officials. In 2003, the 
campaign showcased 
projects in the region that 
were demonstrating quality 
growth and invited the 
public to workshops where 
they could learn how to 
promote quality growth in 
their communities. The 2004 
campaign addressed the 
need for housing choices for 
people of all income levels 
and the 2005 advertisements 
encouraged public 
involvement in promoting 
and developing an improved 
regional transportation 
system. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
  
 
 
 
20 livability and smart growth 
11 By 2002 communities were 
asking for more tools, so 
Envision Utah created a sup-
plement to the Toolbox that 
addressed four more areas: 
Walkable commercial devel-
opment; Public safety and 
street design, Energy conser-
vation, and Planning urban 
forests. In 2005, Envision Utah 
released a Municipal 
Economic Development 
Toolbox at an educational 
forum it hosted on the sub-
ject, and a Compact Housing 
Toolbox that who distributed 
to local jurisdictions in indi-
vidual training sessions. 
Nearly 3,000 planners, local 
officials, realtors, developers, 
and others have attended 
workshops or more special-
ized training sessions on the 
Toolbox. 
Envision Utah’s Quality Growth Strategy depended heavily on the development of 
a regional public transit system and focusing significant portions of future develop-
ment along the proposed rail lines. The Coalition for Utah’s Future had begun laying 
the groundwork for regional transit back in 1990, when it collaborated with the Utah 
Transportation Authority to educate legislators about why they should authorize local 
voters to vote on a sales tax for transit. The legislature passed the authorization, but 
Wasatch voters rejected the sales tax option two years later. Nevertheless, the first tran-
sit line in the Wasatch Area opened in December 1999. It was built with existing funds 
(an existing 1/4 cent sales tax) and extra money received from the federal government 
for the Olympics. It was very well received, with ridership far exceeding expectations. 
Many Wasatch communities are now vying for extensions of the light rail system. 
In the Spring of 2000, Envision Utah began to work behind the scenes to promote 
the region-wide public transportation system. Knowing that voters had rejected this 
same initiative eight years before, the group undertook an extensive education effort. 
The system was easier to sell in 2000 because residents could see the benefits of the first 
light rail line. In November 2000, voters in three counties agreed to tax themselves to 
build more rail lines and put more buses on the road. This initiative was expected to 
raise $43 million per year, a huge increase in Utah Transportation Authority’s $90 mil-
lion budget, and leverage hundreds of millions in federal funding. This was an impor-
tant step in implementing the Quality Growth Strategy. 
In the spirit of continuing to foster community involvement, the Envision Utah 
staff took a tour of 91 cities and towns and 10 county commissions in the Greater 
Wasatch Area to introduce to local officials the Quality Growth Strategy and to collect 
suggestions for implementing strategies. On the tour, many local officials expressed 
frustration about the lack of tools and resources available. At this point, Envision Utah 
realized that its role needed to evolve. The group hired professionals and brought 
together a team of 45 local officials, planning commissioners, realtors, developers, and 
planners to assist with the development of planning tools and tactics. While it would 
have been possible to adopt planning tools that had been created in and for other 
states, Envision Utah opted to engage local stakeholders in this process, developing 
specific strategies for Utah’s politics and environment. 
The Urban Planning Tools for Quality Growth “Toolbox” focused on 5 key areas: 
protecting sensitive lands; 
meeting housing needs; 
developing walkable communities; 
encouraging infill and redevelopment; 
conserving water resources. 
The Toolbox included model development codes and design standards, detailed 
prototypical development types, and model programs to preserve open space.11 
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Once the toolbox was complete, Envision Utah offered a series of workshops for 
local leaders on how to use the it. The toolbox and workshops raised awareness 
among communities about what they could do, but people needed on-the-ground 
examples to convince them that tools could actually work. To this end, Envision 
Utah invited communities to participate in Quality Growth Demonstration 
Projects, and selected three communities based on their commitment to an open 
public involvement process. 
A common process based on the strategies that had been successful at the regional 
level was developed for the three projects. The core process included: 
Development of a steering committee made up of local public officials, busi-
ness and community leaders, developers, environmental interests, and others 
to oversee all phases of the demonstration project, including developing a 
vision, selecting stakeholders, providing direction to the public involvement 
process, and assisting with implementation. 
Selection of a consultant through a request-for-proposal process with the 
stipulation that each consultant agreed to utilize Envision Utah’s community 
involvement approach. 
A community involvement process similar to the previous Envision Utah 
workshops, in which participants were broken into small groups to create 
rough conceptual development plans. Envision Utah then aggregated the 
results of the workshop into a master plan for the area, which was presented 
to the public for comment and revision. 
Presentation of the approved plan to each local government involved in the 
plan by the steering committee of the plan for discussion about their poten-
tial role in implementation. 
With this level of community involvement, Envision Utah has found that commu-
nities are more likely to embrace the plans developed, making changes to their local 
codes, ordinances, and general plans to ensure successful implementation. 
The three initial demonstration projects 
resulted in the Davis County Shorelands 
Plan, The Nebo Community Vision, and 
the Ogden Wall Avenue Corridor Study. In 
Davis County, all of the nine communities 
involved in the process adopted the plan for 
preserving critical lands. Each of these local 
governments is working to designate send-
ing and receiving areas for a proposed 
transfer of development rights program,12 
which will be implemented once all of the 
communities update their local ordinances. 
Southern Utah County is home to many
beautiful landscapes. 
12 Transfer of development 
rights: a method for protect-
ing land by transferring the 
“rights to develop” from one 
area to another. 
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13 Transit Oriented Develop-
ment: residential and 
commercial centers designed 
to maximize access by transit 
and non-motorized 
transportation. 
14 Brownfield property: property 
that has previously been 
developed, the expansion, 
redevelopment, or reuse of 
which may be complicated by 
the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant. 
Envision Utah has since taken on a number of additional demonstration projects. 
Among the more notable of these efforts were: 
helping Tooele County fund and develop a master plan to protect sensitive 
lands and community identity in the face of dramatic growth; 
working with Brigham City to prepare a general plan and implement transfer 
of development rights; 
planning transit-oriented developments13 in Sandy and West Valley City; 
implementing community plans in the Kearns, Magna and Millcreek town-
ships; 
engaging the public to protect a resort atmosphere in the valleys above 
Ogden; and 
streamlining the process to develop brownfield sites.14 
In addition to the demonstration projects, Envision Utah also developed the 
Quality Growth Awards in conjunction with Governor Leavitt to recognize on-the-
ground quality growth projects as an important factor protecting the quality of life in 
Utah. Since 2001, Envision Utah has hosted an annual awards ceremony and a publi-
cation highlighting each project in local papers. The 55 projects honored to date 
demonstrate that Envision Utah’s goals are both sound and practical. Additionally, 
these projects provide an example of attractive developments that other communities 
can emulate. Awards honor both developers and communities in creating quality 
growth. The awards process has been useful in identifying new projects that fit the 
Quality Growth definition. Nominees for the awards have been involved in many kinds 
of development not previously seen in the Greater Wasatch Area. 
In early 2001, the Wasatch Front Regional Council, the area’s metropolitan planning 
organization, released its draft long-range plan for 2030. During the public comment 
period, there was a great deal of criticism about the emphasis of the plan on road 
building. Envision Utah worked with major mining, petroleum, and manufacturing 
interests in the region who wanted to air their concerns about the plan with local offi-
cials. Through the efforts of Envision Utah, a committee was formed to assess transit 
needs and recommend changes to the 2030 plan. This committee included representa-
tives of the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah Transit Authority as well as 
several mayors. 
Following Envision Utah’s success as a facilitating body, the Regional Council voted 
to give it representation on its Executive Council. The original 2030 plan called for 150 
miles of track-mileage or dedicated lanes at $2.1 billion. The revised plan that the com-
mittee developed called for 291 miles of track-mileage or dedicated lanes at $3.3 billion, 
including the most aggressive Bus Rapid Transit proposal in the country. This was 
another important step in achieving the Quality Growth Strategy. 
By early 2002, Envision Utah had made a great deal of progress in what many con-
sidered a short time. As one mayor noted: “Walkable communities are now the default 
position.” Planning commissions and mayors were starting to ask, “What does 
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This example of a walkable community shows a
variety of services. 
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Envision Utah think?” when consider-
ing new developments. Envision Utah 
had impressive public and political 
acceptance and demand for its efforts. 
There was also growing interest from 
outside Utah for help in transferring 
and replicating the Envision Utah 
model. 
In 2002, the Quality Growth Strategy 
took another step forward when the 
Utah Transit Authority purchased a 180-
mile right-of-way from Union Pacific 
for $185 million. The purchase of this 
corridor allowed for the expansion of Utah’s transit system by ensuring the long-term 
affordability of rail development. To make the transit-oriented development that was 
part of the Quality Growth Strategy possible, Envision Utah worked with Calthorpe 
Associates and Cooper, Roberts, and Simonsen (a local consultant), as well as a steer-
ing committee of key stakeholders to develop a set of tools to assist communities in 
planning for transit oriented development — the Wasatch Front Transit Oriented 
Development Guidelines. 
After the release of Transit-Oriented Development Guidelines in November 
2002, Envision Utah held workshops to train 500 developers, lenders, local officials, 
planners, realtors, and other interested citizens. Envision Utah also launched pilot 
projects in targeted communities located along the rail corridor. The projects used 
a process similar to that of the demonstration projects focused on developing site 
plans for transit-oriented development. Many of the communities involved in these 
projects decided to revise their ordinances to accommodate their plans, including 
transit-oriented development land use designations and mixed-use ordinances 
(Van Gorp 2003). 
Throughout 2003, Envision Utah continued to hold educational forums, assist new 
demonstration projects, provide tools and technical assistance to communities, create 
school education programs, and advocate for planning processes for balanced trans-
portation solutions. 
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In 2003 Envision Utah was able to catalyze the first “voluntary coming together” 
to consider alternative plans for growth in the Mountain View Corridor, a major 
corridor in the region. Local officials, the Utah Department of Transportation, the 
Utah Transit Authority, and the local associations of governments came together 
with the encouragement of the governor. There were concerns on all sides of this 
process. In particular, the Department of Transportation worried about whether 
there would be honest facilitation, but accepted Envision as Utah as facilitator 
because of its track record. Envision Utah was able run the process using its 
proven steps, including 
a stakeholder committee; 
publicity, (including signed letters to most local interests and advertise-
ments in English and Spanish; 
public workshops; 
games that revealed options that otherwise would not have been 
considered; 
scenarios; 
a vision; and 
implementation. 
Together, the participants settled on a corridor of mixed-use transit nodes. Ten 
jurisdictions signed on to the process, two have already committed to implementing it, 
and the rest are in process. 
Envision Utah also began to set the stage for the next step in achieving a regional 
public transit system. In 2001 the Wasatch Front Regional Council had revised its plan 
to spend almost a billion dollars more on transit, but it did not yet have the money to 
do so. The 2030 regional transportation plan assumed the legislature would authorize 
local voters to consider another 1/2-cent sales tax for transit. Envision Utah helped 
form a committee to plan the Investing in Our Future Campaign, a public awareness 
campaign in support of the transit expansion and necessary funding. Members of this 
committee included key legislators, representatives from the Wasatch Front Regional 
Council and the Utah Transit Authority, key Envision Utah board members, and local 
elected officials. Envision Utah began working with the Salt Lake City Chamber of 
Commerce and other business groups on the Campaign. Envision Utah strongly sug-
gested having the business community take the lead. At their suggestion, the 
Campaign expanded to include a road repair package to be funded through an 
increase in the state’s gas tax. 
The leaders of the Investing in Our Future Campaign prepared a special 
presentation for legislators that highlighted the regional benefits of transit and transit-
oriented development, including water savings, affordable housing, and lower 
infrastructure costs. The Campaign’s report described hundreds of potential stations 
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throughout the region and the potential economic and community benefits of each 
station. Envision Utah did everything it could to increase the credibility of its research, 
including hiring Cambridge Systematics to prepare the analysis of system costs and 
benefits and asking the Utah Foundation, a business-supported group, to oversee the 
release of the report. 
The 2005 Legislature did not put anything on the ballot, but it did appropriate 
approximately $200 million for highways. The coalition worked throughout 2005 and 
will have a presence in the 2006 Legislature. Governor Huntsman made transportation 
a priority in his upcoming budget. There is some suggestion that the Legislature will 
consider putting a referendum on the November 2006 ballot to increase sales tax to 
accelerate completion of the transit extensions. If the legislature authorizes it, the pub-
lic will vote on the funding mechanism in 2006. Envision Utah laid the political ground-
work for legislative support through a public education campaign. 
In January 2005, the local affiliates of ABC, CBS, FOX and NBC generously donated 
significant airings of two Envision Utah public service announcements. In addition, the 
NBC affiliate helped to produce and aired a half-hour Envision Utah documentary fea-
turing many community, business, and political leaders expounding the benefits of an 
efficient public transportation system. Envision Utah also used newspaper ads and 
radio spots to promote the message. 
Envision Utah believes the Quality Growth Strategy can succeed if the transit sys-
tem can be completed in the next 10 years. The Wasatch Front Regional Council has 
concluded that if it has the additional 1/2 cent sales tax for transit, using creative 
financing, it will be able to build a complete system in 10 years, rather than the 30 years 
originally anticipated. Accelerating the completion of a regional transit system will 
increase the speed of development around transit stations, enabling the creation of 
more regional centers to absorb anticipated population growth. Extensive develop-
ment around the stations in the next 10 years will allow for the best test of the system’s 
ability to meet the mobility needs of the region in time to reconsider the need for 
many new roads. Every commuter line will offset also at least one lane of freeway traf-
fic. The transit system should reduce the pressure for new roads in the more urban 
parts of the region and free up resources for needed rural roads in parts of the state 
that have been left out of past transportation plans. 
The real test of Envision Utah’s success will be whether it has a significant impact 
on decisions about infrastructure, land use, and density in the region. It is too soon to 
tell. Envision Utah is making progress toward this goal by helping to improve the qual-
ity of decisions by local governments, the State Department of Transportation and 
state water quality division, and others. It is seizing every opportunity to help parts of 
the region prepare new regional and local plans and codes consistent with the Quality 
Growth Strategy. In addition, it partnered with the area’s metropolitan planning 
organizations, the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Mountainlands 
Association of Governments, on a new visioning process to develop the next long-
range transportation plan. Known as Wasatch Choices 2040, this ambitious regional 
process incorporated workshops and “chip game” exercises to integrate land use and 
transportation planning with the plans of the two metropolitan planning organiza-
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tions for the first time. Finally, Envision Utah is working on a legally defensible model 
of growth impacts that is more sensitive to the land use changes that take place around 
transit stations. Paul Wadell at University of Washington is developing this new model, 
which will hopefully be ready in time to be used in the 2036 transportation plan and 
could become the standard for all regions in the nation. 
There are promising signs of change in practice since the advent of the Surdna 
Initiative. 
The first light rail line was a success, enabling two more extensions to the rail 
system. 
Suburban areas increasingly want stations and transit-oriented development 
in their communities, and mixed-use and apartment properties are gaining 
favor – Envision Utah is credited with these changes in climate. 
The transit agency has made ridership its top goal. 
The University of Utah, which for years had only a modest undergraduate 
urban planning program, is now seeing higher demand from students and has 
created a graduate program in response to the massive expansion of transit 
and the efforts of Envision Utah. 
The Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget is working with the Quality 
Growth Commission on Quality Growth Community Standards to set crite-
ria to guide state investments in infrastructure. 
The Wasatch Front Regional Council has a new executive director who is 
more attuned to smart growth concerns. 
The growth principles that came out of the Wasatch Choices 2040 effort have 
been adapted by the state’s largest metropolitan planning organizations, the 
Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Mountain Lands Association of 
Governments. These entities are run by mayors which, in effect, means the 
mayors have adopted these principles. Over time these principles will become 
significant as the MPOs guide federal transportation funds to communities 
that implement the principles. 
As the Wasatch Front Regional Council begins work on its next long-range 
plan, it will include project selection criteria that stem from smart growth 
principles. 
In addition, communities are making more and more changes to ordinances, gen-
eral plans, and developments. There is a range of demonstration projects and com-
munity visioning projects, and there is a waiting list of other cities that hope to be 
involved with the Envision Utah process. Kennecott Land Co., owner of half the 
remaining developable land in the Salt Lake Valley, is developing a large Calthorpe-
designed mixed-use pedestrian-oriented community that its president asserts will be 
“an enduring legacy of Envision Utah’s principles.” This community will include tran-
sit-oriented development around a proposed extension of the light rail line. Kennecott 
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intends to extend this model to its proposed developments all along the western bench 
of the valley. A 2003 Envision Utah poll showed that growth issues have become more 
important to Utahans, with a strong majority of respondents supporting walkable 
neighborhoods and housing options for low to moderate income residents. 
A University of Utah survey of government planners, administrators, planning 
commission members, and elected officials showed that 
100 percent were aware of Envision Utah; 
96 percent were aware of the Quality Growth Strategy; and 
93 percent had sent staff to Envision Utah for training. 
Many observers believe that this progress is remarkable, especially in a conservative 
state. 
Envision Utah got another boost in the 2004 elections when Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., 
former Chair of Envision Utah, was elected as Governor of Utah and Gary Herbert, a 
long-time member of the Envision Utah Steering Committee, won Lt. Governor. 
This is still a small beginning. Envision Utah has finished phase one: It is now safe 
to talk about growth and tradeoffs. There are model projects and more 
ordinances. There is still very hard work ahead, as local leaders have to contend 
with the fact that there will be winners and losers. Not every project can be 
funded. Not every highway will be built. If tough choices are made, the highway 
builders and developers of large lot commercial and housing development will feel 
it. The question will be whether Envision Utah has built a broad enough base of 
support to carry the Quality Growth Strategy through when confronted with 
these hard choices. 
For years, other regions have asked Envision Utah for help in replicating its process-
es and tools. To date, Envision Utah has had little more to offer than a one-hour 
PowerPoint presentation. Planning organizations, public leaders, and foundations 
across the nation have expressed interest in discussing how to take the best examples 
from all of the regions that have adapted Envision Utah’s approaches and produce 
teaching tools for more regions and, possibly, a clearinghouse for resources. There are 
signs that Envision Utah has a replicable model, and its leaders have began to explore 
this idea. 
what it takes to do this work 
The media coverage, the consultants and the staff required to run a program as 
involved as Envision Utah are relatively expensive. The Envision Utah budget for 2001 
was $1,596,000 – $384,600 for salaries; $81,000 for administrative expenses; $1,116,000 
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for expenses associated with implementation tasks such as public awareness cam-
paigns, quality growth demonstration projects, the local government toolbox, and 
polling and project assessments; the remainder went to fundraising expenses. 
At the urging of a significant funder, Envision Utah decided to hire a planning staff, 
bringing more work in-house and reducing its consulting budget. Demand for 
demonstration projects also increased. The Envision Utah budget grew to $1,762,000 
in 2004, with $829,000 going to employee compensation. When that funder changed 
priorities in 2004  and decided not to renew its grant, Envision Utah reduced its budg-
et for 2005 to $1,367,000 with $690,000 going to employee compensation. The group 
anticipates that its long-run core annual budget will be somewhat smaller than the 
2005 budget. 
Envision Utah’s initial funding sources were reflective of the Coalition’s vision of a 
multi-stakeholder public-private partnership. The George S. and Dolores Doré Eccles 
Foundation was instrumental in getting Envision Utah off the ground by providing 
$150,000 in seed money as well as a $500,000 matching grant. This grant was matched 
two-to-one by public and private sources. The State of Utah provided half of this 
amount through in-kind support via the Quality Growth Efficiency Tools program. 
The remaining funding was raised from local governments within the study area, 
based on the size and population of the community (Van Gorp 2003). 
The George S. and Dolores Doré Eccles Foundation has remained a significant 
source of funding for Envision Utah. This year, the Eccles Foundation made a three-
year commitment to provide Envision Utah a two-to-one matching grant of up to 
$250,000 per year. Other private funding has come primarily from other national 
foundations, with smaller contributions coming from corporations, civic groups, 
municipalities, and individuals. Envision Utah has also been successful in securing 
major public funding sources. It has received federal grants through the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Highway Administration. In addi-
tion, it has received three separate appropriations from the U.S. Congress. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
29 the new mexico story 
The New Mexico Story: Top Down 
and Bottom Up 
A Case Study of Building a Diverse Statewide 
Coalition to Achieve State Growth Policies While 
Producing Local Success Stories 
context 
New Mexico was the most rural state in 
the Surdna Foundation’s Smart Growth 
Initiative and is one of the most rural 
states in the nation. Geographically, New 
Mexico is the fifth largest state in the 
nation, but it has just 2 million residents. 
It has three significant urban areas, 
which are where 43 percent of residents 
live. Fifty percent of New Mexico’s land 
area is owned by the state and federal 
governments. 
The New Mexico state legislature, which includes representatives of both urban and 
rural constituencies, meets in odd numbered years for 60-day sessions during which 
all issues may be considered and in even numbered years for 30-day sessions that are 
limited to fiscal matters and issues that the governor asks the legislature to consider. 
New Mexico’s three main ethnic groups are Caucasians, Latinos, and Native 
Americans. About one-third of the people in New Mexico speak Spanish in everyday 
life. New Mexico residents have long-standing ties of families and neighborhoods to 
the land. People care about protecting the state’s native heritage. They want to increase 
economic opportunities for everyone, but also to retain the open space and rural cen-
ters that make New Mexico so unique. A problem is finding language to match the 
state’s unique rural character (Mark 2001). 
Montano Bridge, Albuquerque 
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Road Construction to Sprawl 
The economic boom of the 1990s missed New Mexico, except for some elevated real 
estate prices for second and third homes around Santa Fe and other areas within easy 
distance of the state’s major ski areas. When the Surdna Foundation Initiative began, 
communities desperate for jobs and overall economic development were eager to 
build new “ring” roads for companies willing to locate in their areas. Rural poverty was 
deep and had existed for multiple gener-
ations. The divide between rich and poor 
was vast, as it was between native and 
non-native cultures. Mobile homes were 
blossoming throughout rural areas as the 
only affordable housing available for 
low- and middle-income residents. 
Unemployment was high and out-
migration common, especially among 
young professionals. Rural communities 
felt disenfranchised (Mark 2001). 
Population growth has slowed in New Mexico, defying the prediction of the U.S. 
Census in 2000 that New Mexico would be the second fastest growing state through 
2025. Like Utah, 50 to 70 percent of the population growth in New Mexico comes from 
the inside, making it possible to argue for protecting New Mexico for those who have 
grown up there. 
In the late 1990s, other than the newest transplants from California or the East, few 
New Mexicans were worried about sprawl and over-development. The legislature and 
the governor were conservative about growth issues and had no interest in land use 
controls or zoning. The state had little precedent for growth management. Decisions 
about land use in New Mexico were made at the local level. Developers and home-
builders were distrustful of the idea of smart growth. Public transportation barely 
existed. There were few transportation programs that enabled residents to get from 
city to city, and the bus system within the state’s largest city, Albuquerque, provided 
very limited service (Mark 2001). 
The issue that matters most in New Mexico is water, and water affects all develop-
ment issues. For this reason, rural water associations and acequias, the historical enti-
ties that control water rights, have a lot of say in decisions about growth. Water is not 
only a driving issue, but can also be a bridge issue. Rural areas want to protect their 
water. Urban areas don’t want to pay high rates for theirs (Mark 2002). 
In 1999, there was little history of advocacy organizations working well together in 
New Mexico. There was, however, a long history of mainstream environmentalists 
seeming to ignore the interests of native populations, which further complicated the 
capacity to build coalitions around growth issues in the state. Smart growth advocates 
needed to differentiate themselves from mainstream environmentalists, but still 
express environmental concerns. 
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the roles of the surdna foundation’s grantees 
1,000 Friends of New Mexico, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group 
Education Fund, the New Mexico Surface Transportation Policy Project, and the 
Council of Churches were the only groups truly focused on smart growth in the state 
in 2000. 
Started in 1996, 1000 Friends of New Mexico had become the most visible and influ-
ential smart growth organization in the state. Its board reflected New Mexico’s cultur-
al and professional diversity. Two of its past presidents led redevelopment efforts in 
New Mexico cities. Other board members have been developers and past city council 
members. In 1999, 1000 Friends of New Mexico was focused on increasing public 
awareness of growth issues. The group felt that if it could build a broad statewide coali-
tion, it would be possible to achieve new state growth policies, as well as more local suc-
cesses in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, including new comprehensive plans, regional 
plans, and transportation plans that would incorporate smart growth policies. 
As part of its Smart Growth Initiative, in 1999 Surdna gave 1000 Friends of New 
Mexico a grant for the development of a statewide smart growth coalition that would 
reflect the state’s diverse historical, cultural, and demographic perspectives and key 
interests.15 Part of the funding also went to 1000 Friends for its own work. The 
statewide coalition’s purpose was to work on policies to address gaps in existing state 
land use, water management, and transportation laws. 
To help address transportation issues, a portion of Surdna’s grant to 1000 Friends 
went to the New Mexico office of the Surface Transportation Policy Project and the 
New Mexico Environmental Law Center. Funding for the Surface Transportation 
Policy Project was for state transportation policy research and advocacy. Funding for 
the New Mexico Environmental Law Center was to hire legal support. To help build 
the statewide constituency for smart growth, another portion of the grant went to the 
New Mexico Council of Churches. To help bring rural and water interests into the 
coalition, a portion of Surdna’s 2002 grant went to the New Mexico Acequia 
Association. 
The New Mexico Conference of Churches is a membership organization of 15 
regional church bodies representing about 450 Catholic and Protestant parishes and 
congregations in New Mexico. Membership in these congregations is approximately 
636,000, representing 38 percent of the state’s population and 64 percent of the total 
faith adherence in the state. The New Mexico Conference of Churches planned to use 
the Surdna funding to educate and engage its congregations in the smart growth 
debate. This group was seen as a progressive organization with a heavy focus on envi-
ronmental justice. 
The New Mexico Acequia Association works to preserve traditional water rights and 
the economic and cultural traditions that sustain rural life throughout northern New 
Mexico. The viability of its member communities could be threatened by growth and 
the increasing value of water, which were creating pressures to sell water rights. The 
Surdna funding allowed Acequia Association to become part of the coalition. 
15 The Surdna Foundation also 
made an entirely separate 
grant to the New Mexico 
Public Interest Research 
Group Education Fund for its 
work on transportation and 
water issues. 
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In the last two years of the five-year Initiative, Surdna made a grant to the Western 
Environmental Law Center. The Surdna Foundation had heard about this group’s 
efforts to assist elected and appointed officials in rural areas to fight unwanted devel-
opment. Surdna Foundation staff saw a need for additional rural activity and thought 
that the Western Environmental Law Center could help. The Surdna Foundation asked 
1000 Friends to work with Law Center, but provided a separate grant to enable the Law 
Center to expand its legal support for rural counties in north-central New Mexico to 
fight unwanted development and resource extraction challenges and, in some cases, to 
help them write entire zoning ordinances to manage growth. 
case study 
In 1999, 1000 Friends of New Mexico reached out to a small group of New Mexico’s 
expert organizers to discuss planning for a statewide smart growth coalition. This 
small group met several times and agreed to co-convene a larger group. By the end of 
the year, 1000 Friends was ready to launch a diverse statewide smart growth coalition. 
Twenty-five initial partners agreed to team up to build a broad constituency to support 
new state growth management policies and change the direction of growth manage-
ment in New Mexico over the next five years. This was a very ambitious agenda, given 
that there was little precedent or support for land use policies in New Mexico. In addi-
tion, it was very difficult to bring groups together in New Mexico, where there had 
been on-going turf battles and fights over funding. 1,000 Friends and its partners host-
ed many meetings behind the scenes to allow people to mend rifts and see common-
alities. 
1,000 Friends of New Mexico and its early partners believed that a broad coalition 
would help them show how sprawl affected the concerns of the majority population. 
They agreed that the way to achieve comprehensive change was to focus on specific 
problems that were of concern to New Mexico residents and pursue specific remedies 
for them. It seemed especially important to the founding members of the coalition to 
recruit groups that were working to protect New Mexico’s history, heritage, and envi-
ronment; groups that represented many of the unique rural communities in New 
Mexico; and groups working for increased economic opportunities for the state. 1,000 
Friends envisioned an even broader coalition that included civic, business, develop-
ment, and agricultural leaders, once the core group was well-organized. 
1,000 Friends contracted a well-respected consultant to coordinate the coalition 
and initiated the process of hiring a campaign director to work half-time in 
support of the coalition and half-time for 1000 Friends on campaign issues. The 
consultant helped the coalition to agree on its broad priorities, which included 
affordable housing, access to schools, economic improvement, agriculture lands 
and open space, community and cultural preservation, and transportation 
choices. A campaign strategy and timeline were developed with the expectation 
that statewide smart growth legislation (in whole or in part) could be introduced 
in 2001 and passed in 2003. 
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The core components of the strategy were: 
1. research to reveal the impacts of current growth patterns (for exam-
ple, a study of how suburban housing development was affecting 
home equity held by current Albuquerque homeowners); 
2. communications to educate and make the case to communities and 
decision-makers; 
3. on-going coalition building; 
4. citizen outreach, including canvassing of 50,000 households by the 
Public Interest Research Group and Education Fund; 
5. tracking development projects throughout the state and supporting 
the developers who wanted to do good projects; 
6. slowing bad projects through litigation, and; 
7. publicizing the views of New Mexico public leaders about smart 
growth, especially before elections. 
1,000 Friends also planned to bring in experts from other areas, such as San Diego, 
Denver, Salt Lake City, and San Antonio, to share their smart growth approaches and 
what they had accomplished. Because it was important to have some on-the-ground 
success, 1000 Friends and other coalition members also pursued policy changes in 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe. 
To begin developing specific growth policy options and strategies for consideration 
by members of the coalition, 1000 Friends contracted the New Mexico American 
Planning Association to prepare background research on New Mexico law compared 
with more progressive states. It wanted to identify specific gaps in New Mexico’s land 
use, water, and transportation laws. It also began research to determine what new laws 
were likeliest to be accepted by policymakers. Given the central importance of improv-
ing statewide transportation policy, 1000 Friends proposed a special research Initiative 
by the New Mexico Surface Transportation Policy Project to help clarify campaign tar-
gets dealing with transportation. 
By early 2000, the coalition had been named New Mexico Coalition for a Livable 
Future. 1,000 Friends hired Lehua Lopez-Mau to be the Coalition’s coordinator. Ms. 
Lopez-Mau had previously worked in New Mexico on native lands issues and had been 
a 1000 Friends board member. She was a highly dedicated organizer rooted in, and sen-
sitive to, the many cultures of New Mexico. In her first six months of work, Coalition 
membership increased to about 35 organizations and work began on broad public out-
reach. An Executive Committee was formed, which included members from Great 
American Station Foundation, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group, the 
New Mexico Conference of Churches, the New Mexico Parent Teacher Association, 
and a number of state and local community organizations. 
Although the Coalition was operating under the auspices of 1000 Friends, 1000 
Friends tried to allow it to build an independent agenda. This was a challenge from the 
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Coalition Annual Meeting 
start, which might be expected when a coalition is housed within one organization, 
shares staff, and receives funding through that organization. The Coalition’s steering 
committee wanted the Coalition to act as a separate entity, while 1000 Friends felt it 
should exert some control, as 1000 Friends was ultimately was accountable to the 
Surdna Foundation. 
The Coalition began the process of 
building a field presence geographically 
in the northern and southern parts of the 
state. It also stepped up its efforts to 
broaden support for smart growth policy 
among key constituencies, including the 
business community, economic develop-
ment leaders, and agricultural and rural 
groups. The Coalition held its first annu-
al meeting in December 2000, convening 
40 organizations, which showed strong 
support for a number of initiatives. 
The Coalition also helped to create an entity called Businesses for Balanced 
Growth, based mostly in Albuquerque, to gauge public positions on Albuquerque 
growth issues and identify and support five development projects every year that 
needed help with neighborhood support or regulatory approval. This group soon 
had a membership of about 75 local businesses. It was organized around, and had 
a great deal of success working for, passage of Albuquerque’s Planned Growth 
Strategy in 2002. Businesses for Balanced Growth lost momentum after the 
Planned Growth Strategy passed and the staff person who had been the engine for 
the group left. Her replacement was unable to establish the relationships necessary 
to keep the group together. A number of businesses remain interested in 
Businesses for Balanced Growth or some equivalent, but 1000 Friends does not 
have the staff resources to put it together in a way likely to be successful. 
In mid-2000, 1000 Friends of New Mexico sponsored focus groups in two parts of 
the state to improve the Coalition’s sense of what New Mexicans were concerned 
about. A statewide poll followed in April 2001. The polls revealed that public concern 
about growth issues was lower than in faster-growing Arizona or Colorado, but that 
New Mexicans were worried about how growth was affecting family, community, and 
water. The public also had relatively low confidence that growth decisions were being 
made fairly, honestly, or sensibly. 
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1,000 Friends and the Coalition advanced new state policy ideas that addressed the 
issues that the polls and focus groups had indicated were of greatest concern to the 
public, such as safe routes to school, comprehensive plan enforcement, smart 
building codes, and water conservation. Coalition members took advantage of 
every opportunity to raise their issues. They took active roles in advisory com-
mittees to the legislature, including a technical advisory team investigating prob-
lems in the state’s land use laws. All of this activity raised the Coalition’s and 1000 
Friend’s visibility in the legislature and helped to build a case for broader reform.16 
West Side Albuquerque 
At the same time, members of the Coalition felt they had to fend off road and devel-
opment proposals that would contribute to sprawl. This was an appropriate activity 
for individual members rather than the Coalition. 1,000 Friends led opposition to sev-
eral proposals to construct roads through the Petroglyph National Monument, which 
would have promoted sprawl on Albuquerque’s west side, and to one loop road around 
Albuquerque, providing a positive mobil-
ity vision instead. In Santa Fe, it assisted 
local groups that were trying to oppose 
commercial and residential development 
around Santa Fe’s new bypass. With help 
from the New Mexico Environmental 
Law Center and New Mexico Surface 
Transportation Policy Project, efforts to 
watchdog the State Highway Depart-
ment also were much strengthened. 
In 2001, the coalition members could claim some credit for a range of local suc-
cesses. For example, Santa Fe city and its county adopted a cooperative regional plan-
ning authority ordinance based on momentum started by the Coalition. 1,000 Friends 
was the lead organization in supporting successful county tax measures for open space 
acquisition. A privately-funded $250 million Albuquerque downtown revitalization 
Initiative also was helped along by the work of 1000 Friends and its Coalition partners. 
The state policy environment looked like it might improve in 2002 with the 
gubernatorial elections. The existing governor was term-limited, and there was a real 
possibility of a new governor who might be more sympathetic to the smart growth 
agenda. The executive director of 1000 Friends had observed how candidate education 
before and during a campaign could have a powerful impact. It also seemed that this 
would be something around which to organize the Coalition, which was still struggling 
to clarify its goals. 
1,000 Friends sought to emulate the efforts in New Jersey to elevate smart growth 
issues to be part of the gubernatorial elections. The Coalition began working with 
leading gubernatorial candidates from both sides who were expected to run in 2002 to 
make sure that smart growth was a leading election issue. 
In April 2001, 1000 Friends of New Mexico’s executive director, Ned Farquhar, left 
after two years. Losing the person who had envisioned the Coalition and its role was a 
16 The fruits of this labor con-
tinue to be evident. In early 
2005, the New Mexico 
Legislature was poised to 
enact legislation that could 
provide significant funding 
for safe routes to school, and 
water conservation has 
become a significant political 
issue, resulting in significant 
savings through aggressive 
conservation programs in 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe. 
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blow to 1000 Friends and the Coalition, especially since Farquhar had come from out-
of-state and had left the state. The decision on a new executive director was made sev-
eral months later, with a full recognition that it would be a tough task to reestablish 
1000 Friends as a New Mexico-rooted organization with a long-term commitment to 
quality of life in the state. During its time without an executive director, 1000 Friends 
lost focus and vision, which also impacted the Coalition for a Livable Future. The new 
executive director of 1000 Friends had to concentrate on internal issues for many 
months before turning her attention to strategies and priorities for the Coalition. 
The Coalition continued to be coordinated by Lehua Lopez-Mau whose skills with 
people and with coalition-building were nicely complemented by the management 
and strategic thinking talents of the new executive director of 1000 Friends. The 
Coalition was gaining new membership from local community organizations and 
neighborhood associations at the rate of one new member about every other week, 
including people of color and low-income people. It was achieving its goal of partner-
ing with churches and faith leaders in the state, but it still lacked critical support from 
business groups, realtors, and developers. It set a goal that by the end of 2002 it would 
recruit at least six new chambers of commerce (it had two) and another dozen devel-
opers and realtors who would not only support its positions, but also help “spread the 
word” about good managed growth policies. 
The Coalition released a new platform in May 2001. Its goals dealt with: 
● community growth and development that contributes to healthy 
communities; 
● reinvestment in schools, neighborhoods, and infrastructure in existing 
communities; 
● government accountability and coordination of planning; 
● new investments in transportation choices, affordable housing, and eco-
nomic development in rural and urban communities; 
● sustaining historic, cultural, land, and water resources; and 
● providing a voice for residents. 
However, with the change in leadership at 1000 Friends, the vision for the Coalition 
began to change. Farquhar had imagined 1000 Friends and the Coalition functioning 
like Envision Utah, providing a table for everyone, including leading business people, to 
collaborate on constructive policy ideas and try to help the state take small steps. In real-
ity, the Coalition only represented the more activist nonprofit community. There had 
also been tension from the start within the Coalition as to whether to take time to build 
a strong coalition or aim for quick changes in state policy. Rather than focusing on small 
steps over many years, Coalition leaders decided to set their sights on comprehensive 
state land use legislation in 2003. Unfortunately, the guidelines for the working rela-
tionship between 1000 Friends and the Coalition were lost in the shuffle of staff. 
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Downtown Albuquerque 
Even in its transition year, 1000 Friends continued to be the most visible and influ-
ential smart growth organization in the state. It provided leadership to help many 
other organizations focus on smart growth and the closely related issues of water and 
transportation. 1,000 Friends, with help from the Coalition, made some progress on a 
statewide policy on water management. Coalition members helped to prevent passage 
of a $1.7 billion road-building bill. The Coalition proposed planning- and zoning-
related legislation that did not progress, but still provided an opportunity for legisla-
tor education. 
As in previous years, 2001 saw several local successes, such as the state’s first trans-
fer of development rights program for Santa Fe County. 1,000 Friends was in weekly 
communication with Santa Fe’s city and county officials, and by the end of 2001 it 
expected both the city and county to agree on a Rio Grande Water Diversion Project 
for future land use proposals. Also by the end of 2001, 1000 Friends expected that Taos 
County and San Miguel County would adopt land conservation ordinances to protect 
agricultural and open space lands based on the unique, award-winning agricultural 
enhancement ordinance passed by Rio Arriba County a year earlier. By this point, most 
Santa Fe residents had heard of the Coalition and 1000 Friends, and their consistent 
(and persistent) growth management messages. 
At the same time, the Albuquerque 
downtown revitalization, stimulated in 
part by 1000 Friends, was taking hold. 
There was stronger public support for 
spending on revitalization of core corri-
dors. In 2001, Albuquerque voters 
approved a 1/4 cent gross receipts tax 
increase, and the city increased transit 
service 25 percent by adding routes and 
times. By April 2002, transit use was up 
11.17 percent. Progress also was made on stalling a loop road that would have allowed 
Albuquerque to sprawl 20 miles farther west. The New Mexico Conference of 
Churches, New Mexico Environmental Law Center and the Surface Transportation 
Policy Project all played key roles in this effort. 
Northern New Mexico and the middle Rio Grande regions were not the only 
growth areas in the state. As a result of a Sprawl and Poverty Conference in Las Cruces 
in 2000 and a “southern tour” by Coalition staff in April 2001, the Coalition was 
receiving emails and phone calls from southern New Mexico every week. 1,000 
Friends believed that the Coalition had to organize a broad constituency in southern 
New Mexico soon, and within the next year move an agenda of agricultural and open 
space protection coupled with an affordable housing program (based on several suc-
cessful Santa Fe models) to address some of the critical needs citizens faced near the 
southern border. 1,000 Friends created and advertised the position of director for 
Southern New Mexico, which it planned to fill with an experienced community 
organizer by September 2001. The initial efforts to place staff in the south have not 
been successful but the group continues to receive regular requests for help in that 
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region. 1,000 Friends is aware of the need for organization and support in that area, 
and will consider an affiliate program when it has the resources. 
The Coalition and 1000 Friends felt increasingly well-positioned to advance smart 
growth issues during the 2002 election and to advocate for new policies after the 
election. The level of cooperation between rural communities, nontraditional 
environmentalists, farmers, churches, and water associations was better than it had 
ever been. The two groups had an ambitious 2002 action agenda and quality 
research and recommendations to offer the candidates. 1000 Friends wrote a report 
called Taking Charge of Our Water Future: A Water Management Policy Guide for 
New Mexico in the 21st Century, which received good press coverage and was praised 
by the Smart Growth Network. The Coalition delivered presentations on health 
and sprawl to a range of audiences. The Surface Transportation Policy Project, New 
Mexico Public Interest Research Group and Education Fund, and other coalition 
members developed a policy guide for the gubernatorial candidates on trans-
portation and the importance of funding for transit. 
The members of the Coalition began to organize their grassroots bases for the 2002 
elections and 2003 legislative session. The Surface Transportation Policy Project con-
tinued to take the lead on transportation reform efforts, preparing for the 2003 legis-
lature and an effort to involve the public in meaningful participation in transportation 
decisions in the middle Rio Grande Valley. The group’s research revealed that New 
Mexico had the highest highway fatality rates in the nation and spent little on highway 
safety. Polling showed that the public supported improving safety. The Surface 
Transportation Policy Project raised both safety and transit issues in the governor’s 
race. Along with 1000 Friends and the Coalition, it helped to cultivate gubernatorial 
and legislative champions for transit. 
The New Mexico Council of Churches, part of the New Mexico Coalition for a 
Livable Future’s executive committee and a recipient of funds from the Surdna 
Foundation grant, had been focusing primarily on education for the first stage of 
the grant. In the beginning of 2002, it shifted to proactively engaging communi-
ties of faith in smart growth advocacy. In July 2002 the Council of Churches hired 
a part time project director with a background in environmental planning and 
organizing, as well as church experience, and organized the 50-member 
Sustainable Futures Task Force, which eventually grew to 200 people. The Task 
Force, which included both religious and public interest representatives, began to 
meet monthly, with about 25 people attending each meeting. It published and dis-
tributed white papers analyzing state water planning from the standpoint of eco-
justice. It organized a Congregational Outreach Committee to activate church and 
religious leaders to participate in these policy efforts. It began to speak out at 
statewide events on matters of transportation and water planning. It also partici-
pated in policy advocacy  in the state capitol on water conservation and growth 
management. On all of these activities, it coordinated with the Coalition. 
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During this time, the New Mexico Acequia Association, which works to preserve 
traditional water rights throughout northern New Mexico, also began to organize and 
advocate for smart growth policies to insure the viability of its member communities. 
A major priority for 1000 Friends of New Mexico in this period was the passage of 
the Planned Growth Strategy by the Albuquerque City Council in September 
2002. The Planned Growth Strategy was the first piece of smart growth land use 
policy for the city. It provided a framework for land use and growth through 2025, 
including provisions for impact fees, concurrency requirements,17 and a mixed-use 
zoning amendment to encourage development of traditional neighborhoods. 
1,000 Friends helped to form a coalition of organizations, businesses and individ-
uals, obtained endorsements from 140 of them, commissioned a poll to demon-
strate public support for planned growth, and generated a favorable public image 
for the strategy. 
This new coalition implemented a grassroots strategy that was largely led by 
Albuquerque Interfaith. In their efforts to bring the Strategy into the limelight, 
Albuquerque Interfaith and other members of this coalition 
● arranged multiple presentations; 
● set up a speaker’s bureau; 
● sent direct mail; 
● knocked on doors; 
● wrote letters to the editor; 
● wrote newsletter articles; and 
● provided testimony. 
The diverse coalition that supported the Planned Growth Strategy had a strong 
impact on elected officials, especially those from largely Hispanic, poor, and working 
class neighborhoods. The effort brought together and built new relationships between 
Albuquerque Interfaith, 1000 Friends, Albuquerque Friends Meeting, League of 
Women Voters, Sawmill Neighborhood Association, Sage Council, New Mexico Public 
Interest Research Group, New Mexico Council of Churches, and dozens of neighbor-
hood and homeowner groups and businesses. (Colombo 2004) 
As the 2002 gubernatorial elections loomed closer and the New Mexico Coalition 
for a Livable Future settled on a legislative agenda that it would support in 2003, 
Coalition staff geared up. 
● They set up a listserv for members, a phone bank system, and a weekly 
newsletter. 
● They stayed in constant touch with members to mobilize support for the leg-
islation. 
Nob Hill 
17 Concurrency requirements 
ensure that specified public 
services are guaranteed to be 
available when a proposed 
development is completed at 
the time the development is 
approved. 
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● In addition to polling to demonstrate the increase in voter support for growth 
management, the Coalition created a policy guide for the 2002 elections, 
Leading New Mexico to a More Livable Future: A Voter’s Policy Guide for the 
2002 Elections, which offered five key goals for the state. This guide was dis-
tributed to voters and candidates across the state. 
Member support indicated that the Coalition had become a significant political 
force – it became a key constituency for the candidates. It used this strength to meet 
with members of the state legislature and Congressional delegation, as well as city 
council members to make sure everyone understood the policy goals. It held a press 
conference and pursued a broader media strategy to raise the visibility of its agenda 
and the public support demonstrated by its polls. The group received excellent press 
coverage, particularly when the polls showed that people cared about the issues in the 
policy guide. 
The Coalition’s statewide efforts to raise smart growth issues during the elections 
were successful, even though not all of its goals were achieved. Some state legislative 
candidates began talking about transportation, land use, and water, although not as 
many as members as the Coalition would have liked. The impact on the gubernatorial 
candidate policy positions was more significant. Democratic Candidate Bill 
Richardson came out in favor of a state water plan. He sought input from the Surface 
Transportation Policy Project in writing his campaign platform on transportation. 
Richardson, who was elected governor in November 2002, made environmental issues 
a key component of his campaign, particularly water, open space, and transportation 
issues. He proceeded to fulfill these campaign promises. He made a number of 
appointments that the Coalition supported. Former 1000 Friends executive director 
Ned Farquhar was appointed special advisor to the governor on energy and the 
environment. 1,000 Friends staff members were appointed to various task forces and 
transition teams. The Richardson administration, including the new state engineer 
and head of the Interstate Stream Commission, demonstrated commitment to state 
water planning, better transportation planning, and increased spending for transit. 
Unfortunately, the Coalition faltered again when its coordinator left shortly before 
the 2003 legislative session. The Coalition’s Executive Committee recommended one 
applicant, but the ultimate decision lay with the executive director of 1000 Friends, 
who opted to hire another. This generated hard feelings, and disagreements resurfaced 
over who should be making decisions for the Coalition and whether the Coalition 
should be housed within 1000 Friends. The Coalition and 1000 Friends still had not 
defined the scope of authority or rules for membership and voting for the Coalition 
since Ned Farquhar had left. An additional complication was that the Coalition’s 
Executive Committee was self-appointed, on a volunteer basis, and without term lim-
its. This was a hold-over from the previous coordinator, and new members of the 
Coalition wanted the executive committee to be more accountable to members. 
Further trouble came as 1000 Friends was forced, yet again, to seek a new executive 
director. The new Coalition coordinator started just before the 2003 legislative session 
began. He implemented the existing campaign mechanisms, such as legislative alerts 
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and press releases, but he lacked guidance from 1000 Friends as they sought a new 
executive director. Because he did less outreach to members, and did not have the rela-
tionships with Coalition members that had drawn them to the meetings in the past, 
participation began to lag. 
Two years earlier, 1000 Friends of New Mexico, the Surface Transportation Policy 
Project, New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, and the 
Coalition for a Livable Future had set their sights on adoption of significant statewide 
growth and water policies in the 2003 legislative session. Governor Richardson worked 
diligently on a range of these issues, as did many Coalition members. In spite of the 
Coalition’s disarray, member groups still supported each other’s efforts, which was 
unprecedented in New Mexico. Even in its weakened state the Coalition brought a 
cohesiveness to the individual efforts and provided a stronger policy context. A num-
ber of bills passed, including: 
● A state water plan spearheaded by 1000 Friends and the New Mexico Water 
Dialog; 
● Transferable development rights advanced by the New Mexico Public 
Interest Research Group, enabling legislation to mandate local government 
water conservation and drought management plans; 
● A Regional Transit District Act put forward by Mid-Region Council of 
Governments; 
● A Safe Routes to School Program supported by the Surface Transportation 
Policy Project; 
● Removal of the $50,000 New Mexico State Highway Transportation
Department cap on transit spending advocated by the Surface 
Transportation Policy Project; 
● A New Mexico Rail Passenger Study backed by Reconnecting America and the 
Surface Transportation Policy Project. 
The Coalition also successfully supported the passage of a constitutional amend-
ment allowing state spending on affordable housing. Within two years, 1000 Friends 
had successfully supported adoption of statutory language enacting the amendment to 
the constitution. 
All of these efforts benefited from a supportive governor, as well as a broad base of 
support. For example, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group and Education 
Fund consulted and worked with farmers and agricultural interests, planners, local 
elected officials, the New Mexico municipal league, the Association of Counties, the 
New Mexico Homebuilders Association, and the Coalition to generate backing for the 
transferable development rights enabling legislation. And the entire Coalition sup-
ported the Surface Transportation Policy Project’s efforts to remove the state funding 
cap for transit. 
There were disappointments too. While the Surface Transportation Policy Project 
helped change the state framework for transit, transit funding was not expanded. The 
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Project attributed this to its inability to cultivate enough institutional champions with-
in the New Mexico Department of Transportation. However, it would have been diffi-
cult to increase funding for transit in any case. While the governor was generally sup-
portive of the smart growth initiatives, the highest-priority item on his agenda was a 
tax cut. Accordingly, a number of bills were tabled. These represented the majority of 
1000 Friend’s land use agenda. The land use bills gained support of House and Senate 
leadership, but did not get to the Senate floor in time for a full vote. 
The year 2003 was not the watershed for land use planning in New Mexico that the 
Coalition had hoped for, but there had been legislative progress and it was evident that 
the new governor would provide vastly improved opportunities. 1,000 Friends and the 
Coalition continued to support the legislation left on the table in the 2003 session, such 
as: 
● including schools in the Development Fees Act; 
● authorizing local governments to tax real estate transactions in order to fund 
open space and affordable housing programs; 
● creating a land use task force to revise land use statutes; 
● passing a domestic well bill to restrict wells in critical management areas. 
Water continued to be the driving issue for New Mexico. 1,000 Friends hoped to 
gain public and political support for the domestic well legislation. The group also 
intended to impact the management of state water resources and advocate specific 
water resource management recommendations contained in a 1000 Friends water 
report. 
During this time, 1000 Friends was also active at the local and regional levels, where 
it pursued its water agenda, including participating in the development and imple-
mentation of regional water plans. In the Albuquerque and Middle Rio Grande region, 
activities included: 
● continued work to defeat bond issues for road projects; 
● monitoring policy developments for the Planned Growth Strategy; 
● advancing policy changes to the Subdivision Act, the Development Process 
Manual, and the Zoning Ordinance; 
● promoting the passage of city-county unification; 
● advocating water conservation and budget policies and balanced water 
planning. 
In the Sante Fe area and Northern New Mexico, activities included: 
● pursuing the purchase of development rights program in Rio Arriba; 
● supporting an open space program for Taos, an agricultural protection pro-
gram in Valencia County; 
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● conducting a Sante Fe Regional Water Authority feasibility study; 
● supporting a Taos Housing Group’s press for more affordable housing 
projects. 
All of the Coalition members recognized how importance of working on imple-
mentation as well as legislation. 1,000 Friends held workshops around the state to edu-
cate land owners on the new Land Conservation Incentives Act. The New Mexico 
Public Interest Research Group did the same around transferable development rights. 
Unfortunately, at this point the Surface Transportation Policy Project decided to wind 
down its efforts, although some of the Project’s staff planned to continue these efforts 
through another entity. 
With no big issues looming in the legislature, it was even harder to sustain the 
momentum of the Coalition. The group’s common purpose had been helping to make 
the governor a proponent of smart growth and to pass 2003 legislation. With a sup-
portive governor in place, the level of urgency was diminished, and with it the drive to 
work cohesively dwindled. This made it harder to organize. The Coalition also lacked 
a coherent vision for where to go next. Governance issues that had been quietly sim-
mering bubbled up again. The executive committee questioned the budget and the role 
of 1000 Friends. New Coalition members questioned the role of the executive com-
mittee. In the midst of these problems, Surdna Foundation funding ended. Facing a 
loss of funding, the Coalition did not have time to repair itself. 
Some leading members of the Coalition believed that it could have been reinvigo-
rated with the right staff and leadership. However, 1000 Friends and the few Coalition 
executive committee members who were still active agreed that the Coalition should 
evolve into a much looser network. They decided that the network would keep many 
of the positive aspects of the Coalition, including the listserv, annual conference, train-
ing opportunities, and organizing for specific legislation, but there would be no mem-
bership requirement or executive committee. Nor would there be any expectations for 
what members might give or get. 1,000 Friends would become a hub, calling people to 
offer support and responding to their requests for help – particularly requests to con-
nect to other interests under the smart growth umbrella. This model suited member’s 
needs, while it retaining the option to become a formal coalition again if there was a 
sufficiently powerful policy agenda. 
Results 
While the Coalition was frustrating to some, most believe that it was a success. It 
enabled people who had never before collaborated to work together. Organizations that 
had been at odds, such as the Acequia organizations and environmentalists, cooperated 
effectively on the state policy agenda. The Coalition had never expanded to include 
county planners and businesses, as was originally planned, but it had a broad support 
base nonetheless. Observers give the Coalition credit for the strength of Richardson’s 
support for smart growth policies. Moreover, the Coalition experience was invaluable 
to 1000 Friends in establishing its now successful Alliance for Active Living, which has 
active participation from government planners, advocacy groups, and businesses. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
44 livability and smart growth 
By the end of Surdna’s five-year Initiative, the Coalition had changed the nature of 
the debate about growth in New Mexico. 
● Fifty percent of the City Council members in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Las 
Cruces had come to support smart growth policies. 
● Albuquerque’s mayor said that smart growth was the future of Albuquerque. 
State legislative support also was much stronger. 
● The highway department’s name was changed to the Department of 
Transportation, and it became active in context-sensitive design. 
● While five years earlier, the highway commissioner was unwilling even to talk 
about public transit, the Department of Transportation began to shift to an 
inter-modal strategy. 
● The state backed away from a plan to widen an interstate road. 
● There was statewide support for transit planning, and there was active debate 
about transportation infrastructure, although funding issues loomed. 
● Unlike five years earlier, decisions in New Mexico regarding land use includ-
ed concerns about water. 
Due in large part to the efforts of 1000 Friends and the Coalition, Governor 
Richardson is an advocate of smarter growth. 
● He is currently considering an executive order mandating context-sensitive 
design in all state transportation projects. 
● He created a Smart Growth Task Force to develop proposed legislation for the 
next legislative session. The Task Force included five business sector members 
(including developers), five local government representatives, and five smart 
growth advocates. 
● He supported domestic legislation on wells, which had been under consider-
ation for five years, but had not yet received gubernatorial backing. 
● He committed to expanding rail transportation and expressed interest in 
transit-oriented development and incentive-based regional planning. This 
should result in more opportunities to cluster housing and development 
around transit. 
● He mandated that commuter rail be operating between the cities of Belen, 
Albuquerque, and Bernalillo by the end of 2005. 
● He requested the help of Hank Dittmar, the then-Executive Director of the 
New Mexico-based Reconnecting America, and the Middle Region Council of 
Governments. 
Attitudes in the private sector were also starting to evolve: home builders and real-
tors were coming around. The National Association of Industrial and Office Properties 
originally opposed the Albuquerque Planned Growth Strategy, but at a 2004 forum on 
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who really pays for growth in Albuquerque, two member developers got up and said 
that impact fees are a good thing. Many Surdna Foundation grantees have had a real 
say among builders about how New Mexico should grow. In Albuquerque, 1000 
Friends began working side by side with the National Association of Property Owners 
and First National Bank of Sante Fe on a speakers series on smart growth issues. It also 
had a good working relationship with the Central New Mexico Home Builders 
Association. Homebuilders who would not talk to 1000 Friends a year earlier served 
with 1000 Friends on the Governor’s Task Force. 1,000 Friends was no longer seen as 
anti-growth. 
In Albuquerque, the Planned Growth Strategy, downtown revitalization, and 
growing commitment to Bus Rapid Transit and commuter rail were all significant 
changes. Even though the county did not join the city in embracing smart growth, the 
Council of Governments began to work well with the governor and smart growth 
community. 
What Happens Next 
There are many challenges ahead. 
● The most conservative faction of the development community has not 
budged. Real estate industry groups continue to raise funds to promote polit-
ical candidates who are friendly to sprawling development. These realtors 
serve on the Smart Growth Task Forces and are generally better prepared than 
smart growth proponents (Leinberger 2004). 
● Institutional changes are not yet engrained, and smart growth advocates have 
not yet cultivated significant internal champions at the Department of 
Transportation or any other state agencies. 
● Housing permits still are predominantly in the fringe areas. There are some 
new-mixed use developments, such as Mesa Del Sol, which could take some 
pressure off of fringe development, and more in-town housing is being devel-
oped, but these are exceptions. 
● The fight to stop new roads that will cause unnecessary sprawl continues, 
including the proposed extension of an existing road through the Petroglyph 
National Monument. The extension would promote sprawl on Albuquerque’s 
west side. The New Mexico Environmental Law Center is currently litigating 
a case filed in February, 2005 to prevent construction of this road. 
1,000 Friends and the other founders of the Coalition understand that it will be a 
very long time before they will achieve fundamental change in decisions about growth 
and even longer before they will be able to document changes in growth patterns. 
However, the progress to date has inspired actions for the future. 
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what it takes to do this work 
The Surdna Foundation’s New Mexico smart growth campaign budget was about 
$340,000 per year: 
$75,000 for the campaign director; 
$55,000 for field staff; 
$49,000 for outreach projects including Businesses for Balanced Growth; 
$27,000 for annual meeting costs; 
$34,000 for expenses such as steering committee meetings and organizational 
improvement; 
$42,000 for statewide transportation advocacy by the Surface Transportation 
Policy Project; 
$20,000 for the New Mexico Conference of Churches; and 
$28,000 for the New Mexico Environmental Law Center (also for trans-
portation-related work). 
Other funders supporting the work of 1000 Friends included the McCune 
Foundation, Hewlett and Turner foundations, the Educational Foundation for 
America, and the Thaw Charitable Trust. The Beldon Foundation provided support 
for the New Mexico Conference of Churches for activities that were complementary. 
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The Maryland Story: Top Down and 
Bottom Up 
Two Case Studies – Assisting a Visioning 
Process in Baltimore and Improving the State 
Policies of a Supportive Governor 
context 
Maryland is a small, largely urban state. 
It has the third highest median house-
hold income18 and among the lowest 
18 According to the 2000 U.S. 
Census. poverty rates in the nation. It ranks first 
among the states in the percentage of 
professional and technical workers in the 
workforce (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, 2002). The 
Baltimore Harbor is a shining example of 
urban redevelopment. At the same time, 
Baltimore has some of the poorest neighborhoods of any city in the United States. 
Nearly half a million people live in poverty in Maryland – and much of this poverty 
is concentrated in Baltimore (Mark 2001). 
In the urban centers of Maryland, families have been a part of specific neighbor-
hoods for generations and they tend to hold a special affinity for their neighborhoods 
(Mark 2001). Still, many have felt unable to leave because of zoning restrictions that 
limited their opportunities to move elsewhere, (e.g. minimum lot sizes that prevent 
building small homes or apartments). These neighborhoods have repeatedly watched 
economic benefits pass them by on the way to the suburbs. Abject poverty and a sub-
current of racism add elements of complexity to the history of growth in the city and 
the region (Mark 2001). 
Maryland is generally a politically progressive state, although it can be deceptively 
conservative in some areas. Baltimore City and the Washington-area suburbs of 
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19 These areas are very conser-
vative when it comes to 
“affordable housing.” 
Montgomery and Prince George’s County are reliably liberal, while rural counties are 
more conservative. The Baltimore-area suburbs of Baltimore County and Anne 
Arundel County tend to swing depend-
ing on the issue19 or the election. In this 
mildly divisive political climate, the 
Chesapeake Bay is a defining feature that 
transcends the state’s political spectrum. 
Part of the state’s history and identity, the 
Bay is close to a universal concern among 
Marylanders. 
Sprawling development patterns in 
Maryland over the past few decades have 
dramatically changed the state’s landscape. From 1985 to 1997, Maryland’s population 
grew by 19 percent while the state’s developed land increased by 35 percent. From 1997 to 
2002, Maryland farmers stopped working 115,000 acres of agricultural land. Maryland 
expects to add another million people and to lose another half million acres of land to 
development within 20 years (Baltimore Sun, December 2002). While the greater 
Baltimore region experienced seven percent population growth during the 1990s, 
Baltimore was the fastest-shrinking major city in the nation. At the same time, outer 
counties like Harford and Carroll were growing at several times the regional average, 20 
and 22 percent respectively. Howard County population grew by nearly one-third. 
Smart growth already was part of the lexicon among 
policy-oriented people and government staff in 
Maryland in the 1990s. In 1992, the state passed the 
Maryland Economic Growth, Resource Protection and 
Planning Act. In 1997, Governor Parris Glendening per-
suaded the General Assembly to enact a package of 
smart growth legislation, the thrust of which was to 
require local governments to designate areas inside 
which growth had to meet certain density criteria and 
outside of which they would have to forego state infra-
structure investment. The 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act 
was a non-regulatory model that tried to focus growth 
in designated growth areas by using fiscal incentives and 
disincentives. The incentives included: 
● use of the state budget to encourage redevelopment, infill development, and 
preservation; 
● transportation-related improvements around rail transit stations; 
● voluntary cleanup of brownfields; and 
● small businesses and job creation in revitalization areas (Lucero 2000). 
While there was much room for improvement, the state’s top-down and very pub-
lic commitment to smart growth principles was considered a national model. 
Governor Parris Glendening 
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Maryland’s smart growth policies also faced a number of challenges. Many desig-
nated smart growth areas were in existing communities that opposed infill and rede-
velopment projects. Many local governments did not like the state being involved in 
land use policy, even if directing growth into smart growth areas was voluntary. Still, 
the climate for state policy improvement in 2000 was good, with a supportive gover-
nor who would be in office for several more years. This was significant, as Maryland’s 
governor is one of the two most powerful governors in the nation.20 Strengthening 
Maryland’s smart growth policies as quickly as possible was a matter of both oppor-
tunity and urgency, since it was unlikely that the next governor would have as great an 
interest in smart growth as Governor Glendening. 
the role of the surdna foundation grantees 
Many organizations known to the Surdna Foundation were helping Maryland to real-
ize the potential of its statewide smart growth policy and to press for improvements. 
Supporters included the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the League of Conservation 
Voters Education Fund, 1000 Friends of Maryland, and Environmental Defense, 
among others. The Surdna Foundation had also already supported the Citizen 
Planning and Housing Association in forming the Baltimore Regional Partnership and 
the first two years of its very successful work on transportation reform. The partners 
in forming the Baltimore Regional Partnership included Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
1000 Friends of Maryland, the Baltimore Urban League, Environmental Defense, and 
the Citizens Planning and Housing Association. The Baltimore Regional Partnership’s 
efforts had already helped to divert $140 million from three highway expansions to 
travel demand management. The Partnership’s goals were to shift more transportation 
resources, promote mixed-income communities, and preserve rural land. 
In response to the Surdna Initiative, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the other 
partners of the Baltimore Regional Partnership agreed to integrate their smart growth 
activities at the state, regional, and local levels. The joint project was led by the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the largest nonprofit conservation organization working 
exclusively to restore the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay. The Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation and Baltimore Regional Partnership agreed to engage other partners as 
necessary, including the Maryland Public Interest Research Foundation and the 
Maryland League of Conservation Voters. 
Many of the members of this 
Partnership brought authority and 
power to the table (Mark 2001). The 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the 
Baltimore Partnership were key players 
in what would happen on larger public 
policy issues in the state. All of the 
partners were important to the pro-
posed work plan, especially since the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation’s focus on 
20 New Jersey’s is the other one. 
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the Chesapeake Bay and farmland preservation had not engendered strong relation-
ships with low- and moderate-income housing and economic development advocates. 
The centerpiece of the regional strategy that the partners presented to the Surdna 
Foundation was development of a regional vision plan that would integrate land use 
and transportation for the Baltimore area. The idea was to demonstrate the applica-
tion of state smart growth policies and provide a vehicle for improvements to these 
policies. In addition to work on the regional vision plan, the partners agreed to pursue 
opportunities to achieve smart growth policies at the local and state levels. 
The role of the Baltimore Regional Partnership was especially important because it 
had a much broader base and set of interests than the environment, including housing 
and transportation. While the state was making progress on saving open space, much 
more needed to be done to redevelop existing communities and neighborhoods. To 
this end, the Surdna Foundation funded the Baltimore Regional Partnership to work 
on a broader suite of issues, all of which seemed important to the future of smart 
growth in the Baltimore area. These included: 
● development of regional indicators; 
● continued work on transportation plans and issues; 
● making housing in attractive neighborhoods affordable for families of mod-
erate means through new investment products; and 
● rural land preservation through downzoning or programs to transfer devel-
opment rights. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation received Surdna support to assist the Baltimore 
Regional Partnership in the implementation and expansion of smart growth policy at 
the state level and in fostering understanding of smart growth statewide. The 
Foundation’s ultimate goal was to reduce the loss of forestland and farmland to devel-
opment as a way to protect the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay. Proposed activities 
included: 
● communications and outreach; 
● creating local models; 
● producing growth and accountability report cards; 
● providing endorsements for smart growth projects; and 
● advocacy (Mofson 2001). 
As a part of the Surdna Initiative, the Surdna Foundation made a separate grant to 
the Maryland Public Interest Research Foundation, which intended to focus on trans-
portation and land use issues. Its foci were: 
● sustainable public transportation systems; 
● smart transportation choices at the state and county levels, such as transit, 
walking, and biking; and 
● stronger links between transportation and land use decisions. 
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from the bottom up: a case study of a visioning process
to plan a region’s future 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the other members of the Baltimore Regional 
Partnership decided that the Baltimore region needed a visioning process to reveal 
what the public wanted for the region. They believed that if the public had a chance to 
express its interest, people would support smarter growth, giving it greater political 
punch at the local level where land use decisions are made. The Baltimore Regional 
Partnership encouraged the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board – the region’s 
metropolitan planning organization – to undertake such a process for several years. 
When it seemed that the Transportation Board would delay indefinitely, the 
Partnership started to prepare for the process on its own. However, in 2001 the 
Baltimore Regional Transportation Board made good on its commitment of a year 
earlier, and the Baltimore region’s elected officials launched Vision 2030 in May of that 
year. The Baltimore Regional Partnership thought perhaps this was for the best, 
expecting that local elected officials would buy in to a process they had led and would 
have to implement. Donald Fry, president of the Greater Baltimore Committee, the 
region’s primary business association, agreed to chair the visioning process. 
If it was successful, Vision 2030 would produce a baseline and shared vision that the 
Baltimore Regional Transportation Board could use for regional planning for the first 
time. The visioning process had the potential to shift thinking about planning in the 
Baltimore Metropolitan region. It was also challenging because of the many complex 
issues and interests that the process hoped to corral into one shared vision (Mark June 
2001). Although the Baltimore Regional Partnership hoped the visioning process 
would help to implement state smart growth policies in the Baltimore region, this was 
off the table in any deliberate sense. Local suburban officials in the region were resist-
ant to the state’s smart growth laws and to having the state play any role in the vision-
ing process. 
It was agreed that there should be a Vision 2030 Coordination Committee, which 
would make decisions on the process and materials created for the process, as well as 
an Oversight Committee that would represent environmental, social equity, business, 
smart growth, and other interests. In order to have a unified process, local officials 
agreed that the Baltimore Regional Partnership and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation 
should participate on both of these committees. 
In September 2001, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation hired a planner to provide staff 
support for both the vision plan and the Baltimore Regional Partnership. The planner 
researched regional vision planning throughout the country. Based on the planner’s 
recommendations, the Partnership decided to follow the visioning process model that 
had been implemented in Salt Lake City, Utah and Portland, Oregon.21 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership convinced the Coordinating Committee for 
Vision 2030 to undertake rigorous analysis of the growth and transportation options 
for the Baltimore region, as had been done for Envision Utah and was underway as 
part of the Chicago Metropolis Plan process. The Baltimore Regional Partnership 
agreed to pay for the extra modeling costs and retained Smart Mobility, Inc., the group 
that was also doing the modeling in Chicago, to project the impact of different growth 
21 This process was developed 
by Fregonese and Calthorpe 
Associates. 
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and transportation scenarios. Together with the Oversight Committee, the Baltimore 
Regional Partnership developed four scenarios: 
1. current trends and plans; 
2. reduced transit infrastructure and more highway expansion; 
3. mass transit investment, mixed-use development, and less highway 
expansion; and 
4. mixed-use redevelopment with little expansion of transportation 
infrastructure. 
Findings were that the options that emphasized transit and redevelopment would 
save significant open space, provide greater housing options, reduce air and water 
pollution, reduce additional time spent in cars and consumption of gasoline by 
new households, and boost increases in walking and transit trips and accessibility 
to transit of new households and jobs. The Baltimore Regional Partnership also 
worked with consultants to develop case studies to illustrate the impact of growth 
at the community level. These simulations were presented by Vision 2030 facilita-
tors at public meetings. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership also recommended that the Coordinating 
Committee for Vision 2030 increase the number of public meetings from seven to 
seventeen. Surdna Foundation funding underwrote the additional ten meetings. 
However, the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board, the Baltimore Metropolitan 
Council and Vision 2030 consultants did little to publicize the meetings, especially in 
comparison to the broad outreach undertaken for Envision Utah. The Baltimore 
Regional Partnership and its member organizations publicized the meetings to their 
own membership lists. With funds from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation grant from 
the Surdna Foundation, Citizens Planning and Housing Association hired six region-
al organizers –  one for each county in the region and one for the city – to generate 
public turnout. About 500 residents attended the 17 meetings, which was substantial-
ly lower than expected. 
At the Vision 2030 public meetings, similar to the Envision Utah survey process, 
participants were shown the four scenarios and asked to choose their preferred sce-
nario for each of the indicators for the region that was most important to them. The 
surveys indicated a clear preference for scenarios that emphasized mass transit and 
redevelopment. The participants in the public meetings supported increased regional 
coordination, investment in transit, regional social equity, and environmental quality. 
The president of the Greater Baltimore Committee presented the final Vision 2030 
report to the region’s chief elected officials in February 2003. The report consisted of 
15 vision statements and over 100 strategies addressing economic development, educa-
tion, environment, government and public policy, livable communities, and trans-
portation. The ideals laid out in the vision statements included: 
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● a reliable and efficient transit system; 
● diversity of housing choices for all ages and income groups; and 
● clearly defined borders between developed areas and open space. 
The report and the Vision 2030 process were not obvious successes in the short-
term. While the vision statements and the strategies in the final report contained 
important recommendations, there was little focus or cohesion. There were no prior-
ities among strategies or firm timeframes for implementation. The process was neither 
energizing nor captivating. The findings were also not widely publicized. The Vision 
did not capture the imagination of regional business leaders, other opinion leaders, or 
the public at large, as Envision Utah’s Quality Growth Strategy seemed to have done. 
In short, it did not whet the appetite for implementation. 
The Greater Baltimore Committee was asked to facilitate a process to decide what 
entity would oversee implementation of the Vision 2030 recommendations, but this 
was delayed and then delayed again. Some local elected officials resisted the report’s 
recommendations. Business leaders at the Greater Baltimore Committee chose not to 
urge implementation. Neither the business community nor any of the other stake-
holders were galvanized to implement the Vision. The Baltimore Regional Partnership 
decided it was not worth investing further time in the process. 
On the positive side, the public had responded very favorably to Baltimore Regional 
Partnership’s modeling of four scenarios for the future. A regional poll showed that 
two-thirds of the public supported an affordable housing requirement for new devel-
opment and even more supported other positive measures. Also, the Baltimore 
Regional Partnership model contained enhancements to the Baltimore Regional 
Transportation Board’s transportation model that could be useful in the future. The 
Partnership turned its model over to the Regional Transportation Board with the hope 
that it would be used to generate transportation plans with higher sensitivity to the 
positive impact smart growth and transportation alternatives might have on traffic 
congestion and air quality. 
The most positive outcome of Vision 2030 may be that it laid the groundwork for a 
new effort to bring a rapid transit system to the Baltimore region that would be on par 
with the Washington, DC system. The Baltimore Regional Partnership and its mem-
bers, including 1000 Friends of Maryland, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Citizens 
Planning and Housing Association, Environmental Defense, and Greater Baltimore 
Urban League, had been supporting 
greater transportation choices for 
Baltimore for years. Two Citizens 
Planning and Housing Association lead-
ers served on an advisory committee 
charged by the Maryland Department of 
Transportation with developing a new 
vision for high-quality rapid transit in 
the Baltimore region. The Regional 
Partnership monitored this process with 
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active interest. The resulting report recommended expanding the region’s existing 43 
miles of rail transit to a comprehensive 109-mile system for metropolitan area mobil-
ity. It also suggested supporting revitalization near the stations and channeling new 
growth into targeted growth areas. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership saw an opportunity to achieve multiple aspects 
of Vision 2030, such as a greater concentration of growth at the region’s center and 
expansion of transportation choices. It also saw an opportunity to capitalize on the 
new relationships it had formed with the business community and other constituen-
cies through the Vision 2030 process. By the fall of 2002, it shifted its attention from 
Vision 2030 to regional transit. The Partnership saw its niche as making sure that the 
land use aspects of the rail plan received adequate attention. 
Together with the Greater Baltimore Committee, the Baltimore Regional 
Partnership hosted a December 2002 breakfast that attracted 130 business and civic 
leaders to discuss the transit initiative. At the breakfast, the Partnership released a 
report, Transportation Choices: Vibrant Places. Development Opportunities Along the 
Proposed Regional Rail System, which showed that nearly half the region’s projected job 
growth by 2025 and one-fifth of its projected household growth could be accommo-
dated along the new rail system’s lines. This was in accordance existing local plans for 
redevelopment. The report received significant media attention and elevated the dis-
cussion of the land use aspects of the rail plan. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership worked with the Greater Baltimore Committee 
to prepare a white paper on the opportunity to build a high performance rail system 
for Baltimore for the newly elected Republican governor, Robert Ehrlich, who took 
office in January 2003. The white paper had the backing of the Greater Baltimore 
Committee president Don Fry, Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley, county executives, 
state legislators, and the Baltimore region’s members of Congress. The Baltimore Sun 
editorial board also came out in support of the project. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership did not yet have sufficiently broad support. 
The transit plan was in direct competition with a new highway for the Washington 
region of Maryland, and highway supporters were opposed to all other transit initia-
tives. The governor tended to agree with the highway proponents. The Partnership 
realized that it had to build a broader and stronger private sector coalition. By March 
2003, it had recruited an informal network of 30 supporters for the project, half from 
business groups and half from other civic, transit, environmental, and housing organ-
izations and coalitions. The Partnership also coordinated with the Greater Baltimore 
Committee on an ad hoc basis, which was increasingly important within the new state 
administration. In fact, when at first Governor Ehrlich declined to request initial con-
struction funds for the Baltimore Transit Plan through the federal TEA-2122 reautho-
rization process, the Greater Baltimore Committee, the Partnership, and local elected 
officials reacted so strongly in unison that the administration relented. This was a 
small victory, but it gave the Partnership a chance to work together with the local offi-
cials with whom it had been at odds during the Vision 2030 process. At this point, the 
Partnership decided that it needed a more formal entity to champion the implemen-
tation of the transit plan. 
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The Partnership began to look for partners to create a coalition powerful enough 
to get the rail plan built. With the encouragement of the Baltimore Community 
Foundation and business leaders on its board, the Greater Baltimore Committee 
agreed to house and organize the Baltimore Transit Alliance. This staffed, three-year 
effort had funding of $250,000 per year from the Goldseker Foundation, the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, and the Baltimore Community Foundation. Each of the Baltimore 
Regional Partnership’s member organizations received a seat on the steering commit-
tee, as did the Transit Riders League and other community leaders. The goal of the 
Baltimore Transit Alliance was to secure funding for the first two phases of the transit 
plan, including federal funding through the surface transportation bill, TEA-3.23 The 
state would still have to come up with some funding to demonstrate its commitment. 
Most of the effort in 2004 went to winning state and federal funding, but work also 
began on facilitating a dialog within the communities of the region to head off dis-
putes about alignments and station areas. The Citizens Planning and Housing 
Association began to convene meetings to discuss development around the transit 
stops. It pulled together examples of successful community-oriented transit-oriented 
development, and began showing them to community leaders. The Association also 
started a communities and transit committee to guide work around land use and 
opportunities for transit related to the Transit Plan. When the Citizens Planning and 
Housing Association found that local leaders needed to see concrete examples with 
their own eyes, it began to bring experts to Baltimore and take community leaders to 
other regions to show them what was possible. In sum, the Citizens Planning and 
Housing Association set about becoming the place community leaders could turn to 
for help with transit-oriented development. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership’s founders believe that the Transit Plan can 
succeed where Vision 2030 failed. It has a much broader base of support. Because of 
high-level business leadership, it can be bolder. While staff for Vision 2030 consisted of 
a consultant on contract to the Baltimore Metropolitan Council (the council of gov-
ernments), the Greater Baltimore Committee has its own employee supporting the 
Alliance. The member organizations and other participants have learned a great deal 
about how to work together across constituencies, what motivates the business com-
munity, and what political pressures local 
governments face. There is urgency 
about the Transit Plan that Vision 2030 
distinctly lacked. People have a sense that 
if they don’t act now, an opportunity will 
slip away. Business leaders are worried 
about increasing road congestion. They 
recognize that Baltimore does not have a 
top quality transit system and that such a 
system is part of a high performance 
region. 
23 The Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) 
expired in October 2003. The 
third iteration of the Act, 
which is still under consider-
ation in Congress, has been 
dubbed TEA-3. 
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Everything that has been learned is being applied to the effort to achieve a com-
prehensive rail system for the Baltimore region. To succeed, this effort will require 
even stronger transit alliances; better messaging and communications capacity; 
and greater understanding of the economics of transit-oriented development and 
housing markets. The next few years will determine if there is enough energy to 
make it happen. 
from the top down: a case study of long-term policy
advocacy to improve state smart growth policies 
In 1999, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had three major objectives for smart growth 
policy in Maryland: 
● ensuring effective implementation of existing state smart growth initiatives; 
● expanding smart growth policy to be more inclusive of state infrastructure 
development and spending; and 
● building public understanding and support for smart growth. 
The Foundation’s state legislative strategy was based upon the assumption that the 
next governor would be a Democrat who generally supported smart growth. Its strat-
egy was to support the passage of as much smart growth legislation as possible, antic-
ipating that the next governor would maintain existing programs and support their 
implementation. 
In late 1999, the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation collaborated with 1000 
Friends of Maryland to publish a critique 
of implementation of Maryland’s smart 
growth laws called Making Smart Growth 
Smarter: Recommendations for Increasing 
the Effectiveness of Smart Growth and for 
Expanding its Application Through New 
Initiatives. The report included an exten-
sive analysis of local water and sewer 
planning, an evaluation of local respons-
es to state smart growth planning requirements, and a review of state capital agency 
implementation of smart growth policies and procedures. It also called to light: 
● deficiencies in local plans and calculations for sizing Smart Growth Areas des-
ignated by counties; 
● the lack of implementation procedures and guidelines for state agencies; 
● a poor record of targeting projects to priority locations; 
Making Smart Growth Smarter 
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● under-funding for land conservation efforts; 
● the absence of legally required reviews of projects with regional impact. 
The report garnered favorable reactions from Governor Parris Glendening, some 
legislators, and several citizen groups active in the sprawl debate. In fact, Governor 
Glendening specifically responded to the report, stating his intentions to: 
● increase funding for the Rural Legacy Program24 from $25 million to $40 24 The Rural Legacy Program 
provides funds to preserve million; 
large contiguous areas of 
● direct the Maryland Office of Planning to review projects of regional land with significant farm, 
forest, historic and environ-significance; mental resources. The pro-
gram has stimulated preser-● introduce brownfields corrective legislation; 
vation planning and forma-
tion of partnerships, but it is ● present a bill to elevate the Maryland Office of Planning to a cabinet level 
criticized for not effectively agency; combining resources to be 
protected, including farm-
● create a staff position to promote a Live Near Your Work program, which pro- land, forestland, natural 
vided $3,000 to employees to live in target neighborhoods near their places of areas, and greenbelts 
employment; (Vermont Smart Growth 
Collaborative 2003). 
● instruct his smart growth sub-cabinet to respond to all of the report’s recom-
mendations. 
Observers agreed that pressure from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation helped the 
governor to advance his own agenda for smart growth. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation continued to use the report to engage the admin-
istration and General Assembly. It also reached out to various editorial boards, includ-
ing the Washington Post, to communicate its ideas for land use and transportation 
reform. The Foundation took advantage of the momentum built through publicity 
about the report to advocate for new legislation. It proposed and advocated for the 
development and use of smart growth-related performance standards and criteria by 
the Maryland Department of Transportation. It developed a public relations campaign 
for this effort, as well as for efforts to promote a “smart codes” initiative to upgrade 
local building codes, changes to water and sewer planning requirements, and new sep-
tic system legislation. At the same time, the Foundation led or was part of a number of 
efforts to oppose road projects by filing technical and legal comments and using con-
sultants to suggest viable alternatives that would contribute less to sprawl. The 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its partners were able to slow a number of projects 
that would have contributed greatly to sprawl. 
While the Chesapeake Bay Foundation continued to place highest priority on 
improving state policy while Governor Glendening was still in office, it also knew it 
was important to institutionalize state policy gains at the county level. The Foundation 
believed that report cards were an important tool for highlighting where smart growth 
progress could be improved at the county level. It created a county report card tem-
plate, which 1,000 Friends of Maryland used for a smart growth analysis of the local 
comprehensive plans and ordinances of five suburban Baltimore counties. The analy-
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25 This legislation was adapted 
from Oregon State perform-
ance goals for metropolitan 
regions. 
26 Two years later, the Maryland 
Department of 
Transportation had still not 
implemented the intent of 
the law. It chose to assess its 
performance as an agency, 
rather than the performance 
of the transportation sys-
tems. The Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation is considering 
more advocacy, perhaps 
including hearings, to get 
the Department of Transpor-
tation to implement the law. 
sis showed that the counties could do much more to manage growth. It also indicated 
that much of the growth was rural areas, regardless of what comprehensive plans said. 
The analysis attracted some attention, but played a role in policy change only much 
later, when some observers believe it contributed to Carroll County elections that 
brought about a sea change in county smart growth policies. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation decided to try recruiting local grassroots advo-
cates to complete “report cards” for every county as a way of promoting government 
accountability. It found a partner in Anne Arundel County and, with training and sup-
port from the Maryland League of Conservation Voters, a countywide alliance of 
smart growth activists formed in Anne Arundel County. As its inaugural activity, the 
alliance began preparing scorecards that rated the performances of the executive 
administration and the county council on various growth-related issues for distribu-
tion through the press. At the same time, the Foundation prepared briefing papers on 
transportation, air quality, and water quality for use in developing scores on these sub-
jects. It was difficult for the county activists to work together and finish the report. 
They were able to complete the report card before county elections, which allowed 
them to highlight candidate positions on smart growth, but the county effort fizzled 
out about a year later. 
In sum, the report card tool achieved mixed results at the county level. The Anne 
Arundel County smart growth report card received strong publicity and perhaps had 
some impact on policy. However, the time it took to organize local activists and com-
plete it was far greater than the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had anticipated. The data 
collection required seemed to intimidate people. No other county grassroots organi-
zations expressed interest in preparing report cards, and the Foundation decided not 
to invest more time in them for the time being. Instead, it produced educational pam-
phlets such as Stopping Sprawl, Debunking Sprawl Myths, and Smart Transportation, all  
of which focused on increasing public understanding of the problems and solutions. 
Another of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation’s strategies for solidifying and increas-
ing legislative gains was to develop the business constituency for smart growth in 
Maryland. The Foundation worked in partnership with the Urban Land Institute to 
form the Baltimore Smart Growth Alliance in 1999. This was a diverse group of region-
al leaders, including developers, civic organizations, business leaders and members of 
the public sector. The objective of the alliance was to help smart growth development 
projects overcome barriers, such as financing, neighborhood opposition, and inade-
quate brownfields legislation. The group developed a priority list of barriers to address. 
Unfortunately, this seemingly promising process for engaging the business communi-
ty faltered and ended when changes in leadership at the Urban Land Institute reduced 
the available resources, and therefore the group’s ability to make headway. 
Meanwhile, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had succeeded with a number of state 
legislation proposals. For example, in 2000, its advocacy state transportation perform-
ance goals contributed to passage of the Maryland Transportation Performance Goals 
Act,25 which required the state Department of Transportation to report annually on its 
progress toward specific, measurable transportation performance goals.26 The 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its allies also were successful in their support of pas-
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sage of smart codes legislation, which created the Maryland Building Rehabilitation 
Code Program to encourage investment in existing neighborhoods. During this same 
time, bills for historic preservation tax credit, transit funding and farebox recovery, 
and critical areas also passed. 
Late in 2001, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation chose a new target at the local level. 
Various studies had indicated that excessive rural growth was occurring in counties with 
weak rural zoning. The Foundation anticipated that rural zoning would be debated in 
the 2002 elections in several counties, including Charles, Carroll, Harford, and the six 
counties comprising Maryland’s Upper Eastern Shore. It decided that its resources for 
local work would be best spent on efforts to improve rural zoning in target counties. 
Because of the time and effort required to organize in counties, the Foundation 
chose to work in just two counties: St. Mary’s and Charles. The Foundation developed 
a strategy that included grassroots organizers, newspaper ads, mailings, printed mate-
rials, and other advocacy activities. Work at this level was difficult. For example, the 
Foundation was able to demonstrate public support for stronger rural zoning in St. 
Mary’s County by attending hearings and public meetings, sending letters to the edi-
tor, and coordinating calls and letters to local legislators, but County Commissioners 
still adopted five-acre zoning.27 
The Foundation also strengthened its public education 
efforts at the county level. It published a brochure entitled 
Six Things Your Next County Officials Can Do to Help Save 
the Bay in advance of the November 2002 elections. This 
leaflet was intended to encourage voters to press candidates 
for county executive and county councils on their posi-
tions on key land use issues and willingness to improve 
their county’s standing. It highlighted data on the 
Maryland counties that were experiencing the greatest loss 
of farmland, forestland, and other data. 
The November 2002 elections came as something of a 
surprise. While many of the local officials elected were 
more supportive of smart growth, a Republican governor won. When Governor 
Robert Ehrlich took office, there were many smart growth laws on the books as well as 
initiatives that reflected good intentions for land conservation. However, Governor 
Ehrlich dismissed these in the face of large budget deficits. He did not come out direct-
ly against smart growth, but he did make it clear that smart growth was a low priority 
for him. For example, Governor Ehrlich was part of a decision to exempt the Route 32 
road-widening project from the state’s smart growth laws, even though the govern-
ment study completed for the project showed it would cause extensive sprawl. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other Maryland smart growth advocates had 
to move from a proactive to a defensive strategy. The Foundation planned a media 
campaign to defend existing smart growth programs and, especially, to prevent diver-
sion of the state’s dedicated land conservation funding to efforts to reduce the budget 
deficit. Advocates knew programs would have to be cut because of the deficit, but they 
hoped to influence where the cuts would be made. 
Bay Watershed 
27 By encouraging consistent 
medium-sized plots, five-acre 
zoning does not promote 
smart growth and it fails to 
protect ecosystems and agri-
cultural land. It would have 
been preferable to have zon-
ing for high density in some 
areas and low density else-
where. 
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28 In Prince George’s County, 
this program targets farm-
land, woods and wetlands 
along the Patuxent River, pre-
serving wildlife habitats and 
farms. 
29 GreenPrint is a statewide 
strategic conservation initia-
tive to maintain biologically 
diverse landscapes by steer-
ing growth to appropriate 
areas while preserving por-
tions of the landscape to 
protect lands critical to long-
term ecological health. 
In the early 2003 legislative session, Governor Ehrlich severely cut funding for 
many of the programs that had been part of Governor Glendening’s smart growth 
legacy, especially the smart growth land conservation programs Rural Legacy28 and 
GreenPrint.29 The new governor also terminated transportation spending on the 
Maryland Department of Transportation’s Smart Growth and Neighborhood 
Conservation Program, and shifted funds to cover costs associated with the 
Intercounty Connector Highway, which Governor Glendening had refused to fund. 
The Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative had been well-sup-
ported by neighborhoods, as it had provided flexible dollars and resources to assist 
communities that had good revitalization programs to invest in streetscape improve-
ments, bike lanes, pedestrian facilities, and the like. State support for transit also was 
cut. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation was a member of the coalition called Partners for 
Open Spaces, which was able to counter efforts to completely eliminate these pro-
grams and the real estate transfer tax that was funding open space programs. The 
Baltimore Regional Partnership played an especially important role, as it represented 
a broader spectrum of voices speaking for housing, transportation, and environmen-
tal issues. The Partnership had built strong relationships among legislators and local 
officials in the Baltimore region through its education efforts, and in so doing had gar-
nered support for these policies. This is one reason why the Maryland Legislature did 
not eliminate the smart growth laws. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other envi-
ronmental organizations also successfully challenged efforts to enable public-private 
partnerships for transportation project construction that might avoid compliance 
with smart growth, clean air, and environmental impact laws. The Foundation helped 
stop legislation to expand water and sewer service outside of Smart Growth Areas. And 
it was successful in supporting a brownfields bill, which set up a task force to find ways 
to improve the Maryland brownfields program. 
It is not unusual for new governors to have new goals and to shift resources to 
implement these goals. It was not a surprise that Governor Ehrlich began to disman-
tle Maryland’s smart growth infrastructure, especially when the programs had only 
weak support among local officials and in the business community. Governor 
Glendening had created a 15-person Maryland Office of Smart Growth. Governor 
Ehrlich gradually reduced staff in that office. In early 2004, the State Department of 
Planning proposed to eliminate the Office of Smart Growth and shift its responsibili-
ties to the Department of Planning. 
If the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had anticipated that a Republican governor 
would be elected, it probably would have invested more effort in institutionalizing 
existing smart growth policies. But even a year before the election it was expected that 
the Democratic lieutenant governor would be elected governor in 2004. Even if 
Governor Glendening’s lieutenant had not shared his ardor for smart growth, she 
would likely have supported implementation of existing policies. The Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation used the final years of Glendening’s term to make state policy gains with 
the intention of working to institutionalize these gains under the tenure of the new 
governor. Only in hindsight were the flaws of this strategy evident. 
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In the fall of 2003, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation was poised to release a new edi-
tion of its successful Making Growth Smarter report. However, it delayed this release in 
order to focus on an opportunity it saw to do something important for the Chesapeake 
Bay – a choice that reflected the Foundation’s foremost commitment to the 
Chesapeake Bay and water quality. The Foundation shifted its attention to advocating 
a surcharge on sewer bills and septic systems, funds from which would be used to 
upgrade technology in sewer treatment plants around the state. The potential impact 
of reducing nitrogen pollution in the Chesapeake Bay was enormous. The “flush tax” 
became law in April 2004. 
Facing a state government that was making smart growth a much lower priority, the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation shifted more of its attention to strategic actions at the 
county level. The 2002 elections created new opportunities for local smart growth 
advocacy north of Baltimore in Harford and Carroll Counties, east of the Baltimore 
region in Queen Anne’s County, and in Talbot County on Maryland’s eastern shore. In 
Queen Anne’s County an entire slate of pro-growth county commissioners was not re-
elected. Support for smart growth policies also grew in Talbot County. 
In Carroll County, growth became a lightening rod issue, as residents voiced con-
cerns about school crowding, congestion, and vanishing local landscapes. Carroll 
County, long one of Maryland’s most permissive jurisdictions for residential builders, 
imposed a year-long freeze on most projects in June 2003.30 This was a dramatic turn-
around. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership, which had built relationships with local elect-
ed officials and activists throughout the Baltimore region over many years, hired grass-
roots organizers in Harford County and intends to hire an organizer in Carroll 
County. The Harford organizer was initially supervised by the Partnership, and then 
by Citizens Planning and Housing Association. The Carroll organizer will be hired and 
supervised by 1000 Friends of Maryland. 
In late 2003, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation initiated a partnership with the City 
of Annapolis, using Surdna Foundation funds, for the city to hire a Clean Commute 
Coordinator. The goals were to educate businesses about how to use and benefit from 
available Clean Commute incentives and to demonstrate to local and state policymak-
ers that commuter choice incentives could solve traffic congestion and air pollution. 
The coordinator developed the program, created program materials, and began mar-
keting the program. By its second year, the Clean Commute Coordinator had: 
● enlisted various businesses, primarily in the hospitality industry, in the 
commuter choice program; 
● printed and distributed a program description and promotional materials, 
including print, radio, and TV ads; 
● designed and promoted an employer-provided benefit called “Fare-less Cab,” 
which guaranteed a ride home for transit riders, carpoolers, and bicycle and 
pedestrian commuters in the case of unforeseen circumstances. 
30 In mid-2004, Carroll Country 
tightened its development 
approval process 
significantly. 
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The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its partners were able to make some progress 
under the new administration in the Maryland statehouse, especially through a Smart 
Growth Collaborative with members of the business community that it helped to cre-
ate in 2002 with the Urban Land Institute. This was the Foundation’s second attempt 
to create a forum to involve the business community in smart growth efforts. The 
Smart Growth Collaborative brought together business people and developers, as well 
as environmental interests and state and local government, to discuss growth issues 
and try to reach consensus. The Foundation was part of the steering committee and 
hosted the meetings. The Collaborative produced a report with recommendations that 
was submitted to Governor Ehrlich soon after his election. One recommendation was 
that Governor Ehrlich establish a development capacity task force, which he did. 
In 2004, the development capacity task force presented its recommendations to the 
governor. Based on these suggestions, the governor agreed that counties would be 
asked to perform development capacity analyses and that the state would provide tech-
nical support to the counties to do the analysis. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
which served on the task force, expects that the counties will discover that they have 
more land with redevelopment and infill potential than they assume, which will 
expand the existing land inventory. The hope is that counties will attract developers for 
this land, reducing pressure to expand the growth areas designated under state smart 
growth policies. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 1000 Friends of Maryland’s report Making 
Smart Growth Smarter, called for targeting state efforts and capital project funding in 
smart growth areas. In response, Governor Ehrlich created a Priority Places Initiative 
to provide special incentives for development projects in key locations within qualified 
growth areas. Local governments and private parties can nominate these areas and the 
state provides streamlined regulatory reviews and financial assistance through existing 
grant programs. 
An Agricultural Preservation Taskforce established by the legislature completed 
work in the fall of 2004. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which also served on this 
taskforce, helped to ensure that priority preservation areas were part of the discussion. 
Under the proposed concept, the state could create a new pot of money for land 
preservation. To qualify for these incentives, local governments would designate pri-
ority preservation areas that would be certified by the state and commit to take steps 
to prevent development in these areas. The Foundation and the Partners for Open 
Space Coalition, which has 100 member organizations, will consider advocating for the 
introduction of legislation for priority preservation areas as part of its 2006 legislative 
agenda. 
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What Happens Next 
In 2005, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had intended to release a new version of 
Making Smart Growth Smarter, evaluating the consistency of state and local trans-
portation investments with the state’s smart growth program. However, the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation redirected its efforts toward open space preservation 
because of the emergence of state open space preservation as a highly prominent smart 
growth issue in 2005. In response, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation helped form a 
statewide coalition, The Partners for Open Space, to fight for retention of full state 
funding for open space preservation and to counter state efforts to sell off state-owned 
park and open space lands. The coalition was highly successful during the 2005 session 
of the Maryland General Assembly in protecting open space funding, in instituting 
new law requiring the repayment of open space funds diverted to balance the state 
budget, and in instituting new law requiring proposals for the sale of state park and 
open space lands to be aired for public and legislative review. 
As a result of state policies and administrative decisions under Governor 
Glendening, there has been a shift in state expenditures and greatly increased investment 
in downtown areas and other established growth centers in Maryland (Vermont Smart 
Growth Collaborative 2003). Still, the Baltimore Sun reported in April 2004 that, 
although the Smart Growth policies of former Maryland Democratic Governor Parris 
N. Glendening have greatly advanced land protection and urban revitalization since 
1997, the newest Census data indicate a continued population shift to the far suburbs of 
Baltimore and Washington, while inner-ring suburbs stagnate (Green 2004). This is a 
valid observation, but not necessarily an indicator that smart growth policies are failing. 
According to most experts, 10 years is too short a timeframe to achieve systemic 
change in decisions about growth, let alone to see significant changes in develop-
ment patterns. It took 50 years to establish the existing patterns of growth. It will 
take much longer than a decade to reverse the path. 
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Baltimore Regional Partnership, 1000 Friends 
of Maryland, the Maryland Public Interest Research Group, and the other Surdna 
Foundation grantees intend to continue down the same road. They will be on the 
defensive to prevent rollbacks in existing policies and programs. They also will look for 
ways to work with the State administration and to spur change at the local level. 
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what it takes to do this work 
The budget for the first three years of this Initiative was $831,000. The budget for year 
one was $500,000: 
$138,000 for Chesapeake Bay Foundation personnel expenses; 
$29,000 for Baltimore Regional Partnership staff; 
$237,000 for consultants, interns and direct expenses associated with the 
2030 vision plan, report cards, business council development, local case 
studies, etc.; 
$96,000 for administrative costs. 
The Baltimore Regional Initiative and statewide activities of the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation’s Maryland office also received support from the Ford, Morris and 
Gwendolyn Cafritz, Town Creek, Henry M. Jackson, Lockhart Vaughan, Abell, and 
Baltimore Community Foundations, as well as Prince Charitable Trust and the 
Clayton Baker Trust. 
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The New Jersey Story: Bottom Up and 
Top Down 
Two Case Studies – An Insider Approach to    
Impacting State Policy and a Grassroots 
Organizing Effort to Promote Regional Equity 
context 
New Jersey is the most urbanized state in 
the nation. It will likely be the first state 
in the nation to reach full build out, 
probably in the next 50 years. Within the 
state, there is a fierce race to protect open 
space and a struggle to rescue cities and 
inner ring suburbs that are in decline. 
While New Jersey has the highest 
median household income in the 
nation,31 its urban centers continue to be 31 According to the 2000 U.S. 
Census. pockets of institutionalized poverty with 
insufficient resources for urban reinvest-
ment and redevelopment. Data from late in the 1990s showed that Trenton schools had 
poverty rates at or above 71 percent, while all other schools in Mercer County had 
poverty rates at or below 24 percent. Other counties in New Jersey had similar dispar-
ities (Mark 2001). 
While urban leaders fight to save their cities, suburban and rural areas are receiving 
local and state assistance for maintaining open space and the rebuilding of town 
centers. The growth patterns to date seem to be heavily rooted in racism (Mark June 
2001). At the same time, environmental advocates seem to have no regard for the 
dearth of affordable housing in the state. These conditions are frustrating, and 
historically it has been difficult to build coalitions between urban, suburban, and rural 
communities. 
Aerial – SF Houses 
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New Jersey may be the most proactive state in the Northeast in terms of state plan-
ning and open space acquisition. The State Planning Act of 1985 established a coordi-
nated planning approach focused on sprawl. The Act relies on incentives for munici-
palities and support for inter-jurisdictional consultation and coordination. In 1992, 
the State Planning Commission created under the State Planning Act of 1985 adopted 
a State Development and Redevelopment Plan. 
While the State Development and Redevelopment Plan is not binding, it provides 
a powerful vision for the state and a tool for guiding implementation policies. It 
contains goals and strategies for how those goals can be achieved and by whom. 
It includes a map that helps define priority areas for state investment. It is revised 
every five or six years with intensive input from government at all levels and the 
public. By determining where infrastructure and capital investment are directed, 
the State Plan could help to reverse urban disinvestment, protect open space, and 
build more affordable housing (Mark June 2001). 
Cape May Beach 
Because New Jersey’s State Plan is 
mostly a guidance document, there is a 
huge need for implementation policies, 
more incentives for compliance, and 
broader public understanding and sup-
port. Since the State Plan was first adopt-
ed in 1992, three New Jersey governors 
have signed Executive Orders seeking 
state agency compliance with the State 
Plan. Republican Governor Christine 
Todd Whitman contributed to imple-
mentation of the Plan by introducing a major open space preservation initiative to 
protect an additional 1 million acres beyond the hundreds of thousands that already 
had been preserved. The next governor, Jim McGreevey, took Whitman’s commitment 
to a new level both in his rhetoric and by defining new Executive branch responsibil-
ities for smart growth. Smart growth is good politics in New Jersey, which distin-
guishes it from almost every other state. 
New Jersey has 566 municipalities, each with strong local control. Statewide, 150 
towns have voted to increase taxes for open space in ballot measures, and the public 
buzz in many circles is about sprawl and open space. Still, municipalities are coping 
with conflicting state policies. The State Development and Redevelopment Plan urges 
them to build in specific areas, while property tax policies urge them to build any-
where they can to fund basic services. New Jersey municipalities receive 76 percent of 
32 The national average is 45 their total revenue from property taxes – the fifth highest rate in the nation.32 Many 
percent. municipalities also bristle at the idea of top-down growth management. The New 
Jersey Builders Association and many developers continue to oppose smart growth. 
Republicans and Democrats in New Jersey are all willing to talk about curbing 
sprawl and congestion in the state. They have a harder time broaching the issue of 
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“affordable housing.” The Mt. Laurel court decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which stopped towns from zoning to exclude people and demanded that they plan for 
housing affordable to low- and moderate income families, was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged three times up to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
the roles of the surdna foundation’s grantees 
New Jersey Future 
New Jersey Future helped the State Planning Commission to adopt the first New Jersey 
State Development and Redevelopment Plan. Since then, its primary focus has been to 
support the implementation of the State Plan, especially encouraging state agencies to 
use their regulatory and spending authority aggressively to advance the goals, objec-
tives and process outlined in the State Plan. 
At the time that the Surdna Foundation’s Smart Growth Initiative kicked off, New 
Jersey Future was considered one of the major players on smart growth in New Jersey. 
It had a board that included representatives of some of the most important business-
es in the state, Republican and Democratic public officials, and the executive directors 
of several leading environmental and planning organizations. New Jersey Future was 
seen by state officials and many local planners and enlightened political leaders as a 
reliable resource. It also had become a primary source for reporters seeking informa-
tion about growth issues. As the triennial revisions on the State Plan commenced, New 
Jersey Future believed its next step was to launch an ambitious constituency building, 
public education, and community organizing process. 
Isles 
Isles is a 24-year-old not-for-profit community development and environmental 
organization based in Trenton, New Jersey. The Surdna Foundation had already sup-
ported Isles through its Community Revitalization grant program. For several years, 
Isles’ president, Martin Johnson, had been exploring new ways to measure their 
impacts and success. As Isles began to move from conventionally quantifiable meas-
ures of success such as number of homes built or numbers of community gardens or 
parks created, to measures such as self-reliant families and healthy, sustainable com-
munities, it began to ponder whether it was working on the right objectives and at the 
right scale. Isles had had very successful on-the-ground projects, but its target com-
munities continued to experience population flight, concentrated poverty, poor school 
performance, and other negative trends. The group’s president felt that the forces that 
were impacting neighborhoods were regional in nature, and that concentrating efforts 
at the community level was not enough. Isles began an intensive effort to understand 
these regional forces. 
The Partnership 
Central New Jersey is home to one of its most neglected urban centers, Trenton, as well 
as some of the state’s wealthiest communities, which are starting to feel pressure from 
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33 It is worth noting that at the 
time of Surdna Initiative, 
there were two other Surdna 
grantees that were not for-
mally part of the Initiative, 
but whose work was in line 
with the Initiative: the 
Tri-State Transportation 
Campaign, which had been 
making progress in shifting 
New Jersey Department of 
Transportation planning and 
spending away from new 
roads; and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 
which was fostering New 
Jersey legislation that would 
provide tax incentives for 
developers to build in accor-
dance with smart growth 
and green principles. 
rapid growth. Initially, Isles set out to create a new regional organizing group that 
would bring together interested organizations to discuss the social and economic 
implications of sprawl in central New Jersey. However, after a few months it became 
clear that a statewide organization would be more effective than a regional coalition. 
Isles created the New Jersey Regional Coalition with the intent of developing it into an 
independent statewide entity.33 
New Jersey is different from the other Surdna Initiative states because there are 
dozens of organizations focused on smart growth issues. Other strong smart growth 
advocates in New Jersey include the New Jersey Conservation Foundation, the New 
Jersey Association of Environmental Commissions, the Regional Planning 
Partnership, the New Jersey Public Policy Institute, the Rutgers Environmental Law 
Clinic, Audubon, the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, the Sierra Club, and 
Clean Water Action. 
The vast majority of these organizations were approaching smart growth from an 
environmental perspective – they sought to protect the environment from develop-
ment. This meant that most of them were disconnected from urban and increasing-
ly suburban areas – those places where appropriate development is most needed and 
where critical social issues are in dire need of attention. In addition, while there were 
about 40 organizations involved in promoting smart growth in some way, there was 
no clear leader. A key challenge was to determine how all of the work being done tied 
together and harmonize the work of the various groups. For these reasons, the New 
Jersey Regional Coalition was able to fill an important, non-threatening niche. 
new jersey future: a case study of getting the most
out of state policy by building credibility with public
officials 
New Jersey Future was created by a collaboration of business leaders, developers, and 
environmental and civic leaders who thought that policy was driving the state in the 
wrong direction. They successfully advocated for the New Jersey State Plan beginning 
in 1987, and they stayed together to implement the Plan. Achieving smart growth in 
New Jersey still required: 
new legislation; 
regulatory changes; 
favorable court decisions; 
local zoning changes; 
new coalitions of support; 
a ramping up of public under-
standing and support. Hoboken – Row 
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In 2000, the board of New Jersey Future decided that the quality of life in New 
Jersey should be a key focus the 2001 elections should address. The group set out to 
make smart growth a dominant issue in the campaign. As a first step, it conducted an 
intensive assessment of views among opinion-leaders about smart growth and about 
the state of land use governance structure in New Jersey. This included “elite” inter-
views with 36 key decision-makers (planning board chairs, mayors, and county execu-
tives) to understand their perspectives on smart growth, to gauge potential support for 
policy reform ideas, and to identify points of leverage. New Jersey Future also com-
missioned one of the largest voter opinion polls every conducted. The poll revealed 
that eight out of 10 New Jersey voters believed the state was running out of land, and 
75 percent said the state should give spending priority to existing communities over 
new development. This was the very attitude that New Jersey Future wanted to nur-
ture. All in all, New Jersey Future’s board spent a full year exploring what policy plat-
form it would advocate during the upcoming political campaigns. 
New Jersey Future felt that its research opened a significant window of opportu-
nity to change the system. Using data that had not been combined before, the 
group conducted an analysis that documented which areas were suffering under 
the existing circumstances. This  investigation revealed distress in inner-ring sub-
urbs, some of which appeared prosperous. In order to succeed, the next step was 
for New Jersey Future to bring this message to the State House and to members of 
local governments who were reluctant to change directions. 
Haddonfield 
Because 2001 was a gubernatorial elec-
tion year, all of New Jersey Future’s smart 
growth activities in that year were aimed 
at educating candidates on smart growth 
and building support among the next 
wave of leaders in the legislature, as well 
as other key constituents, including the 
media. The group hired a campaign con-
sultant to advise it on how best to inject 
smart growth issues into the governor’s 
race and the legislative races. 
In April 2001, New Jersey Future released a report called Achieving Genuine 
Prosperity: 20 Ways to Move New Jersey Toward a Just, Healthy and Prosperous Future, 
which described where the state was “off course” and suggested 20 policies and prac-
tices that would correct its course. The report was carefully developed and packaged 
for the candidates in the upcoming elections – a strategy that exhibited a high degree 
of sophistication (Mark 2001). New Jersey Future planned a major media campaign 
around the release of the report, covering every media outlet and taking every advan-
tage to present the findings. The group’s staff and board members made a series of edi-
torial board visits that were very successful, with one important paper running the 20-
point plan as a series. A series of op-eds also came out of the report. New Jersey Future 
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As required by the Mount 
Laurel obligation. 
was able to capture considerable attention, which it hoped would result in new 
policies. 
New Jersey Future became the “go to” group for information and sound advice on 
sprawl and smart growth during the gubernatorial campaign in 2001. After the pri-
maries, the group continued to keep its issues at the forefront of the gubernatorial 
debates and discussions (Mark 2001). The Democratic nominee frequently asked for 
advice. New Jersey Future briefed the Republican nominee once, and though its staff 
continued to provide additional material to candidates in both parties, only the 
Democratic team engaged in discussing the issues. 
New Jersey Future tried to work all of the recommendations in the 20 Ways report 
into the pre-election debates. Based on the problems highlighted in the report, it 
launched a number of special reports addressing affordable housing, traffic, taxes, 
and other issues. It used Future Facts, a bi-monthly email briefing, to reinforce its 
policy recommendations. It worked with debate sponsors and news media to pre-
pare questions for candidates. And it asked the candidates to provide their posi-
tions on the 20 policy proposals for smarter growth. 
A key indicator that the group’s campaign strategy was a success was that a major-
ity of newspaper editorials said that Democratic gubernatorial candidate James 
McGreevey deserved to win because of his smart growth stance. Just before the elec-
tion, New Jersey Future decided to conduct a second public opinion poll, piggyback-
ing four questions on to an Eagleton Institute poll. The poll revealed that 71 percent of 
voters were likely to vote for a candidate who favored affordable housing development. 
New Jersey Future did not slow down 
after the elections. During the transition 
period, it was active in identifying and 
trying to help fill the most important 
jobs within the state administration and 
provide input on transition strategies. 
Governor-elect McGreevey established a 
cross-departmental transition team on 
smart growth that was charged with 
making recommendations on how to 
achieve his smart growth campaign 
pledges. New Jersey Future staff served 
on the smart growth team and the agriculture team and contributed substantially to 
both transition reports. 
Meanwhile, in December 2001, the State Planning Commission released the newly 
revised State Plan. The new version more specifically directed state resources to devel-
oped areas. It also required municipalities to fulfill their obligations to provide afford-
able housing in order to receive State Plan endorsement,34 and therefore have greater 
access to state funding. These gains were attributed to the efforts of the Coalition for 
Affordable Housing and the Environment, which New Jersey Future helped found. 
Delaware and Rotham Canal 
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New Jersey Future usually worked alone, but this was an exception. Though there was 
frequent discord between members, the Coalition for Affordable Housing and the 
Environment united powerful voices that had been at odds in the past. 
The McGreevey administration unveiled a strong anti-sprawl agenda in the January 
2002 State of the State Address. It promised a package of legislation including more than 
a dozen bills. The promised bills incorporated key New Jersey future ideas, such as: 
conservation-focused amendments to the municipal land use law; 
transfer of development rights; 
incentives for municipal implementation of the State Development and 
Redevelopment Plan; 
more and better county planning; 
transportation changes discouraging highway curb cuts and favoring transit 
and transit-oriented development. 
In his first weeks in office, however, the new governor laid off the entire professional 
staff in the Office of State Planning as a budget cutting measure. New Jersey Future felt 
that this decision was contradictory, and merited challenge. The group’s staff contact-
ed the editorial boards of the state’s largest newspapers and asked them if they were 
aware of what this decision would cost New Jersey. The newspapers wrote editorials 
and news articles decrying the decision. 
Following the flurry of media attention, the governor opted to reinstate the 
Planning Office as the Office of Smart Growth and asked New Jersey Future for help 
in writing one of his first executive orders. The resulting orders incorporated key rec-
ommendations from the 20 Ways to Move New Jersey report, including: 
a smart growth shield, under which the state would provide legal protection 
to municipalities in implementing the State Plan; 
alignment of state regulations and policies with smart growth principles; 
strengthening of redevelopment programs. 
The executive order also created a Smart Growth Policy Council of key cabinet and 
executive branch leaders, which was a variation on the Smart Growth cabinet-level 
post recommended in the 20 Ways report. 
New Jersey Future offered 57 newly elected or re-elected state legislators in the most 
distressed legislative districts custom profiles of their districts, including information 
on disinvestment and sprawl and overviews of who was suffering and how. It also began 
to engage these legislators in dialogues about the kinds of policies that would benefit 
their districts. The group also created and staffed the nation’s second legislative Smart 
Growth Caucus, including more than 25 initial members. The purpose of the caucus 
was to raise awareness about growth issues in the legislature and to address issues across 
jurisdictions – linking growth to issues such as transportation and the environment. 
New Jersey Future also shared its district profiles with mayors, but it stayed focused on 
its primary target, which was state legislators, the governor, and state agencies. 
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New Jersey Future earned a trusted place in the McGreevey Administration and 
among a number of legislators, but there were still many challenges, particularly the 
large state budget deficit. With less spending flexibility, regulation became a more 
viable tool, but one that was much more politically complex. To help shape the gov-
ernor’s smart growth legislative package, New Jersey Future created three tests for 
evaluating smart growth legislation and policy, and distributed them widely to 
policy-makers and to editorial boards: 
Does the initiative promote growth in the right places (according to the State 
Plan) and inhibit it in the wrong places? 
Does the initiative promote inter-governmental coordination between and 
among state and local governments?  
Does the initiative promote predictability in decision-making for both con-
servation and development? 
The group briefed the administration and the editorial boards of the major news-
papers on these lines of inquiry, and they have proven invaluable for smart growth 
analysis and communications. New Jersey Future still uses them to evaluate current 
policies, as do many news outlets. 
New Jersey Future continued to seek other opportunities to advance smart growth. 
It hosted a 2002 Smart Growth Awards program to bring together business and other 
leaders to reaffirm the importance of smart growth in New Jersey. The head of the 
Board of Public Utilities was an advocate for smart growth, so New Jersey Future 
brought the major utilities together to consider revising the regulatory structure to 
reward reinvestment in existing communities and shifting the costs for new infra-
structure in greenfield areas to those users. With input from utilities, the Board of 
Public Utilities wrote draft regulations that used the State Development and 
Redevelopment Planning Areas to ensure that customers in cities and older suburbs no 
long subsidized new extensions of service. These regulations, which were  adopted in 
2004, are a model that has only been implemented in a few states. New Jersey 
Foundation also encouraged the Department of Environmental Protection to provide 
financial incentives for municipalities to adopt conservation principles in their master 
plans and zoning ordinances. 
Throughout Governor McGreevey’s first year of office, New Jersey Future took 
every opportunity to underscore the message that smart growth is not just about 
land preservation (which Governor Whitman had championed during her term 
in office), but also about growth in the right places. The group initiated Smart 
Growth Awards, wherein they selected the best projects around the state and hon-
ored them with awards. These awards honored town officials, developers and cor-
porations for outstanding work in promoting the healthy growth of New Jersey 
communities. At the group’s invitation, the governor presented the awards. About 
250 developers and business leaders came to the first annual awards ceremony out 
of curiosity and for a chance to meet the governor. 
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By 2004, the Smart Growth Awards were an institution. They received media cov-
erage including one full-page editorial with photos in the Philadelphia Inquirer. The 
awards call attention to concrete examples of good growth in urban, suburban, and 
rural contexts. They are also positive publicity for the developers and towns that 
made these projects happen. 
Although New Jersey Future’s primary focus had been state policymakers, it also 
took several steps to spur implementation at the local level. In April 2003, the group 
opened the Smart Growth Gateway, an online clearinghouse of New Jersey-specific 
smart growth information that included: 
strategies; 
tools; 
case studies; 
model ordinances; 
smart growth scorecards for measuring how “smart” are projects; 
sources of technical assistance and funding. 
Again taking advantage of its communications capacity, New Jersey Future placed 
ads and offered monthly prize giveaways to attract users to the site. The hope was that 
the website could become the one-stop shop for ordinary citizens and professional 
planners. 
In creating the website, New Jersey Future collaborated with many other groups 
that had specific expertise to create content, including the Voorhees Transportation 
Policy Institute at Rutgers, the Biodiversity Project, the Greater Mercer Transportation 
Management Association, the Regional Planning Partnership, and the Stonybrook 
Millstone Watershed Association. New Jersey Future is constantly on the prowl for new 
content, and continues to advertise the website in smaller newspapers and news 
sources for municipalities. The number of regular hits on the website has doubled 
since the early days of its introduction. Today the site averages about 2,000 hits per 
month. It has also received an education award from the American Planning 
Association’s New Jersey chapter. 
New Jersey Future also developed various materials to aid implementation. It pro-
duced a series of easy-to-read pamphlets called the Smart Growth Recommendation 
Series. These pamphlets explain various policies such as transferable development 
rights and impact fees, they offer examples of policy implementation, and they pro-
vide checklists for implementing effective programs. In collaboration with the New 
Jersey Chapter of the American Planning Association and the State, New Jersey Future 
also edited a redevelopment handbook for New Jersey municipal officials and local 
planners to help demystify the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law. 
New Jersey Future created two smart growth scorecards, one to help citizens and 
local officials identify smart growth strengths and weaknesses in proposed develop-
ment projects and the other to help evaluate municipal commitments to smart growth 
as reflected in plans, rules, and projects. These scorecards were distributed to all New 
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35 Wherein an individual or 
organization that is not a 
party to a particular lawsuit 
is allowed to advise the court 
regarding a point of law or 
fact directly concerning the 
lawsuit. 
36 See details on Highlands pro-
tection below. 
37 Transferable development 
rights allow communities to 
restrict growth in certain 
areas and direct it to others, 
while allowing landowners in 
the growth-restricted areas 
to realize an economic bene-
fit from their land. The rights 
to develop are separated 
from the land itself in the 
preservation areas, and sold 
to developers who can use 
them to build at increased 
density in the desired growth 
areas. The preservation-area 
landowners retain their land, 
and receive the market rate 
for their development rights. 
Developers can build more 
units per acre than otherwise 
possible in growth areas, and 
the community saves money 
on infrastructure costs. 
Jersey mayors and planning board chairs as well as dozens of other groups. New Jersey 
Future made presentations to groups of officials, residents, and the press on the use of 
the scorecards. The press has used the project scorecards to evaluate proposed projects, 
and feedback has been good. State-level organizations outside of New Jersey have been 
given permission to reproduce the project scorecard and the group receives regular 
requests to talk about it. Generally, the project scorecard has been well-received, but 
there has been less interest in the municipal scorecard. It seems that there is more con-
cern about specific projects than there is about whether communities are heading in 
the right way. 
New Jersey Future also secured pro-bono legal assistance to file several amicus 
curiae35 briefs in support of good municipal planning to advance smart growth. One 
such brief supported a municipality whose zoning techniques to protect farmland 
were being challenged. In another case, the courts affirmed that municipalities have 
some latitude in interpreting current law to encourage mixed use projects in order to 
redevelop downtowns in older communities. This decision helped to make the State 
Plan the defining line for what is defensible planning. 
In 2003, New Jersey Future launched the legislative smart growth caucus. It contin-
ued to work on its legislative agenda and to work on revised utility pricing. It began 
working with mayors to advance their knowledge in various ways through a mayor’s 
coalition, which after an initial strategy meeting now receives monthly e-briefs on key 
issues. It undertook regular, in-depth research reports on timely legislative and policy 
issues. 
Because the State Plan was taking on increasing importance as a mechanism for 
guiding municipal activities, New Jersey Future worked on developing a process for 
determining consistency with the Plan. The group earned a seat on the governor’s 
seven-person Blue Ribbon Transportation Commission and advanced transit and Fix-
It-First agendas. It added new content to the Smart Growth Gateway, including trans-
portation case studies, watershed protection information, and many other topics. It 
also established an Action Network (an idea it sparked by a Surdna Foundation learn-
ing session) made up of members and “Future Facts” subscribers that could be mobi-
lized for important initiatives. Finally, New Jersey Future helped to lead the New Jersey 
Regional Coalition, which is described in the Isles section. 
The year 2003 was slow for new policy, but it was an important year for setting the 
stage. New Jersey Future continually offered policy ideas, urging legislators and the 
Administration along. It also consistently offered support in advancing policies that 
focused on impact fees, incentives for redevelopment, transferable development rights, 
and protecting the Highlands region.36 The group’s staff and sometimes its board 
members wrote op-eds when a nudge was needed to keep the agenda visible. 
When transferable development rights37 legislation was pulled from a final vote in 
2003, New Jersey Future responded to a call for help from the Administration in 
resolving the impasse. The group called in technical experts on transferable develop-
ment rights from three states to help develop a solution that would address concerns 
of farmers and others about the proposal. A typical point of controversy in transfer-
able development rights programs is whether there will be sufficient demand from 
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developers for farmer credits and a sufficient supply of credits for developers. The final 
bill stipulated that in order for a town to implement a transferable development rights 
program, an independent expert must first complete a real estate and economic analy-
sis of supply and demand. New Jersey Future played a key role in the passage of this 
bill, helping promote the bill’s merits to stakeholders and the legislature. 
New Jersey Future was also a member of the Highlands Coalition, a group 
comprised mostly of environmental organizations that came together to advocate for 
legislation protecting the Highlands regional watershed. More than half of all New 
Jersey residents get their drinking water from the Highlands, an 800,000-acre swath of 
largely open land stretching across the northwestern portion of the state. This water 
supply is threatened by a fragmented approach to managing the area’s rapid regional 
population growth. The natural resources of the Highlands are controlled by 
thousands of private landowners and some 90 local governments with limited land-
use planning and regulatory capacity. 
Because the other Highlands Coalition member organizations were environmental 
groups, New Jersey Future had some difficulty seeing eye-to-eye with them on whether 
emerging legislation had sufficient growth management incentives. Not for the first 
time nor for the last, New Jersey Future angered many of the environmental groups 
with its pro-growth stance. While the payoff was significant, such collaborative efforts 
are challenging at best in New Jersey.38 
In early 2004, the collaboration and preparation of the past year paid off: transfer-
able development rights legislation passed. New Jersey Future turned its attention to 
implementation. It wrote a policy brief and brought local leaders and planners togeth-
er to learn about the program. 
The Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act was introduced the same day the 
transferable development rights legislation passed. This Act contained proposed meas-
ures to protect the drinking water supply including strict protections for about 
400,000 acres of “core” watershed lands through land purchases, new environmental 
regulations, and a regional plan that dictated strict limits on development. 
The Highlands Act put a great deal of land off limits to development. The state legis-
lature said it would only support the bill if incentives were provided for putting the devel-
opment elsewhere. Behind the scenes, legislators worked with the governor on this “fast 
track” bill. The Highlands Act passed on a Tuesday, and the Governor’s Office released a 
“streamlining” bill, which would streamline the development permitting process, on 
Friday of that week for a vote on the following Monday. Environmentalists were infuri-
ated by the bill, which they believed would speed development all over New Jersey. New 
Jersey Future asked for three amendments to the bill and got one: the permitting process 
would be accelerated only in areas where the State Plan called for development. 
With this concession, New Jersey Future decided to support the bill, even though it 
still would allow development to occur rapidly and without as much oversight as it 
preferred. Environmental groups felt this was a terrible decision, but New Jersey 
Future felt it was the best decision it could make at the time. 
From a smart growth perspective, the streamlining bill came down to a choice 
between a terrible bill and a bad one. In hindsight, New Jersey Future felt it should 
38 There is an historic and con-
tinuing disconnect between 
environmental groups in the 
state, which are  aggressively 
anti-growth, and smart 
growth advocates, including 
New Jersey Future. This ten-
sion continued to be played 
out in 2005 in new regula-
tions for ground water stan-
dards, and in flawed legisla-
tion for streamlining devel-
opment permits, derisively 
labeled the “smart growth” 
bill by the environmental 
community. 
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39 Greenfield refers to land that 
has never been occupied by a 
permanent structure. 
40 On a per capita basis, New 
Jersey has the highest 
property taxes in the nation. 
have declined to support either. After careful review of the final fast track statute, the 
group decided to withdraw its support and to lead a wide, collaborative effort to design 
an alternative smart growth streamlining project. New Jersey Future remains deeply 
committed to implementing meaningful incentives for growth in urban areas, inner 
ring suburbs, and other areas targeted in concert with the State Plan. 
What Happens Next 
There has been significant progress towards smart growth in New Jersey over the past 
decade. 
The public understands the nature of the problem. 
The governor and legislature have passed important pieces of smart growth 
legislation. 
More state transportation resources are being used to Fix It First and fewer 
new roads are being built than in the past. 
Hundreds of towns have improved their master plans and decisions and taxed 
themselves to acquire open space, as have all 20 New Jersey counties. 
Thousands of acres of land have been protected. 
Development has slowed in the northwest region of the Highlands. 
Development has also slowed in the Pinelands Region due to strong regula-
tions limiting development to protect water resources. 
In the southern part of the state, efforts to avoid sprawl are shaping new 
development. The number of nominations for Smart Growth awards have 
increased each year and more people are coming to the awards events. The 
quality of the development work being done has also improved. 
Some greenfield39 developers have been leaving the state because it has 
become more difficult for them to develop new greenfield projects. 
New Jersey Future has cultivated relationships with major developers inter-
ested in mixed use communities and urban places. Many of these have deep 
enough pockets to break through the continuing barriers. 
However, there are still significant impediments to “doing it right.” Most municipal 
master plans still don’t allow for street car suburbs, despite evident demand and higher 
property prices in areas that offer this amenity. In addition, many municipal leaders 
are not on board: they are frustrated with the state law that allows density bonuses for 
developers in communities that don’t have affordable housing plans – they don’t want 
to be told what or where to build. They also don’t want to have to zone for multi-unit 
housing, which will attract families with children and raise property taxes for 
education.40 
The property tax system is the primary barrier to smarter growth in New Jersey. The 
relatively modest incentives offered in the State Plan hold little appeal to local officials 
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when they are under pressure to attract commercial development to fund local servic-
es and to keep out denser development because it might attract more families with 
children and schools, and thereby raise taxes. In 2004, a citizen’s coalition that includ-
ed New Jersey Future built a statewide campaign for tax reform. The Governor subse-
quently appointed a commission to recommend tax code changes. New Jersey Future’s 
role going forward will be to ensure that tax reforms are growth-neutral if not sup-
portive of smart growth. Property tax reform figures significantly in the group’s prepa-
rations for a smart growth platform for the November 2005 elections. 
A second barrier to smarter growth in New Jersey is what one legislator dubbed 
“multiple municipal madness.” New Jersey has a weak county government structure. 
Land use decisions are made by 566 separate but adjoining municipalities, some of 
which are as small as a square mile. Cities that are large enough to require profession-
al planning rarely have anything but the most minimal staff capacity. The Smart 
Growth Gateway and other New Jersey Future educational efforts have offered guid-
ance to some local officials, but have not reached the vast majority. New Jersey Future 
is collaborating with Rutgers, the American Planning Association, the state, and oth-
ers to write a curriculum and offer classes for local planning board members. Trial 
classes held in 2004 were a tremendous success, and a second class is being planned. 
This is a good first step, but much more needs to be done to educate and engage local 
officials and planners. 
A third barrier to smart growth in New Jersey is the “not in my backyard” syndrome. 
Many residents and leaders appreciate the ideas behind smart growth, but are unwilling 
to make compromises in their own communities. New Jersey Future has worked at the 
policy level, supported by a base of business, civic, and public leaders, but it realizes this 
is not enough. There is a need for a broader grassroots constituency to advance smart 
growth. This is why New Jersey Future has partnered with regional organizations. 
New Jersey Future is also a founding member of the regional coalition that Isles has 
formed to mobilize grassroots support for policy change. The issues that are bubbling 
up through the coalition-building process, including tax reform and housing, are 
among New Jersey Future’s highest priorities. The group plays a valued role in New 
Jersey. Through its strong media efforts and quality research, it has had the ear of state 
leaders in the legislature and state agencies. Within these bounds, it has been success-
ful. However, New Jersey Future will not succeed alone. Another effort is needed to 
create a coalition to bridge issues and build a broad base of support for smart growth. 
isles: a case study of building the grassroots base for
smarter growth and regional equity 
“It is not enough to be right,” says Martin Johnson, the President of Isles. According to 
Mr. Johnson, while elected officials need to be intelligent and committed to smart 
growth, they must also be supported by an informed public. And that requires a grass-
roots, constituency-based research and organizing agenda and capacity. 
In 2000, Isles began to explore opportunities to ground and link a smart growth 
agenda with its urban community development agenda in central New Jersey. This is 
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Systems 
a link that many experts say is essential for truly successful smart growth strategies, but 
is unusually difficult to create. Isles was breaking new ground. While there had been 
much talk about the importance of regional coalition building and integration of 
urban and suburban organizing and development strategies in order to achieve smart 
growth, there are few places where such an approach has been implemented (Mark 
2001). 
Throughout 2001, Isles laid the groundwork for a regional approach to connect the 
best attributes of local place-based and regional organizing and action. First, Isles 
began regionalizing all of its program areas – urban agriculture, environmental edu-
cation, environmental health, brownfield redevelopment, youth job training, and real 
estate. It began to undertake collaborative projects with regional and statewide groups, 
including a watershed management and urban growth initiative in partnership with 
the Regional Planning Project,41 a regional education campaign in partnership with the 
Stonybrook Millstone Watershed Association, an affordable housing campaign with 
the Affordable Housing and Community Development Network of New Jersey and the 
startup of the statewide Coalition for Affordable Housing and the Environment. 
Isles felt that an important part of its efforts would be developing new, broader 
indicators for healthy, sustainable  communities  and family self-reliance. It initiated a 
community indicator project by gathering information on best practices elsewhere. 
Using this information, it undertook surveys and focus groups to identify meaningful 
indicators. It also began to work with organizations and luminaries to research and 
assemble indicators and data on the neighborhood, municipal and, where possible, 
regional levels. Those involved in this effort included: 
New Jersey Future; 
Myron Orfield, a former Minnesota legislator and an authority on state and 
local government and finance, land use, and regional governance; 
David Rusk, a former mayor of Albuquerque and a consultant on urban pol-
icy with focus on the impacts of urban sprawl, racial segregation, and con-
centrated poverty on growth patterns; 
john powell, 42 the Executive Director of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of 
Race and Equity at Ohio State University and an expert on racial justice, 
social policy and regionalism; 
the National Success Measures Project; 
A primary goal of this collaborative was to develop comparisons between cities and 
suburbs, both old and new. Isles wanted to create a learning culture around smart 
growth and this required good data. The group pooled its GIS43 resources with that of 
other advocacy groups to make a regional database available for use by the public. 
Using Surdna Foundation support, Isles hired a “sustainable development” project 
coordinator to manage the emerging regional connections and new indicator-sup-
ported initiatives. In addition, Isles created two new positions, Vice President of 
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Communications and Director of Research and Development, to help implement its 
regional education efforts and coordinate a community indicator project. 
Working with peer community development and other “place-based” organizations 
in the region, Isles encountered a challenge. Each group was focused on its own local 
issues, with little organizational connection to the broader context. Isles used several 
tactics to address this: 
It increased its investment in community education, organizational capacity-
building, and promotion of local dialogues around issues such as concentrated 
poverty, racist housing policies, property tax reform, and suburban white flight. 
It crafted language to connect better to suburban citizens and churches. 
It recognized the priorities of the various participants and tied their local 
concerns to broader issues, including talking about how the regional trends 
were impacting the city of Trenton and vice versa. 
It worked to keep the issues of race and poverty on the table when other smart 
growth issues were discussed. 
It sponsored forums on poverty concentration and race and regionalism to 
educate the public on broader forces shaping local communities. 
It completed a study that showed that the highest concentrations of asthma 
and other diseases were in Trenton and older suburbs, and that these statis-
tics were related to the age of the housing stock as well as income and region-
al transportation policies. The group used those findings to garner interest on 
environmental issues in urban communities and to connect to the suburban 
environmental constituency. 
The next step for Isles was to organize the New Jersey Regional Coalition to pursue 
a research and organizing agenda in support of policies and practices to counter the 
social and economic impact of sprawl and to support regional equity. The Coalition 
included the New Jersey Public Policy Research Institute,44 New Jersey Future, the New 
Jersey Institute for Social Justice, the Regional Planning Partnership, the Jubilee 
Interfaith Coalition, and the Affordable Housing and Environmental Coalition. The 
goals of this Coalition were: 
to help guide effective research, to educate the public; 
to build relationships between traditional sprawl experts and equity-oriented 
organizations; 
to organize constituency groups; 
to foster policies and procedures that work statewide. 
Soon after it was formed, the Coalition hired Myron Orfield and the Metropolitan 
Area Research Corporation to conduct a study of economic disparity and regional 
growth in New Jersey that would highlight the impacts on local government fiscal 
capacity and quality of life. In May 2002, 120 statewide leaders came to hear a kick-off 
44 The oldest African American 
policy think tank in the 
country. 
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presentation on the pending study. While the study was underway, Isles began plan-
ning business, legislative, and civic leadership roundtables to review the findings and 
a public education campaign targeting businesses, faith-based institutions, higher edu-
cation institutions, community organizations, and municipal officials. 
By the end of 2002, the New Jersey Regional Coalition, which had grown to nine 
members, was a unified group. It had successfully struggled to create a common agen-
da despite disparate interests. It was ready to create and advance an organizing agenda 
related to sprawl, social equity, and the environment at the regional and state scales. 
The preliminary report from Myron 
Orfield, New Jersey Metropatterns, effec-
tively demonstrated the challenges facing 
the state. The report showed that older 
suburbs were facing social and fiscal 
crises similar to the urban centers and 
that competition for tax base and 
unplanned growth had hurt almost every 
community in New Jersey. These find-
ings were very similar to studies done in 
other states. It was hoped that this con-
crete information would spur regional 
cooperation. 
After the May 2003 press conference releasing the final report, Isles began to pres-
ent the report to the general public and to leaders throughout the state, including 
members of labor organizations, churches, and civic groups. To enhance its public out-
reach, Isles developed a PowerPoint presentation highlighting key maps and data from 
New Jersey Metropatterns. This presentation was adapted for different audiences 
throughout the region. The Coalition sponsored a major statewide summit in June 
2003 called the People’s Summit for Regional Equity. It also sponsored six regional 
summits and dozens of smaller constituency-based meetings, forums, and presenta-
tions. More than 500 individuals attended the statewide summit, representing diverse 
constituencies, including labor unions, religious organizations, and environmental 
groups from across New Jersey. Through these outreach efforts, thousands of people 
were briefed on the study and maps. 
Following the statewide summit, the 
Coalition brought on additional central 
and northern Jersey affiliate organiza-
tions (until this point, the Jubilee 
Interfaith Coalition Jubilee had been the 
only northern Jersey affiliate). Together, 
these sub-groups would coordinate their 
activities through the Coalition, which 
was co-chaired by the President of Isles 
and the New Jersey Public Policy and 
Research Institute. In central New Jersey, 
Suburban Boardup 
Willingboro – Empty Strip 
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the affiliate is the Central Jersey Regional Equity Coalition. The southern New Jersey 
partner is the South Jersey Regional Equity Organizing Project. In the North, the effort 
is lead by the Jubilee Interfaith Organization, which was working closely with an 
organizer from the Gamaliel Foundation. Each of these affiliates created steering com-
mittees and began extensive recruitment efforts. A hundred influential church, civic, 
and government leaders were trained to be leaders in the regional equity movement. 
Additional research by Myron Orfield’s firm that illustrated regional fiscal disparities 
aided the organizing effort. 
Conversations with institutional leaders in the three regions of the state broadened 
the Coalition’s reach and attracted the attention of some of New Jersey’s legislators. In 
2003, Isles, the New Jersey Regional Coalition, and the regional affiliates in southern, 
central, and northern New Jersey reached out to nearly 500 institutions. Coalition 
membership expanded to include community groups, faith groups, environmentalists, 
regional planners, civic leaders, racial justice groups, business people, and urbanists. 
The Coalition recruited the majority leaders in the state senate and assembly as allies. 
Isles was gratified at this strong positive response to the New Jersey Metropatterns 
report and the eagerness to organize and advocate for change. 
A large part of the organizing focus and energy was found in the older suburbs. 
Suburban parishes, congregations, and communities tend to be more aware of how 
concentrated poverty in the city is pushing out into the suburbs. Faith-based 
institutions were especially important partners in the suburbs because there are fewer 
community-based organizations than in urban neighborhoods. Over 500 suburban 
congregations participated in Coalition meetings. At each congregation, the Coalition 
organized a leadership group to get involved in the statewide agenda. 
These new relationships began to change how Isles did business. As the group 
began working with grassroots suburban groups outside of Trenton, it started 
working on community development projects in the older suburban areas. In its 
neighborhood planning, it started to consider how communities fit in their 
regions, rather than focusing on neighborhoods in isolation. It began to train 
community residents in Trenton and in the suburbs of Trenton to understand this 
regional analysis. 
What Happens Next 
With the New Jersey Regional Coalition’s coordination, the regional affiliates are train-
ing leaders in organizing skills and developing an agenda for policy change, such as 
fighting against efforts to transfer affordable housing requirements from wealthy to 
poor communities. The regional groups began developing policy platforms in the fall 
of 2004. The goals were: 
to continue to build the momentum of the organizing; 
to further develop platforms; 
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to continue to network environmentalists, community development and 
housing advocates, faith based groups, civil rights groups, business interests, 
planning organizations, and elected officials. 
As this goes to print, the platforms include: 
property tax reform; 
affordable housing development outside of high poverty areas; 
integration of communities; 
more regional planning and decision-making. 
Based on the Isles vision for the next steps advancing a mass movement in New 
Jersey around smart growth issues, the Jersey Regional Coalition continues to train 
leaders, network, and develop organizing strategies around the policy and regulatory 
platforms. 
In some sense, New Jersey Future and Isles are “meeting in the middle.” New Jersey 
Future’s modus operandi has been policy leadership. It has used analysis and the media 
to urge state leaders to change. But while New Jersey Future found a way to deliver 
media attention, it could not deliver votes. Isles was successful at local development 
and environmental projects – building neighborhood self-reliance – but the overall 
trends were working against it. To remain focused on its mission, “to foster more self-
reliant families in healthy, sustainable communities,” it had to engage the regional 
forces without impinging on its successful on-the-ground development work. New 
Jersey Future and Isles found common ground through an alliance based upon an 
understanding of how regional forces influence community health and what it will 
take to really impact the region. 
what it takes to do the work 
The budget for New Jersey Future’s work on smart growth is about $515,00: $350,000 
for staff; $165,000 for operating expenses. Funders have included the Geraldine R. 
Dodge, William Penn, and Doris Duke Charitable Foundations, as well as the Surdna 
Foundation. 
The Isles sustainable regional project budget was $212,000 for each of the first two 
years: $137,800 for personnel, $17,000 for consultants, and the remainder for miscella-
neous expenses such as transportation, events, telephone etc. Funders included the F. 
B. Heron Foundation, the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation, the Princeton Area 
Community Foundation, the Fund for New Jersey, the Surdna Foundation, and unre-
stricted direct mail solicitations. 
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Lessons Learned From the Four-State 
Initiative 
The Surdna Foundation found that it could cull many common lessons from the 
Smart Growth Initiative case studies, both for philanthropy and smart growth strategy. 
The lessons are divided into four categories: 
Capacities and Skills to Do Smart Growth Work 
Policy Agendas That Advance Smart Growth 
Process Steps That Advance Smart Growth 
Lessons for Philanthropy 
capacities and skills to do smart growth work 
Organizational Infrastructure for State Smart Growth 
Four types of organizations play complementary roles in promoting the adoption of 
smart growth policies: 
an even-handed convener that is dedicated to bringing diverse people togeth-
er to reach agreement; 
an organization dedicated to advocating smart growth, but which keeps 
channels open to diverse people; 
an organization that fights particularly bad sprawl projects to buy time for 
better solutions; 
patient foundations to fund the necessary long-term public-private work. 
An Organization That Provides a Table Where All Are Welcome to Work On Growth 
Issues 
Some regions and states already have government entities that can serve as even-hand-
ed conveners. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) can provide this table for 
discussing and working through regional growth issues (for example, Portland’s MPO 
is playing this role), although most have not built the capacity yet to carry on this kind 
of long-term, inclusive regional discussion about growth. Other regions need to create 
such a structure in the nonprofit sector. In Salt Lake City, Envision Utah is playing this 
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role. Its broadly inclusive group, including business leadership, is raising and resolving 
issues and providing political cover for local officials to come out in support of smart 
growth. 
To provide the “open table” for discussion, an organization has to be willing to 
allow what emerges from the dialogue to be the product of the participants and trust 
that a well-informed group of people will make good, broadly-accepted decisions. 
According to community leaders in Utah, the somewhat “mainstream” options that 
emerged from the visioning process and the development of growth options were 
important in building broad support for Envision Utah (Van Gorp 2004). As noted by 
Robert Grow, the first leader of Envision Utah, “It is about problem solving, not phi-
losophizing.” The neutral convener can help regional and state leaders to make good 
decisions by providing both very high quality information and a chance to work 
together to solve problems. 
To keep all channels open, Envision Utah staff took care in handling their relation-
ships with political leaders. While the governor’s administrative actions and policies 
have had a significant impact on how state agencies support the work of Envision 
Utah, Envision Utah has carefully managed the governor’s role because Utahans are 
vehemently opposed to state intrusion into planning. Observers also credit Envision 
Utah with doing a clever “dance” with the legislature: educating members on the eco-
nomic benefits of quality growth in their districts, but not over-pushing and causing 
a negative reaction among the legislature’s most conservative members (Mark 2001). 
An Organization Dedicated to Advocating for Smart Growth Policies While Keeping
Channels Open to Diverse Stakeholders 
Achieving smart growth requires a champion to keep score, scan for opportunities, 
stay focused on the goal, and form coalitions with diverse groups to pursue specific 
policy objectives. It is best if it is an organization that is not associated with one issue, 
such as the environment. A state’s smart growth organization should be an advocate 
for specific policies, but in a way that keeps the lines of communication open to every-
one. This kind of an organization would fill a gap even in Utah, where, besides 
Envision Utah, there are only single-issue organizations (focusing on environment, 
transit, etc.) following growth issues. 
1,000 Friends of New Mexico has effectively played this role for most of its years, 
pursuing a policy agenda while building and sustaining good relationships with poli-
cymakers and business leaders. During the few years that it shifted to more tradition-
al, aggressive environmental advocacy, it burned bridges that it had built to the gover-
nor, local governments, and developers. As an outsider, it lost its ability to broker solu-
tions. Now 1000 Friends has reopened communications with these stakeholders. It has 
made it clear that its role is not to demonize anyone, but to build trust and dialog and 
to educate. This is close to a “neutral convener” philosophy, but it is coupled with a 
policy agenda. 
This kind of advocate for smart growth is needed even in states with a governor 
who is supportive of smart growth. Advocacy for smart growth allowed Maryland’s 
smart growth-friendly governor to keep making improvements to state laws. When 
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the Making Smart Growth Smarter report showed that Maryland state agencies had not 
institutionalized smart growth policies and procedures, Governor Glendening said he 
would work harder to implement the recommendations in the report. Advocacy was 
also needed to institutionalize the laws that the governor had passed within state agen-
cies, especially within the Department of Transportation. 
An Organization That Will Aggressively Fight Exceptionally Bad Sprawl Projects to Buy 
Time for Better Solutions 
The neutral convener cannot join battles to stop bad projects. Envision Utah has not 
opposed the Legacy Highway, which would greatly increase sprawl around Salt Lake 
City, because it was a divisive issue. As the even-handed convener, it needed to stay 
clear of the most conflict-ridden battles. A smart growth policy advocacy organization 
can sometimes join such battles, but it should recognize and weigh the potential polit-
ical costs. It helps to have a third, more strident entity to play the bad cop. Local offi-
cials can find it difficult to say no to a road or development project – they may be des-
perate for tax revenues, be close associates of the builders, or be worried about a law-
suit from a developer who is turned down. Having an organization that is ready to 
fight bad projects provides political cover for such officials and encourages them to 
think harder about their choices. The Tri-State Transportation Campaign (Tri-State is 
a Surdna grantee, but not formally part of the Initiative) has effectively played this role 
in New Jersey, as has the New Mexico Environmental Law Center in New Mexico. 
Patient, Flexible Foundations to Fund this Work 
Maintaining an effective organizational infrastructure for smart growth work presents 
many challenges for foundations: 
It is long-haul work that is best anchored by multi-year grants – for all of the 
groups in the Initiative the five year time frame was only a slice of a much 
longer endeavor; 
Its complex nature requires cross-sectoral thinking by the funders — tradi-
tional funding categories do not always fit the need; 
The ideal level of education and outreach required is costly (but, as Envision 
Utah has shown, its larger than average budget – over $1 million per year – 
delivers greater than average results). 
In its early stages, the work can also require high risk support. Although Isles 
expects that its Coalition members increasingly will support the Coalition through 
membership fees, it had to raise $500,000 to build the coalition over its first three 
years. It was difficult to attract funding for this period from Isles’ traditional commu-
nity development funders, in spite of its strong track record, because there were few 
good examples of regional equity organizing. 
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Necessary Qualities of the Statewide Smart Growth Organization 
There are a few qualities that most effective smart growth organizations seem to share. 
They tend to be politically savvy, powerfully backed, patient, willing to learn, and 
opportunistic. 
Politically Savvy 
It is critical for smart growth advocates to be aware of the vast and very powerful polit-
ical and economic forces that are in play in the smart growth arena, and how to make 
those forces work for them. Advocates especially need to understand how to be help-
ful to elected officials who would like to do the right thing, but need political support 
to do it. This requires a staff equipped with experienced planners who understand how 
local governments work and policy wonks who know how to work the system in the 
capitol. 
Envision Utah, for example, built a great deal of credibility in both the economic 
and political spheres by picking key current and past mayors, county commissioners, 
and directors of planning to use as wise advisors. In Maryland, smart growth advocates 
had friends and colleagues inside the governor’s office with whom they could test out 
strategies. New Jersey Future continually tapped the advice of its board, which includes 
business leaders with political and policy experience, as well as highly placed govern-
ment advisors, to develop strategies. 
Powerfully Backed 
Envision Utah created a leadership council that included many visible local leaders, 
including former governors and mayors, current mayors and county commissioners, 
prominent business people, media leaders, and leaders from the Latter Day Saints 
Church. Envision Utah undertook an extensive discovery process to find people to 
serve on the council – people who would be committed to the process and who could 
help them identify other leaders who would be approachable on growth issues. In this 
fashion, the group built a critical mass of political leadership. Although on a different 
scale, 1000 Friends of New Mexico and New Jersey Future also exercised care in devel-
oping diverse and powerful boards. 
Patient 
It takes patience to change entrenched systems. The current zoning policies were 
adopted decades ago. Systems that took over 50 years to form can’t be changed 
overnight. Changes that effect smart growth have been small and incremental in most 
states. 
It also takes time to develop a rapport between various interests – it can take two 
years just to get the affordable housing people and environmentalists to be comfort-
able together within a broad coalition. It can take two more years just to get organized 
and build some credibility. It may then take a few years to raise awareness about 
growth issues and begin a public dialogue. And it takes even longer to achieve policy 
changes that enable different growth patterns. It will take longer still to see new devel-
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opment on a large scale. And, once there is this development, it will take many more 
years to build new communities and see impacts in terms of quality of life, congestion, 
and air quality. 
In Oregon, considered a national model, it took 10 years to achieve a new frame-
work for growth planning. Envision Utah, another national model, began a decade 
ago, but the process really began years earlier with the consensus building efforts of the 
Coalition for Utah’s Future. When the New Mexico Coalition aimed for comprehen-
sive legislation within three years, it failed. An incremental approach, including new 
policies at the state and local levels, has consistently been more effective than a dash 
for the finish line. Among other things, gradual change also allows time for local offi-
cials to absorb and accept new programs. 
Perceptions that there are easy fixes to growth problems are a threat to smart growth 
initiatives. For example, traffic congestion is the driving force behind much of the cur-
rent agitation for smart growth. In Maryland, smart growth advocates have expressed 
concern that unless solutions to the traffic problems are found quickly, the support for 
smart growth proposals may turn to anger or cynicism and defeat the smart growth 
movement (Mark 2001). If the public expects quick solutions to traffic congestion, it 
will be disappointed. Solutions will be incremental and the track record will be mixed. 
Willing to Learn 
Smart growth organizations need to be good listeners and ready learners. They need 
to be open to new ideas and people and willing to change course based upon new 
information. Envision Utah did this in multiple ways: 
interviews to inform stakeholders about the Envision Utah process, to inform 
the Envision Utah staff about barriers and opportunities, and to help draw 
new people into the process; 
workshops to educate stakeholders about the need for a regional vision and 
to learn from their locally-based knowledge; 
a public relations campaign about the strategy; 
surveys of the public about their desires for how their region should grow. 
New Jersey Future spent a year going talking to leaders throughout the state before 
it formulated its policy agenda during the Initiative. Isles discussed the findings of its 
metropatterns research with thousands of grassroots leaders in New Jersey and inte-
grated input from those leaders before beginning to build a policy agenda. 
Opportunistic and Entrepreneurial 
Smart growth organizations need to be opportunistic. In 2000, the growth rate in New 
Mexico was high and projected to increase, but it unexpectedly slowed. Formed in the 
face of an urgent growth challenge, it became much harder for the Coalition to act 
when slower growth reduced the urgency. Then, when a new governor was elected, 
new opportunities emerged. In Maryland, support for smart growth shifted radically 
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in Carroll County after an anti-smart growth slate was not re-elected. New Jersey 
Future’s access to the governor and the cabinet improved with the election of 
Governor McGreevy, while the Chesapeake Bay Foundation saw its access diminish 
after gubernatorial elections. 
Smart growth organizations need to constantly scan for the best opportunities. 
When the Wasatch Front Regional Draft Long-Range Plan for 2030 was widely criti-
cized, Envision Utah quickly stepped in to broker solutions and to address the criti-
cisms. Because the Chesapeake Bay Foundation anticipated that rural zoning would be 
debated in several counties during the 2002 elections, it made sure that people in the 
counties had tools for the debate. 
Grantees often feel under pressure from funders to commit to specific strategies and 
policy goals. Given the many factors that shift opportunities and possibilities for smart 
growth, grantees need a relationship with their funders that allows them the flexibility 
to adapt work plans to get the most bang for the buck. 
Valuable Capacities for Championing Smart Growth 
There are some organizational capacities that are highly valuable for effectively cham-
pioning smart growth. These core capacities include strategic planning, score keeping, 
communications, volunteer engagement, conflict resolution, and expertise in address-
ing issues of race and class. The core set of capacities shifts (or, perhaps more accu-
rately, grows) with the stages of the work. Skills required to build awareness are differ-
ent than skills needed to foster implementation. For example, to better respond to 
growth in demand for its implementation services, Envision Utah made changes to its 
staff, adding three full time planners, one full time community awareness manager, 
and one full time government relations manager. 
Strategic Planning 
Smart growth organizations need to be able to think long-term and have long-term 
outcomes in mind, even as they face a shifting environment. They must be able to set 
clear goals and choose strategic priorities. It is not realistic or productive for small 
organizations to try to be everywhere and cover every issue. Strong strategic planning 
skills help smart growth organizations to hone in on the best opportunities. 
A Way of Keeping Score 
Smart growth advocates also need to have a set of indicators in place so they can meas-
ure and demonstrate their progress and consciously make adjustments in strategies 
and tactics as they work towards their long-term outcomes. Development of these 
indicators seems to pose a real challenge to smart growth organizations. There is a gen-
eral feeling that the work and outcomes are long term and complex, and that the lack 
of dramatic short-term progress might turn off funders and scare away public and 
political support. In many states it also is difficult to find agencies that have the will 
and/or the resources to collect and analyze the detailed data needed to definitively 
track the impact of smart growth policy and investment. These are important chal-
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lenges. Overall, smart growth organizations need additional assistance in learning how 
to measure and evaluate their internal and external work to ensure progress and focus 
on real results. 
Communications Skills 
Smart Growth practitioners need not only great ideas, but also the communications 
skills to engage and mobilize large segments of the population. A valuable starting 
place for good communications is values-based research. As pointed out by Dick 
Mark, designing new communities and redesigning older neighborhoods is values-
laden and values-driven work. It is about identifying and working with people’s core 
values and beliefs about their homes, their families, their neighborhoods, their futures, 
and their personal and economic security. Some of this work is almost spiritual (Mark 
2001). 
Effective communications tactics allowed the Envision Utah staff to engage Utah 
citizens. One of the first steps taken by Envision Utah was to perform a values 
framework study, which offered insight into the widely-held family values, as well as 
negative perceptions about population density. Envision Utah appealed to these values 
by emphasizing the impacts that growth could have on the Utah that will be there for 
the children and grandchildren of current residents. By concentrating on issues that 
concerned most Utahans, such as the economy and quality of life for the next 
generation, Envision Utah gained broader support for its goals and strategies. Through 
a gradual process, Utah residents are becoming aware of the dire housing situation 
their children will face under the status quo development scenario and this is 
prompting them to consider alternatives. Without its excellent communications 
tactics, Envision Utah probably would have encountered more political opposition 
and greater difficulty in attracting funding at the level it needed. 
Envision Utah succeeded because it hired experienced communications profession-
als and conducted polling, focus groups, and other pubic opinion research to shape its 
message and generate media hooks. Envision Utah staff figured out all the key mes-
sages, but then hired outside people to design ads and provide imagery. Its staff also 
worked hard from the very beginning to nurture relationships with media leaders in 
the region. Several publishers and television managers served on the Envision Utah 
steering committee And the staff included media managers and owners in every meet-
ing and kept them informed. 
Communications skills also can allow smart growth organizations to build their 
credibility and policy access. Local and state leaders perceive the smart growth organ-
izations that the Surdna Foundation funded as having power, authority, and the abili-
ty to make a difference. These organizations have leveraged these perceptions through 
concerted communications efforts. New Jersey Future systematically and effectively 
used communications to enhance its stature and ability to influence policy. The greater 
part of the New Jersey Future case study is a model for effective communications. New 
Jersey Future brought an experienced communications professional on staff. As a 
result, its public language was sharp, focused, and easily understood by reporters, 
political leaders, and the public. New Jersey Future was able to become the primary 
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source for state and local political leaders and reporters seeking the ideas on growth 
(Mark 2001). 
New Mexico organizations did not dedicate the same level of resources to values-
based research as the organizations in New Jersey and Utah, but they were well aware 
of the need to develop messages that hit peoples’ core concerns. Although it was not 
directly part of the Surdna Initiative, some local observers believe that Albuquerque 
Interfaith, the grassroots organization that was part of the campaign to adopt 
Albuquerque’s Planned Growth Strategy, made the greatest contribution to adoption 
of the Strategy by connecting it to continued funding of local governmental services 
and sufficient school facilities to educate young people. In this way, Albuquerque 
Interfaith won the support of the Albuquerque Public School Board and many parents 
Colombo 2004). 
Most smart growth advocates still don’t have the communication professionals and 
tools they need. Investment in top-of-the-line communications often is seen as a cost-
ly frill by advocates and their funders. Without the means to test potential messages, 
advocates must guess at which messages will work, making it hard for them to connect 
to new communities and new constituencies and capture their support for smarter 
growth (Mark 2001). 
Volunteer Engagement Skills 
Smart growth organizations can augment their impact by empowering others to carry 
the smart growth message. Envision Utah has effectively recruited aides and opinion 
leaders to assist in this process. For example, the 100 business and community leaders 
who made up the group’s multi-stakeholder public-private partnership, and the 40 
leaders who comprise the Envision Utah Steering Committee, all are boosters for the 
plan and sources of ideas for how to improve the process. To keep volunteer leaders 
engaged, the Envision Utah executive director’s philosophy has been to support and 
recognize volunteers while keeping a low profile for staff. 
Conflict Resolution Skills 
Smart growth organizations can be valued brokers of compromise. When transferable 
development rights legislation was pulled from a final vote in 2003, New Jersey Future 
called in technical experts on transferable development rights from three states to help 
devise a solution that would address the concerns voiced by farmers and others about 
the proposal. Envision Utah has played a similar role many times in Utah, including in 
finding ways to reduce criticism of the region’s 2030 transportation plan. 
Coalition Building Skills 
There are few examples of success in advancing a smart growth agenda where there has 
not been a broad coalition, including business, community, and government leader-
ship. The more people who are in the tent, the fewer there are outside it to subvert the 
process. Smart growth organizations need to be skilled coalition builders and sustain-
ers. They need to be able to recruit and help members to define a clear purpose and 
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rules for working together. The experience in New Mexico also demonstrates how 
important it is to reassess purpose and rules on a regular basis to ensure that coalitions 
don’t lose their way as the external context for their work and their leadership change. 
Leadership changes at 1000 Friends of New Mexico contributed to loss of clear direc-
tion for the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future. Although the Coalition con-
tinued to play a useful role, it was hampered by the lack of clarity about its purpose 
and the rules of membership. 
Expertise in Addressing Issues of Race and Class 
Issues of race and class are at the root of work on smart growth, and increasing atten-
tion is devoted to them, but there is little expertise or experience within many smart 
growth organizations. Some smart growth agendas integrate issues of equity in terms 
of affordable housing and urban reinvestment, but success in engaging with commu-
nities of color has been limited. For example, the term “density” cannot be used in 
most states for fear of public backlash, but little attention is being paid to what is at the 
root of this backlash and strategies that might be used to overcome it. Race and class 
are the “silent” issues in smart growth work and the issues with the greatest potential 
for blocking progress in both urban and rural states. 
Among the four Initiative projects, the work done by the New Jersey Regional 
Coalition represents a big step in the right direction on race issues. The New Mexico 
groups have made some progress in this area, but in all cases more work could be done 
to address issues of race and class and engage a wider range of communities and 
classes. Efforts along these lines can go a long way to achieving long-term success, but 
it takes additional support, training, sensitivity, and most of all, leadership of people 
of color, to make it work (Mark 2001). 
policy agendas that advance smart growth 
Differences in culture, challenges and opportunities, and capacities of smart growth 
players have significant impacts on what strategies will work and what outcomes are 
achievable in various states (Mark 2001). While growth pressures are a driving force in 
New Jersey, water is the compelling issue in New Mexico. While the values of the 
Church of the Latter Day Saints guide policy in Utah and, to a lesser degree, other 
western states, this is not so in the East. In 2002, 1000 Friends of New Mexico saw its 
opportunities to effect change dramatically improve with the election of a new gover-
nor. In the same election year, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation saw its prospects to 
influence policy diminish, forcing it to make changes in its strategy. 
Variability in priorities and circumstances are what make it hard to define an entire 
strategy that would be replicable from one state to another. Peter Calthorpe of 
Calthorpe Associates in Utah considers Envision Utah’s bottom-up approach the most 
transferable effort he has seen because Envision Utah’s strategy is a process, rather than 
a set of principles or policies. Using the same process, states can arrive at very differ-
ent policies and outcomes (Van Gorp 2003). 
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Still, there is evidence from the case studies to suggest that state policy frameworks 
for smart growth, such as the Maryland state growth law, are also replicable when the 
conditions are right. The Maryland smart growth law, a top-down approach, is credit-
ed with shifting the policy landscape in Maryland. Various studies have found that a 
strong state framework is a positive factor in encouraging local governments to adopt 
smart growth plans and ordinances. As a result, this approach has gained new adher-
ents. Utah has adopted legislation with many similar features to the Maryland law. And 
Governor Richardson of New Mexico has met with Governor Glendening of Maryland 
to discuss how this approach might work in New Mexico. 
Smart growth advocates debate the effective balance between the top-down 
approach, such as government-driven method in Maryland, and the bottom-up 
approach, as employed in Utah. The optimal balance point surely varies from place to 
place. For instance, in staunchly conservative states, top-down frameworks are not 
likely to succeed. Even when there is a solid state policy framework in place, effective 
implementation will require the public buy-in and local understanding that a bottom-
up process can engender. 
Whatever the approach, a thorough review of the four Initiative projects demon-
strates significant overlap in the smart growth activities supported. Building on 
Envision Utah’s 32 individual strategies to realize the Quality Growth Strategy, we list 
these activities below, most of which are applicable across states and regions. The 
examples of the detailed policies that flow from these activities could easily comprise 
a monograph unto themselves, so we do not attempt to provide them here. 
Activities to Promote Smart Growth Strategies 
Development 
Foster and promote walkable development where feasible; 
Encourage transit-oriented development; 
Promote safe routes to school, transit, etc.; 
Endorse the creation of a network of bikeways and trails, especially commuter 
trails linking daytime destinations; 
Support mixed use and other zoning amendments. 
Population 
Promote density bonuses to developers to encourage the development of 
affordable housing; 
Provide information regarding developer incentives and tax breaks for devel-
opment of affordable and mixed-income housing; 
Create local housing trust funds to develop and maintain affordable housing; 
Encourage cooperative region-wide “fair share” housing policies; 
Help to develop a program of incentives to local governments to create and 
implement plans for affordable and mixed-income housing; 
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Devise affordable housing requirements for new development. 
Transportation 
Promote the building of a region-wide transit system to make transit more 
convenient and reliable; 
Work to increase funding for transit service; 
Advance tele-commuting; 
Encourage job locations that include retail and services in a walkable config-
uration; 
Support the addition of carpool lanes and promote incentives for their use; 
Endorse reversible lanes to reduce peak hour congestion and take advantage 
of unused road capacity. 
Policy 
Promote tax incentives for reuse of currently developed areas; 
Help to provide incentives for downtown revitalization; 
Craft and implement Smart Codes to encourage building rehabilitation; 
Establish Historical Preservation Tax Credit Programs; 
Promote county-level development capacity analyses; 
Advocate clean up and reuse of brownfields sites; 
Provide predictability in decision-making for both conservation and devel-
opment; 
Offer flexible funds and resources to assist communities that have good revi-
talization programs to invest in streetscape improvements, bike lanes, and 
pedestrian facilities. 
Land Conservation 
Support the establishment of transfer of development rights programs to 
promote protection of open spaces and to maintain quality of life; 
Support the protection of sensitive lands; 
Support land conservation ordinances to protect agricultural and open space 
land; 
Promote use of conservation easements to preserve critical land and organize 
these areas into a regional network to the extent possible; 
Pursue public land trades to create more private developable land, preserve 
critical lands and watersheds, and protect sensitive lands from development; 
Support tax measures for open space acquisition. 
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45 Infill: development that takes 
advantage of land availability 
closer to urban centers. 
Water 
Advocate restructuring of water bills to encourage conservation; 
Support statewide water management policies; 
Provide education regarding low-irrigation landscaping, drought resistant 
plants, and low water-use appliances; 
Promote the use of grey water and secondary water systems; 
Encourage local and regional government water conservation and drought 
management planning; 
Propose restrictions on wells in critical management areas; 
Advance balanced water planning. 
Planning 
Encourage inter-jurisdictional cooperation; 
Promote local master plans and zoning ordinances that include walkable 
development and preservation of open space; 
Provide incentives to encourage communities to comply with planning 
requirements; 
Advance comprehensive plan enforcement; 
Support impact fees; 
Advocate concurrency requirements; 
Provide technical assistance to communities in drafting their plans and regu-
lations. 
Legislation 
Explore how to revise the tax structure to promote better development decisions; 
Advocate restricting state spending for infrastructure to locally designated 
growth areas called “priority funding areas;” 
Propose use of the state budget to encourage; 
o renovation, preservation, and infill;45 
o transportation-related improvements around rail transit stations; 
o voluntary cleanup of brownfields; 
o small businesses and job creation in revitalization areas; 
o affordable housing. 
Advance incentives for development projects in key locations within qualified 
growth areas; 
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Facilitate the establishment of smart growth-related performance standards 
and criteria for state agencies; 
Help to revise the utility regulatory structure to reward reinvestment in exist-
ing communities and increase the costs for new infrastructure in greenfield 
areas; 
Support state “Fix it First” policies. 
process steps that advance smart growth 
The experiences of the four Surdna Initiative states suggest that there are specific 
process steps that help to advance smart growth. These include extensive outreach to 
opinion leaders; visioning processes embedded in broader stakeholder engagement 
processes; public relations to raise awareness, involvement, and expectations; building 
broad coalitions and partnerships; strategic use of reports and research; support for 
demonstration projects and developers trying to build smart growth projects; educa-
tion efforts for public officials and planners; smart growth report cards; help for local 
governments to defend planning and zoning decisions; and litigation to stop the worst 
projects. 
Extensive Outreach to Opinion Leaders 
The time New Jersey Future spent talking to opinion leaders and polling the public 
helped to define the group’s legislative agenda and its campaign to raise smart growth 
issues in the New Jersey gubernatorial election. Extensive outreach to local and state 
leaders helped in building support, identifying winnable policies and strategies, and 
garnered suggestions on how to help policymakers advance good policies. New Jersey 
Future complemented one-on-one interviews with periodic polling to demonstrate 
public support, to identify how to talk about issues, and to gauge changes in public 
opinion. 
Envision Utah went through an even more extensive discovery process to find the 
players who could carry quality growth forward and the strategies that would be effec-
tive in Utah. It conducted 150 interviews of community leaders before it invited peo-
ple to serve on its Leadership Council. It asked questions such as: 
How do you feel about growth?  
What do you think should be done about it?  
Is it a good idea to create a process to deal with growth?  
Would you be involved?  
These interviews were essential both for providing direction as to how the process 
should go forward and in determining which stakeholders to engage. 
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Focus Groups, Polls, and Surveys 
Smart growth organizations in all of the regions used focus groups and polls to under-
stand concerns and demonstrate support. 
Envision Utah conducted a poll that showed that Utahans were anxious about 
future growth. It also conducted several surveys to engage the public. In one 
case, respondents were asked to rank scenarios and to indicate what they felt 
was the most significant challenge currently facing the region. This was 
instrumental in informing the group’s strategy. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership conducted a poll that showed two-thirds 
public support for an affordable housing requirement for new development 
and even higher public support for other measures. 
1,000 Friends of New Mexico sponsored focus groups in two parts of the state 
to improve the Coalition’s sense of what New Mexicans were concerned 
about. It then followed these focus groups with a statewide poll, which 
demonstrated that people cared about the issues in its policy guide. 
New Jersey Future commissioned one of the largest voter opinion polls ever 
conducted in the United States. It revealed that eight out of 10 New Jersey vot-
ers believed the state was running out of land, and 75 percent said the state 
should give spending priority to existing communities over new development. 
A Visioning Process 
In Utah, once-skeptical political leaders say that participating in visioning exercises in 
their communities is what helped to change their thinking about growth. The vision-
ing processes provided a “safe haven” to learn and debate options without fear of pub-
lic or political embarrassment. According to Peter Calthorpe, Envision Utah’s game-
based approach to visioning allowed participants to begin to look at the issues holisti-
cally and see the outcomes of their decisions. Envision Utah’s game-based process was 
effective at multiple levels – from neighborhood to region (Van Gorp 2004). 
In both Utah and Maryland, the community visioning processes also greatly 
informed smart growth organizations about the core values of their target audiences. 
The incorporation of visioning processes and focus groups is much more effective 
than polling alone in helping smart growth organizations to understand the language 
community residents use to talk about growth issues, the values that they express, and 
their hopes and fears (Mark 2001). 
Embedding the Visioning Process in a Broader Stakeholder Engagement Process 
Many regions have undertaken visioning processes that have resulted in exciting 
reports that sit on the shelf. A comparison of the visioning processes in Utah and 
Maryland suggests that such processes have a better chance of being implemented 
when they are part of a much larger and on-going process of community engagement 
and are undertaken with a spirit of inclusion. 
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As previously described, the Envision Utah process began with 150 interviews of 
key leaders in the region to figure out who cared most about quality growth and 
should be invited to lead the process. It also conducted research early on the values of 
people of the region. In this way, Envision Utah was able to tap into a sense of urgency 
within the business community and galvanize business support in part because of 
crushing growth pressures. 
Baltimore Vision 2030 did not take these steps in selecting its steering committee, 
designing its process, or in framing the challenges for the public. As a result, 
Baltimore’s business elite did not take ownership of the Vision 2030 process. With 
much smaller growth pressures in Baltimore, perhaps growth issues should not have 
been the organizing theme. 
Envision Utah was led by an even-handed public interest group representative of 
local business, civic, and government interests. It changed the political dynamic by 
creating an environment where local officials could act under cover. Envision Utah 
also offered local public officials help in overcoming their political reasons for not 
supporting quality growth. In Baltimore, the region's chief local elected officials 
sponsored the effort on their own and had much less political cover. This does not 
signify that government-led efforts do not work. As mentioned earlier, the Portland 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) played the convener role successfully, as 
have several other MPOs, but it requires some trial and error experience to master. 
Envision Utah was able to negotiate agreements across a broad set of stakeholders. 
In Baltimore, public officials held veto power over the Baltimore Vision 2030 process. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership tried to use maps similar to those employed by 
Envision Utah to present options for growth. Local government officials, who were 
worried about how the maps might affect their master plans, vetoed them. The con-
trol that elected officials had over the process politicized it and constrained the cre-
ativity, boldness, and excitement. 
While producing scenarios with the community is a key part of a visioning 
process, it is not a substitute for full stakeholder engagement. In Baltimore, there was 
heavy emphasis on the scenarios, and there was very little outreach or publicity. 
Envision Utah conducted a tireless education effort for legislators, public officials, the 
business sector, media, and the public. It began with a region-wide visioning process, 
and then used the same ploy for sub-regional and community processes. Every 
process relied on: 
governance structures (diverse steering committees representative of leader-
ship in the region); 
excellent tools for analysis; 
public engagement in choosing strategies (through design workshops); 
publicity; 
work with local officials early and often to encourage and support imple-
mentation. 
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Envision Utah carefully and consistently used media to build expectations and 
engage the public at every step. In Baltimore there was no such effort. Baltimore 
Vision 2030 had little publicity and public participation was weak. 
The funding arrangement in Baltimore allowed the visioning process to proceed 
without strong buy in from key stakeholders. The MPO resources that went into 
Vision 2030 were minimal. Local governments received a federal grant to pay for most 
of the process and staffed it with consultants. The only other funds were those BRP 
raised for the modeling work and extra community meetings. In Utah, the business 
community and local governments all contributed to cover some part of the costs of 
Envision Utah. 
In both Utah and Maryland, local governments were wary of state mandates and 
did not want the state to dictate local planning, but Envision Utah found a way to tap 
state help, while Baltimore Vision 2030 did not. In Maryland, the local elected officials 
who led the process did not want the State involved in any way. Both the State Office 
of Smart Growth and the State Department of Transportation had smart, experi-
enced professionals who offered assistance. Local governments turned them down. In 
Utah, the state was very helpful to the visioning process, providing in-kind contribu-
tions and other support. It seems likely that in its capacity as a third party, Envision 
Utah allowed the Utah governor to be helpful without raising concerns among local 
governments. 
Envision Utah has found that it takes a high level of community involvement to 
motivate communities to embrace the plans developed and to make changes to their 
local codes, ordinances, and general plans to ensure successful implementation. The 
Baltimore Regional Partnership and its founders agree with this assessment. They 
have concluded that while modeling and meetings are catalytic tools, successful 
visioning processes prioritize engaging leaders and the public and finding solutions 
to political problems. Unless a process builds strong civic leadership and public sup-
port, it won’t change the political context and it probably won’t be implemented. 
Public Relations to Raise Awareness and Increase Expectations 
Envision Utah constantly looks for new media “hooks” to garner media attention and 
to keep the public engaged and excited about the Quality Growth Strategy. Envision 
Utah discovered that local media outlets were willing to contribute over $1 million in 
air time in the month of January each year, when other advertising slowed. The group 
timed annual media campaigns for the beginning of each year to take advantage of this 
resource. Local newspapers also agreed to distribute surveys, insert Envision Utah 
pieces, and provide reports to the public. Envision Utah used this news coverage and 
targeted advertising 
to keep the public up-to-date on each step of the process; 
to inform them of community meetings and opportunities for public partic-
ipation; 
to give them opportunities to give input via surveys. 
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New Jersey Future made a shrewd decision when it decided to use the 2001 guber-
natorial and legislative elections with its allies to engage policymakers and the public 
in a discussion of remedies to sprawl and disinvestment. It employed a successful pub-
lic relations strategy to make smart growth an issue in the New Jersey gubernatorial 
election. The group’s press strategy, which is described in the case study, convinced the 
gubernatorial candidates that smart growth was important. The frequent positive 
press coverage New Jersey Future obtained for its policy ideas helped to educate the 
public and made it easier for the governor and legislators to sign on (Mark 2001). 
1,000 Friends of New Mexico and the Smart Growth Coalition in New Mexico used 
a similar strategy to elevate smart growth issues in New Mexico’s gubernatorial race. 
They launched an effective campaign to get gubernatorial candidates to take positions 
and make commitments on smart growth issues, which also increased the visibility of 
these issues to the public. 
Broad Coalitions and Partnerships 
In all four of the Surdna Initiative states, broad-based support was an essential com-
ponent. The Baltimore Regional Partnership has a relatively broad base of founders 
and supporters, including environmental, equity, and housing advocates, as well as 
relationships it has cultivated with local officials in many counties in the Baltimore 
region and with business leaders. Observers say that this broad support base has been 
key to the Partnership’s effectiveness with the state legislature on housing and trans-
portation issues, including the legislature’s decision to defend the Smart Growth Areas 
Act, which Governor Ehrlich did not support. The new business-led Baltimore Transit 
Alliance and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (a member of the 
Partnership) are working together to facilitate joint transportation and land use plan-
ning as part of the first segment of the Baltimore Regional Rail Plan. A recent 
Maryland Public Interest Research Group report that contained recommendations on 
transit-oriented development was embraced by both state transportation and 
Baltimore City planning officials. 
Observers believe that the New Mexico Smart Growth Coalition increased the cred-
ibility and strength of calls for new smart growth policies by representing all the parts 
of the state and diverse issues. Although the New Mexico Coalition never included the 
business community, as originally planned, and did not achieve its land use policy 
goals, it had many important successes in changing state policy within its five year 
timeline. In addition, the Coalition’s efforts to educate gubernatorial candidates about 
growth issues and to secure commitments from Governor Richardson were successful. 
The experiences in all four states indicate that having the support of business lead-
ers, in particular, improves credibility, political access, and capacity to provide the 
political cover public officials need to make hard decisions. In Baltimore, the Surdna 
grantees repeatedly needed the support of powerful private sector alliances or private 
sector action. This strong business support is the reason why efforts to promote fund-
ing for a comprehensive regional rail system in Baltimore are still alive. Developers also 
have a great deal of influence on political and community leaders, on the behavior and 
policies of financial institutions, and on the media. When they build the first projects 
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that demonstrate smart growth principles, the conversation in a community changes. 
It is imperative that advocates keep identifying, educating, and most of all supporting 
developers who want to do it right (Mark 2001). 
Support from faith organizations can be equally important. This should not be sur-
prising, given how values-laden smart growth work is. In Utah, Peter Calthorpe feels 
that the support of individual church leaders and of church-owned KSL-TV for the 
Envision Utah process was extremely important in the acceptance and success of the 
group’s efforts (Van Gorp 2003). In New Mexico, faith-based groups played a critical 
role in building the grassroots support that Albuquerque’s elected officials needed to 
support the Planned Growth Strategy. Faith-based organizations also played an 
important role in building the urban-suburban coalition described in the New Jersey 
story. Isles spent much of its energy on reaching out to leaders in the older suburbs, 
where faith-based institutions were especially important partners because there were 
few community based organizations. 
Public leaders also play an important role. Envision Utah, the Baltimore Regional 
Partnership, and 1000 Friends of New Mexico and other New Mexico organizations, 
invested a great deal of time in reaching out to local public officials and making them 
partners in smart growth efforts. Envision Utah, New Jersey Future, and the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation all also benefited from good relationships with and sup-
port from their governors. 
Advocacy-based coalitions need to build a broad grassroots base. The lack of such 
a base has been a barrier to smart growth policies in New Jersey, especially on tax 
reform. New Jersey Future had the ear of state leaders in the legislature and State agen-
cies, but it didn’t have grassroots clout, which is why it helped Isles to form its 
statewide coalition. 
The cost of not reaching out to every leader with an interest in growth issues can be 
high. Envision Utah learned early that leaving out even just a few leaders could derail 
plans. As a result, Envision Utah made it standard practice to reach out to every leader 
who could potentially hinder the Quality Growth Strategy, understand his or her con-
cerns, and try to address them. Because of its role as an even-handed convener, 
Envision Utah looked for the points of agreement and avoided controversial situa-
tions. Smart growth organizations that are advocates still need to try to address the 
concerns of those who oppose them. If they cannot, they need to find ways to neu-
tralize the opposition. 
Broad-based coalitions need to be sustained even when policy goals are achieved. 
The coalition that helped make the Planned Growth Strategy in Albuquerque possible 
dissolved once the plan was adopted. According to local leaders, this allowed the mayor 
to try to undermine implementation. Albuquerque Interfaith is trying build a strong 
and on-going membership that can ensure further progress if it attracts the founda-
tion support to do so. (Colombo 2004) 
Building clear goals and a common agenda for a broadly-based smart growth coali-
tion is important, very difficult work. When there was a clear threat, the New Mexico 
Coalition for a Livable Future shined. In general, however, the New Mexico Coalition 
struggled to define its purpose and the role of each member in achieving this purpose. 
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This has been easier in Utah, because Envision Utah built a common vision and set of 
strategies for how to achieve the vision. 
The New Mexico experience also demonstrates how important it is to clearly delin-
eate the rules for membership in and governance of a coalition. At least in part, the 
New Mexico Coalition fell to pieces because members became frustrated with the rela-
tionship with 1000 Friends of New Mexico, the lack of leadership (during the last 
year), and the leadership of the executive committee, which was self-appointed with-
out any process for elections. The Coalition should have established a voting process 
for decisions and a selection mechanism for the executive committee, including the 
means to replace members and recruit and engage new people. To be sustainable, the 
Coalition also needed the funding and staff time that would have come from the full 
support of its members. 
Addressing Race and Class Issues in Coalition Building 
There is much talk about the importance of integrating urban and suburban planning 
and promoting regional equity in order to achieve smart growth, but there are few suc-
cess stories. While it is a bit soon to draw conclusions about the outcomes of the Isles 
effort to build a grassroots urban-suburban coalition for smart growth and regional 
equity in New Jersey, the Isles staff believes that there are a some key lessons to draw 
from its successful experience organizing its coalition. 
Leaders of the effort to build a grassroots urban-suburban coalition for smart 
growth and regional equity cannot be wedded to a traditional approach to com-
munity or urban development. Isles went through a fundamental change in its 
approach to community development as a first step in building its urban-sub-
urban coalition, as described in the case study. It was open to such change, as 
was the New Jersey Public Policy Research Institute, its partner, which decid-
ed it would no longer focus solely on urban issues. 
Urban-suburban coalition building efforts need both an intellectual base for 
talking about regions, disparity, racism, and justice and a way to capture data to 
help people understand how they are impacted by regional conditions. In New 
Jersey, Myron Orfield and other leading thinkers provided the intellectual 
base. New Jersey Future and Myron Orfield provided the research support. 
New technologies enabled mapping of data in a way that was easily under-
standable. Integration of GIS and other graphics made the maps come alive, 
which was key in engaging stakeholders. But it is important to note that good 
information is best used as a tool for organizing. Many other regions have 
produced similar maps without making progress to change the conditions 
that created them. Isles used the maps as the impetus for an aggressive grass-
roots organizing strategy. 
Social and racial justice must be addressed. Because these topics are sensitive, 
they are often avoided. However, there are effective ways to broach this nec-
essary dialogue. Isles began to build its coalition by pulling together a diverse 
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group of people with important perspectives on social and racial justice to 
oversee the analysis of the region and ensure there would be broad buy-in to 
the analysis. This organizing group felt comfortable confronting issues of race 
and helping to integrate race into the development analysis. 
Building an urban-suburban coalition requires skilled organizers who are not 
stuck in a conventional or local organizing culture. Further, these organizers 
should be capable of bringing a diverse range of people together across a 
region. Still, the core approach is the same as conventional organizing: listen-
ing to leaders from throughout the community, allowing those leaders to edu-
cate the coalition rather than the coalition educating them, and helping those 
leaders to address problems they face in their communities. The coalition that 
Isles helped to create has reached out to thousands of people. To facilitate 
statewide coordination, Isles helped create regional coalitions for the north-
ern, central, and southern parts of the state. 
Organizing takes time. It took three years for Isles to build a statewide coalition that 
was ready for a public presence. This time was dedicated to extensive outreach, capac-
ity building, joint exploration of the issues, and developing the rules and goals for the 
coalition. Now the Coalition is reaching beyond meetings and dialogue to set forth an 
annual legislative agenda for both regional and state policy. Taking the necessary time 
to do the job right is likely to extend well beyond the capacity of the philanthropic 
community. In order for a coalition to be sustainable, its members must perceive its 
work as sufficiently aligned with their own interests to justify supplying funds to cover 
a substantial part of the budget (the three New Jersey Coalition affiliates are starting 
to talk about membership fees for this purpose). 
Strategic Reports and Research 
The experience in both New Jersey and Maryland has been that polished and profes-
sional reports can have significant media and policy impacts. In both states Surdna 
grantees produced and publicized glossy, professional, well-researched reports that 
recommended improvements in state smart growth policies. Both reports – New 
Jersey Future’sAchieving Genuine Prosperity: 20 Ways to Move New Jersey Toward a Just, 
Healthy, and Prosperous Future and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 1000 Friends 
of Maryland’s Making Smart Growth Smarter: Recommendations for Increasing the 
Effectiveness of Smart Growth and for Expanding its Application Through New Initiatives 
– were specifically mentioned by allies and skeptics alike. These reports, which had 
long shelf-lives, were used often by policymakers. Each was effective because it was pol-
ished and carefully packaged for a target audience (Mark 2001). 
New Jersey Future has undertaken regular, in-depth research reports on timely leg-
islative and policy issues to bolster its case, provide well-supported recommendations 
to candidates, and provide hooks for media coverage. Smart growth organizations in 
all of the other states have relied similarly on research reports to help make the case for 
policies. For example, at a transit meeting for business and civic leaders, the Baltimore 
Regional Partnership released a report that showed that nearly half the region’s pro-
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jected job growth by 2025 and one-fifth of its projected household growth could be 
accommodated along the new system’s lines, which was exactly in line with existing 
local plans for redevelopment. 
Decision Support Tools 
Tools to support new decisions played important roles in three of the four Initiative 
states. The Baltimore Regional Partnership convinced the Coordinating Committee 
for Vision 2030 to include more rigorous analysis of the growth and transportation 
options for the Baltimore region, as had been done by Envision Utah. It felt that this 
analysis was critical to enabling the public to fully consider alternative growth scenar-
ios. In New Jersey, Isles also felt that an important part of its effort to collect data was 
to use GIS capability to communicate growth patterns to communities. Envision Utah 
also used state-of-the-art modeling and visualizing tools in creating its quality growth 
scenarios. Now Envision Utah is working on a legally defensible model of growth 
impacts that is more sensitive to the land use changes that take place around transit 
stations. 
Support for Demonstration Projects and Developers Trying to Build 
Smart Growth Projects 
Demonstration projects remain the most powerful tool in the smart growth toolbox. 
Neither political leaders nor the public can grasp the difference between a good devel-
opment and a bad one until they see models of good ones. A creative in-fill project or 
a well-designed transit station can go a long way in garnering enthusiasm for doing 
things differently (Mark 2001). In Utah, Envision Utah has been very savvy about 
investing in demonstration projects for exactly this reason (Mark 2001). 
“Smart” developers often need help getting these first developments built. They 
must first convince neighborhoods, planning commissions, and traditional environ-
mentalists to accept something new. Both Envision Utah and the Santa Fe office of 
1000 Friends of New Mexico have learned to work with and reward these developers. 
New Jersey Future has also developed relationships with supportive developers and 
builders through its awards process and other outreach (Mark 2001). 
The experiences in both Utah and New Jersey demonstrated that awards for good 
projects can be a helpful tool. In both states, Smart Growth Awards have provided the 
examples and recognition people need. They also offer a way to keep track of changes 
in the quantity and quality of good projects. It was part of the Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation’s original strategy to develop a business group to highlight good projects 
in Maryland. This was not possible in the end, but the group still believes it is an 
important activity. 
Systematic Education Efforts For Public Officials and Planners 
People act when they have both the desire and the capacity. Lack of capacity is a major 
barrier to implementation of smart growth policies. Local governments need a lot 
more training, tools, and technical assistance than usually are available. Envision Utah 
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has been revolutionary in its engagement with local officials around model plans, 
demonstration projects, tools, training, and technical assistance. Envision Utah’s tool-
box, training seminars, and technical assistance are helping local governments to 
implement the goals of the Quality Growth Strategy. Over 1000 local officials have 
been trained to use its toolbox through all day and three-hour seminars. Because local 
planners designed the toolbox, other planners are more likely to use it. 
In addition to local elected officials and planners, fire marshals and other code 
enforcers are key players to educate. They can make or break a project and they tend 
to not be engaged in education about new designs, new technologies, and new 
approaches to development. Envision Utah has developed a training module for fire 
officials to learn from colleagues in other states and cities that includes information on 
things such as how the narrow streets sometimes called for in smart growth work can 
be just as safe and accessible for emergency equipment as traditional designs (Mark 
2001). 
New Jersey Future is starting to provide education tools for local officials and the 
public through its Smart Growth Gateway. It is collaborating with Rutgers, the 
American Planning Association, the state, and others to write a curriculum and offer 
classes for local planning board members. When transferable development rights leg-
islation passed in New Jersey in early 2004, New Jersey Future immediately began to 
develop models and guides and explore a joint effort to assist communities to adopt 
transferable development rights. 
The Baltimore Regional Partnership is educating public officials and planners 
about transit and transit-oriented development strategies. Transit and transit-orient-
ed development are also playing important transformative roles in Salt Lake City, 
Albuquerque, and Baltimore. Both the Citizens Planning and Housing Association in 
Baltimore and Envision Utah have developed transit-oriented development toolkits 
and training sessions. All of the new transit lines under development across the coun-
try – almost every major metropolitan area has one – provide an education opportu-
nity for smarter growth that should not be missed. The opportunity is especially good 
because the criteria for selection for federal funding for new transit lines includes land 
use planning around stations. 
Smart Growth Report Cards 
Surdna Foundation grantees tried a number of different approaches to promote the 
use of smart growth report cards to increase accountability. Groups in both Maryland 
and New Jersey produced report cards on implementation of existing smart growth 
laws, and in both cases these report cards were well-received and broadly cited. 
Observers believe that advocates, such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, played a 
valuable role in Maryland by reporting on the progress of the Department of 
Transportation, Department of Environment, and Department of Housing and 
Community Development. 
Both the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and New Jersey Future also created templates 
for county and local government report cards, but few grassroots groups showed any 
interest in completing county scorecards. In contrast, New Jersey Future found that the 
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three tests it created for evaluating smart growth legislation and policy were well-
received. New Jersey Future also found that grassroots groups and media outlets were 
interested in project scorecards. It seems that people are often concerned about proj-
ects long before they are concerned about policy. 
Scoring smart growth projects can also be important because there are a growing 
number of instances of “green scamming” by developers hoping to ride the smart 
growth bandwagon. In many states, developers are marketing “smart” developments 
and “walkable” communities that are not actually in line with smart growth strategies 
(Mark 2001). 
Help for Local Governments to Defend Planning and Zoning Decisions 
Municipalities need help defending smart growth planning and zoning decisions. New 
Jersey Future has tried to make the State Plan defensible for municipal planning by 
submitting amicus briefs defending municipalities’ latitude to follow it. The Western 
Environmental Law Center has gone further in New Mexico, helping small rural 
communities to write zoning ordinances and defend them. Rural counties and 
municipalities, in particular, often lack the legal and technical expertise and funds to 
draft, implement, and enforce land use and subdivision regulations (even though they 
have the power). Legal counsel and planning staff are overwhelmed and often lack 
necessary expertise in land use law. The Western Environmental Law Center’s 
“community first” approach to environmental law works particularly well in the 
traditional communities of northern New Mexico, which historically have been hostile 
to environmental activism. With this in mind, the Law Center does not impose an 
agenda on its clients, but, rather, assists traditional communities in developing their 
own approaches to protection (Mark 2001). 
Litigation to Stop the Worst Projects 
New road projects can set the course for growth in a region for decades into the future. 
Many U.S. road projects are implemented in large part due to inertia – once they are 
in motion within the bureaucracy, they are hard to stop. Litigation to slow the most 
harmful projects buys time to demonstrate the demand for alternative types of devel-
opment and the benefits to regions of alternative growth patterns. It also creates an 
incentive for Departments of Transportation to rethink long-range plans. 
Litigation is more effective when it is part of a broader strategy to achieve policy 
changes and fund alternative projects. Following a decade of advocacy against road 
projects, the Tri-State Transportation Campaign has seen a significant shift in the New 
Jersey Department of Transportation’s decision-making about key projects. The 
Department converted one route extension near the Jersey Shore into construction of 
a 20-mile bike and pedestrian path. It scrapped a proposed Bypass east of Princeton in 
favor of a small connector road and improvements to local intersections. And, in sev-
eral counties, the Department announced plans to work directly with municipal and 
civic leaders to develop integrated land use and transportation plans to avoid “the cycle 
of growth and widening that has plagued one of the nation’s most congested states.” 
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lessons for the surdna foundation and philanthropy 
In retrospect, the Surdna Foundation’s opening assumptions were reasonable. The 
selection process worked well to identify places that would generally yield good results. 
The duration, scale, and learning components of the Initiative also allowed for real 
value to be added to the work. But there is room for improvement in shaping future 
Initiatives. In hindsight, Surdna thinks that more time and money invested in design-
ing the Initiative and throughout the process could have yielded greater clarity of pur-
pose, deeper learning and, arguably, stronger results. 
Strengths of the Surdna Foundation Smart Growth Initiative 
Five Year Support 
The commitment that Surdna made to fund this Initiative over a relatively long term 
was a cornerstone of the Initiative. So much of what is done in the smart growth arena 
– building relationships across sectors, informing and engaging community leaders 
and the public, developing model projects, shaping policy, building new infrastructure 
– takes years to bear fruit. Long-term funding helps to reduce uncertainty and fosters 
long-term planning both for the work and the organization. The inefficiencies of just-
in-time, hand-to-mouth fundraising are reduced and good development systems can 
be put in place. Secure funding also creates the perception of stability and solid core 
support that can help to attract other funding. 
Flexibility 
Sometimes the best laid plans don’t pan out, and opportunities can change quickly. 
The Surdna Foundation recognized the need to be flexible and was willing for grantees 
to change gears when needed. It tracked progress formally on an annual basis and 
informally on an ongoing basis. It also asked for a new proposal and work plan each 
year, but in most cases, Surdna funding amounted to general support. 
Partnership with Surdna Foundation Staff   
Foundation staff work from a unique vantage point. Staff often see what is going on 
across the country and in different fields – information that can be invaluable for 
grantees regardless of whether the work is at a national, regional, or local level. It is 
especially helpful when a program officer makes the effort to keep in touch and learn 
with grantees. Given the long timeframe of the Initiative and his extensive knowledge 
of the issues, Surdna’s program staff for the Initiative, Hooper Brooks, was able to 
develop a strong relationship with many of the grantees. Grantees reported that it was 
very helpful to have a program officer who understood the complexity of the work and 
the politics of changing institutions. The broad U.S. domestic scope of Surdna’s pro-
gram coupled with his role in developing the Funders’ Network for Smart Growth and 
Livable Communities, enabled Mr. Brooks to communicate effectively on what was 
happening in many places and with many funders. 
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Meetings 
Convening a diverse variety of players can be a powerful tool for learning and build-
ing networks. The meetings in each Initiative state turned out to be a wonderful high-
light. Two meetings a year were not seen as onerous by grantees, and often provided a 
welcome break from the day-to-day slog. Surdna considered its investment of between 
$15,000 and $25,000 in each meeting (for travel, lodging, food, meeting space, etc.) to 
be money well spent. Meeting attendance was not limited to the executive directors of 
the participating organizations and thus provided a rare opportunity for junior staff 
to meet new colleagues and learn. In this case, there was great benefit to sharing sto-
ries and lessons between groups. Over the course of the Initiative, relationships deep-
ened as did the quality of exchange. Typically, grantees in each location put extensive 
energy into planning a day of site visits, meetings with local leaders, and hosting din-
ners. Surdna staff and board learned as much as anyone else at these events and con-
tinue to be deeply appreciative of the extra effort that made them so successful. 
Technical Assistance 
The technical assistance provided throughout the Initiative was helpful to all involved. 
Making a consultant like Dick Mark available to grantees and the specialized work-
shops at the meetings were both seen as useful for building skill, thinking through the 
possible role and focus of indicators, providing glue between the groups, and facilitat-
ing knowledge transfer between the groups and Surdna – well worth the relatively 
modest expense. 
Foundation Board Members Engaged 
Surdna’s Board Committee for the Environment program participated in the selection 
and grant review process. Some Surdna trustees attended select semi-annual joint 
meetings and others accessed the issue through engagements and relationships with 
activists in their own communities – in part due to their experience with the issue at 
the board level. 
Ways to Improve Upon the Surdna Foundation Smart Growth Initiative 
More Time Upfront to Reach Outside the Grantee Community for Strategic Advice 
Surdna might have increased its impact if it had engaged help from outside sources to 
hone its strategy in each state. This could have taken many forms: 
closer coordination and consultation with place-based funders; 
an early and ongoing relationship with a consultant like Dick Mark; 
more contact with local government officials, journalists, business leaders. 
The main reason these did not happen was lack of time and staff capacity on 
Surdna’s part. There was also a sense that much could be learned by diving in to the 
grant process. Since the Initiative was launched, the Funders’ Network for Smart 
Growth has learned a great deal about how to catalyze funder/practitioner collabora-
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tions at the state and regional levels. The Growth Management Leadership Alliance has 
also taken on full-time staff and now has the capacity to provide more support to the 
field. Were Surdna to launch such an Initiative today, it would consider the possibility 
of working with these organizations as joint venture partners to deepen meeting con-
tent and possibly expand participation of other practitioners and funders. 
More Time Up Front to Help Grantees Clarify Goals and Develop Progress Indicators 
Despite the difficulty encountered in developing simple shared indicators, it would 
have been helpful to spend more time up-front (and on an ongoing basis) with 
grantees to aid them in articulating their theories of change and what they were trying 
to accomplish in the short-term and the long-run. This would have made it easier to 
track progress and adjust strategies. Just as the American Planning Association selec-
tion process was built around selected criteria, a similar joint process in each place 
would have simultaneously sharpened measurement of progress, created a tighter 
framework for joint learning, and, in a couple of instances, refined desired strategies. 
Clarity About How Joint Grantees Would Work Together 
The states where the Surdna Foundation made grants to just one or two organizations 
had an easier time making progress than those where the funds were split among many 
organizations. Funding multiple organizations together built in conflict and complex-
ity. While Surdna participated in the job of strategy development and funding alloca-
tion, it would have worked better if Surdna had convened and facilitated meetings in 
Maryland and New Mexico on an annual basis and pressed for stronger protocols 
about collaboration upfront – possibly including memorandums of understanding. 
More Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 
Few smart growth organizations have the full capacity needed to succeed. They fre-
quently need consulting support both to strengthen their organizations (fundraising, 
board development, etc.) and to improve their strategies. Many smart growth advo-
cates could benefit from and would appreciate intensive assistance on fundraising, 
strategy development, communications, mobilizing the grassroots, legislative tech-
niques, and other topics that would help them take their game to the next level. 
If funds had allowed, it would have been ideal to have consultant support to help 
the Initiative grantees, such as that provided by Dick Mark or from specialized organ-
izations, on-call for the duration of the Initiative. With sufficient time, a consultant 
along these lines would have been able to evaluate situations on-the-ground and assess 
the unique strengths and weakness of the lead organizations and individuals. This 
would have enabled the consultant to provide advice and counsel to the grantees, and 
this input would likely have been of a higher quality given the trust that might have 
been established if more time were available. 
More consultant time on the Initiative would have also helped to identify additional 
ways for the Surdna Foundation to be helpful to grantees. For example, when the 1000 
Friends of New Mexico director who was in place at the start of the Surdna Initiative 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
lessons learned from the four-state initiatve 109 
left, the consultant might have seen the need to contract a top flight organizational 
consultant in the region who could have worked more deeply with the 1000 Friends 
and the Coalition to identify the best replacement candidates. 
Tracking, Evaluation, and Communications 
In addition to providing additional technical support for the grantees, if resources 
allow, it would be helpful to dedicate consultant or staff time from the outset of the 
project to help track and evaluate the work on a rolling basis, and provide feedback to 
Surdna and grantees. In addition, rather than waiting for a summary monograph such 
as this, capturing and communicating the work and the lessons learned at regular 
intervals to an audience of funders, practitioners, and others would further extend and 
enhance the learning. There are many options for regular dissemination such as email 
listservs, blogs, newsletters, and articles. 
Tapered Funding  
Even though grantees were clear that they would not receive Surdna funding beyond 
the five years of the Surdna Foundation’s Smart Growth Initiative, some of them were 
still not prepared for its end. Further, much of the new funding that had been expected 
from other sources fell victim to the unanticipated economic downturn and changing 
foundation priorities, (although it could actually be argued that Surdna’s consistent 
level of funding over five years may have helped some groups survive these last two 
outcomes). 
While there is no ideal way to handle this situation, exit strategies need to be dis-
cussed upfront in much greater depth by all concerned. Some grantees felt that they 
might have been more proactive in replacing funding if the five-year support tapered 
off slowly, and perhaps over a longer time period, as a reminder to grantees that they 
needed to find other funding. Also, some suggested that at the back-end extra dollars 
to help groups retain outside development experts might have helped smooth the 
transition. A better process for collaboration among existing funders might also have 
yielded the benefits of combined thinking and outreach to new funding sources. 
Foundation Board Members More Deeply Engaged in Learning Along the Way 
Given the busy lives and schedules of foundation trustees, it is always difficult for them 
to find the time to be more engaged in specific grants. Given the long timeframe need-
ed for smart growth efforts to flower, it is very important to find ways to maintain 
trustee enthusiasm – helping them to understanding of the importance of the issues, 
and commitment to fund. Annual outcomes reports are not enough. In many ways, 
this is one of the biggest challenges for smart growth practitioners. It might help to 
structure an Initiative of this type around states where board members live. However, 
at the time of the Surdna Initiative’s inceptions, the issue had not sufficiently ripened 
in some of these places to offer enough traction. 
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conclusion 
Is it worth it for foundations to tackle smart growth? 
The Surdna Foundation’s staff and board definitely think so. When growth goes well, 
multiple benefits flow – environmental, economic, and social. While the gains are 
slow, there are definitely gains. Yet, given the complexity and the slow pace of change, 
it can be daunting for funders who are used to tracking change issue by issue over a 12 
to 36 month period. 
It took many years for states and regions of the United States to become as dys-
functional as they are and it is not unreasonable to think that it will take years to slow 
down and begin to reverse the damage. We are trying to change complex systems. To 
do it wisely, we need first to understand them and then develop a better sense of how 
they can evolve over time – and a way to measure that change. Smart growth organi-
zations and staffs change. Agency mindsets evolve. Trends vary. Economies shift. 
Politics and leadership change. All of that and more has happened in the Surdna 
Initiative states. But in all four places there has been progress – progress that can be 
durable. The civil sector must stay engaged and the philanthropic sector is needed to 
ensure that continuity. Not only does this entail a commitment to significant invest-
ment and long-term engagement, but to informed and strategic engagement. 
Expectations must be realistic and practical, and funding must be carefully targeted. 
Over time, as the systems that comprise bad growth begin to change, there will be big-
ger and bigger payoffs that will appeal to increasingly diverse funding agendas. 
Is a place-based initiative like Surdna’s the best way for a national funder to sup-
port the work and add value to grantee activity? 
Compared to a more traditional, grant-by-grant, responsive funding approach, Surdna 
thinks there were clear benefits for the four Initiative states. The case studies certainly 
bear this out. By providing a stable, predictable source of funding, by facilitating a 
learning exchange, by providing outside expertise and by providing a strong staff rela-
tionship, there was value-added to the quality of the work and to the outcomes. 
Clearly, more could have been done to make the Initiative more productive and more 
successful, but not without increased non-grant investment and staff time. 
Determining how much greater an investment to have made would depend on an 
assessment of how much value could be added. That is hard to judge in advance. There 
will be a point of diminishing returns. 
So what next for Surdna?  What to fund?  Where?  
Surdna is revisiting some of the questions it asked prior to the Initiative. 
What is the best way for a national funder to engage the smart growth issue? 
What priorities should a national funder adopt and support regardless of 
place and time-sensitive political and economic conditions?  
What are the next tier priorities that are more dependent on variation in 
such conditions?  
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The Initiative was clearly a rich and productive experience. Surdna is still digesting 
what to do with what it has learned. Does it now make sense to expand Surdna’s circle 
of place-based engagement (and knowledge) to catalyze or support action in new tar-
geted areas where the opportunity is ripe? Or would it make more sense to structure a 
second round engagement with the original four states? Or should Surdna step back 
and focus more on using what has been learned to improve the overall structure and 
capacity of the field through nurturing technical assistance and other kinds of inter-
mediary organizations and the work of place-based funders?  
These are questions that might be more appropriately aimed at all foundations that 
want to see smarter growth. 
What is the best path forward? 
What will it take to get there? 
What is the best role for each kind of funder?  
The last decade has seen a marked increase in smart growth activism in many 
sectors – nonprofit, business, and government. Even though it has not achieved 
“market share,” there is significant policy and on-the-ground change in a few places, 
broad public engagement underway in more places, and a marked increase in public 
understanding of the issues in many more. There is also a flourishing of networks and 
organizations that can help funders understand what has happened, what is likely to 
happen, what has been learned, and what is needed next – the Funders’ Network for 
Smart Growth and Livable Communities, Smart Growth America, and the Growth 
Management Leadership Alliance to name a few. This report tells only a few of many 
stories – stories that these and others can hopefully use as a springboard for charting 
the future. 
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